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In this dissertation, I build game-theoretic frameworks to study how new Internet-enabled 
technologies can change the strategies of firms and online platforms.  
The first chapter studies how the integration of primary and resale concert ticket platforms can 
affect consumers and musicians. Consumers can buy concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g., 
Ticketmaster) or from resale platforms (e.g., StubHub) where tickets are resold by other 
consumers. Recently, Ticketmaster has also been developing its resale business and attempting to 
control the resale market by blocking consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms. 
Legislation in many states in the US requires consumers should be able to freely resell tickets on 
any resale sites. The rationale is that Ticketmaster’s stronger pricing power will lead to increases 
in its service fees and final ticket prices, making musicians and consumers worse off. In this paper, 
we establish a game-theoretic framework and show that the opposite can happen: if some 
consumers are uncertain of whether they can attend the concert when buying tickets, the primary 
platform’s control of the resale market can lower the prices and service fees in both the primary 
and the resale markets. The musician and consumers will be better off as a result. Moreover, we 
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find that, when the primary platform controls the resale market, the presence of a small group of 
scalpers can counterintuitively reduce the final ticket prices and increase the musician’s profit and 
the consumer surplus. We also show that competition in the resale market may harm the 
consumers. Using data from Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com, we provide some suggestive 
empirical support for the theoretical predictions. 
The second chapter studies how new technologies that reduce the consumer’s search cost will 
affect online retail platforms, third-party sellers, and consumers. We show that a lower search cost 
can increase sellers’ expected profits even though it will increase price competition among sellers. 
A lower search cost always benefits the platform when it optimally adjusts its fee. When the search 
cost decreases, the platform should reduce its fee if demand elasticity increases significantly, in 
which case the platform, the sellers and the consumers can all be better off. By contrast, if the 
lowered search cost does not significantly increase demand elasticity, the platform’s optimal fee 
will increase, potentially leading to higher retail prices but making consumers and sellers worse 
off. Furthermore, when the market has a premium seller with higher base quality than non-
premium sellers, a decrease in search cost will increase non-premium sellers’ profits but has a non-
monotonic effect on the premium seller’s profit.  When consumers can filter some product 
attributes on the platform, their direct benefit from searching the unfilterable attributes is reduced 
but the expected consumer surplus will increase. 
The third chapter studies how cost transparency will impact a firm’s intertemporal pricing and 
innovation decisions. We show that cost transparency stymies the low-cost firm’s ability to 
intertemporally price-discriminate because consumers now correctly anticipate the future price 
drops and delay purchases, as it is no longer feasible to pool price with the high-cost firms, whose 
future prices drop less because of the high cost.  Thus, cost transparency will benefit the high-cost 
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firms but hurt the low-cost firms. Surprisingly, consumers can also be hurt by cost transparency if 
the firm has a high cost. However, cost transparency leads to an expected increase in both firm 
profits and consumer surplus—a win-win for both firms and consumers. This increase in expected 







Chapter 1   Can Musicians and Fans Benefit When a Primary 
Ticket Platform Controls the Resale Market? 
1.1  Introduction 
In 2017, the revenue of the concert-ticket industry in the U.S. reached over three billion dollars, 
and more than twenty million consumers in the U.S. have attended at least one concert in that 
year.1 Ticketmaster, with an over 80% of the U.S. market share, is the dominant ticket platform in 
the primary ticket market (Roberts 2013). It has contracted with 80 out of the top 100 concert 
venues, and has become the exclusive ticket outlet for many top musicians (Sisario and Bowley 
2018). Ticketmaster mainly profits from the service fees paid by ticket buyers. For example, it 
charges a $17.85 service fee for a $61 ticket of Justin Timberlake’s The Man of The Woods Tour 
at the Madison Square Garden, New York. The peer-to-peer ticket resale market (a.k.a. the 
secondary market) is also growing rapidly. StubHub, with an over 50% share of the ticket resale 
market in the U.S., has seen a 30% annual growth rate in revenue in 2015 (Thomas 2016).  
Over the past few years, Ticketmaster has expanded its business to the resale market. In 2008, 
it acquired TicketsNow, an online ticket resale platform, for $256 million. In 2013, Ticketmaster 
introduced its own “Fan-to-Fan” resale system, Ticketmaster Resale (formerly known as TM+). 
Musicians can enroll in Ticketmaster Resale so that consumers can resell their tickets on 
Ticketmaster. For concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, the primary and resale ticket availability will 
be shown on the same seat map (see Figure 1.1 for example). In 2014, Ticketmaster received $900 
million from the ticket resale market (Ingham 2015). Moreover, Ticketmaster has been trying to 
extend its monopoly power in the primary market to the resale market by blocking competing 
resale platforms. For example, after signing on as the exclusive resale partner of the Golden State 
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Warriors (GSW) in 2012, Ticketmaster warned GSW season-ticket owners that their tickets could 
be revoked if they resold the tickets outside Ticketmaster. Consequently, StubHub saw an 80 
percent decrease in resale transactions of GSW season tickets. Ticketmaster also introduced the 
“Paperless Ticket” system (also known as Credit Card Entry) for some events, which requires 
consumers to show the credit card used to buy the ticket and a photo ID to enter the concert. 
Because few consumers would like to give their credit card and photo ID to others, Paperless 
Ticket system make it very difficult for consumers to resell tickets via other resale platforms, e.g., 
StubHub. Consumers can resell their paperless tickets only through Ticketmaster’s resale system.  
 
Figure 1.1 Seat Map of a Concert with Ticketmaster Resale 
The public reacted negatively to Ticketmaster’s “anti-competitive” practices. StubHub sent e-
mails to its customers to caution that “companies ‘like Ticketmaster’ are moving to restrictive 
paperless systems, which could kill the secondary market for tickets” (Indiviglio 2011). StubHub 
also sued Ticketmaster and GSW in 2015 for creating illegal market conditions, although the 
lawsuit was later dismissed (Rovell 2015). The Paperless Ticket system has also led to a drastic 
dispute among consumers. For example, a spokesman for Consumer Action argues that “[it] is 
wrong to deprive consumers of the right to fairly sell, trade or give away the ticket” (Pender 2017). 
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A news article in The Atlantic also blames Ticketmaster for “extend[ing] its near monopoly of 
ticketing to the secondary market” (Indiviglio 2011). Several states in the U.S., including Colorado, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, have passed or are 
debating bills requiring ticket issuers to offer tickets in a freely transferable format that can be sold 
on any resale sites. The Virginia bill, the Ticket Resale Rights Act, was proposed by state delegate 
David B. Albo, who lost $400 because he was unable to resell his two paperless tickets for Iron 
Maiden (Vozzella 2017). Albo argues that Ticket Resale Rights Act “would help consumers, given 
Ticketmaster’s near-monopoly over big-venue ticket sales nationwide.” It is generally believed 
that Ticketmaster’s entry into the resale business will create a ticket-intermediary monolith and 
will harm the welfare of musicians and consumers. 
This paper builds an analytical framework to examine how the primary ticket platform’s entry 
into the resale market and its attempts to block competing resale platforms will affect the musicians, 
the primary ticket platform, the resale platform, and the consumers. In the main analysis, we 
consider two scenarios. In the independent-platforms case, the primary ticket platform and the 
resale platform are owned by independent parties. This scenario reflects the situation in which 
Ticketmaster has not entered the resale market controlled by independent platforms such as 
StubHub. In the integrated-platform case, an integrated platform monopolizes both the primary 
and the resale markets. This setting captures the situation in which Ticketmaster enters the resale 
market and uses Paperless Ticket to prevent consumers from reselling tickets on other resale 
platforms. In Section 5.3, we examine a third case, where the integrated platform competes with 
an independent resale platform in the resale market (i.e., the integrated platform does not preclude 









Figure 1.2    Three Types of Market Structures 
We consider a two-period model where some consumers are uncertain of whether they will 
have a time conflict with the concert in the first period, and the uncertainty is resolved in the second 
period. Consumers are heterogeneous in their probability of being able to attend the concert and 
their valuation of the concert. If a consumer buys a ticket in the first period, she can resell the ticket 
to other consumers on the resale platform in the second period. Consumers can buy tickets from 
either the primary platform or the resale platform, but if the demand for a concert exceeds its 
supply on one platform, consumers may be unable to get a ticket from that platform. The musician 
chooses the ticket’s face price and the venue size (i.e., the number of available tickets) in the first 
period. In the independent-platforms case, the primary platform and the resale platform set their 
service fees respectively. In the integrated-platform case, the integrated platform sets service fees 
on both platforms altogether. The final price paid by consumers on the primary market is the sum 
of the face price and the service fee on the primary platform. The equilibrium resale price is jointly 
determined by the demand and supply in the resale market. Consumers have rational expectations 
on the future prices and the probabilities of being able to get a ticket from either the primary or the 
resale markets. 
The conventional wisdom would predict that if the primary ticket platform (Ticketmaster) has 


























in the primary and resale markets will be higher and the consumers and the musician will become 
worse off. However, we show that the conventional wisdom may not hold in some situations: both 
the consumers and the musician can be better off when the primary and the resale platforms are 
owned and operated by one firm (as in the integrated-platform case) compared with when the two 
platforms are independent (as in the independent-platforms case). The intuition hinges on the 
spillover effect from the primary market to the resale market. When the ticket primary-market 
price is lower, consumers with lower likelihood of attending the concert will buy tickets in the first 
period. These consumers are more likely to resell tickets, so the transaction volume in the resale 
market will increase. In other words, lowering the price in the primary market has a positive 
spillover to the resale market, leading to higher profits from the resale market. By contrast, in the 
integrated-platform case, the integrated platform will internalize the positive spillover by lowering 
the final price in the primary market. As a result, the profit in the resale market increases. Hence, 
the double-marginalization problem in the primary retail channel will be alleviated. The final price 
will be lower, leading the musician to choose a larger venue size, so more consumers will be served. 
As a result, both the musician and consumers can be better off. We also find that when the 
integrated platform competes with a third-party resale platform whose market share is significant, 
the musician and consumers can become better off if the integrated platform can successfully block 
its competitor and thus monopolize both the primary and the resale markets. Furthermore, we show 
that an integrated platform tends to choose a lower resale percentage fee in order to boost sales in 
the primary market. To summarize, when the primary platform also controls the resale market, it 
tends to charge lower price and service fee on both the primary and the resale market due to the 
spillovers between these two markets. The double-marginalization problem in the primary market 
can be alleviated, and both the musician and consumers can become better off. We also discuss 
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how our insights can be generalized to other markets, e.g., used-goods and peer-to-peer product-
sharing markets. 
We also demonstrate that, interestingly, consumers could be worse off when the final ticket 
price or the resale percentage fee decreases. This is because low prices and service fees can attract 
consumers with a lower probability of attending the concert to buy tickets early. Therefore, more 
consumers with a higher likelihood to attend the concert will be crowded out from the primary 
market and have to buy tickets from the resale market, in which case some consumer surplus will 
be seized by the resale platform via the resale service fee.  
Finally, we discuss the impact of the presence of some scalpers, who buy tickets with the sole 
intention of reselling them at higher prices. We also show that in the integrated-platform case, the 
existence of a small group of scalpers may lead to lower ticket prices and higher musician’s profit 
and consumer surplus. This is because scalpers are more likely to resell tickets than ordinary 
consumers. Thus, the integrated platform can earn more profit from the resale market by selling 
tickets to scalpers, so it has an incentive to keep the ticket price in the primary market low enough 
to make it profitable for scalpers to scalp tickets. The integrated platform’s extra incentive to 
reduce the final ticket price will further alleviate the double-marginalization problem in the 
primary market, which may potentially make the musician and the consumers better off.  
We provide some suggestive empirical support for some of our theoretical predictions from 
the data collected on Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com. Some musicians enroll in the 
Ticketmaster Resale system which allows consumers to resell tickets on Ticketmaster. Others do 
not enroll, so consumers cannot resell tickets on Ticketmaster. For concerts with Ticketmaster 
Resale, Ticketmaster tends to charge a lower resale percentage fee than StubHub for the same 
concert. Ticketmaster is also more likely to charge a lower service fee for primary tickets of 
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concerts with Ticketmaster Resale than concerts without Ticketmaster Resale. This is consistent 
with our theoretical prediction that Ticketmaster’s optimal service fee in the primary market is 
lower when it also operates its own resale platform, and that Ticketmaster’s optimal service fee 
for resale transactions is lower than that of an independent resale platform. 
1.2  Literature Review 
This paper contributes to the economics and marketing literature on secondary markets for 
event tickets. Most of the studies focus on whether allowing consumers or scalpers to resell tickets 
is beneficial to event organizers and consumers. Courty (2003a) shows that, in a setting where 
consumers are uncertain about their valuations at the time of purchase, allowing reselling cannot 
strictly increase the ticket agency’s profit. Geng et al. (2007) examine a similar setting and show 
that “partial allowance” of resales, i.e., allowing consumers to resell only before the event 
organizer’s announcement of the second-period price, can strictly increase the event organizer’s 
profit. Courty (2003b) shows that the existence of ticket brokers will reduce the primary event 
organizer’s profit because brokers can arbitrage when the event organizer raises its price over time, 
which limits the event organizer’s ability to exercise intertemporal price discrimination. Karp and 
Perloff (2005) find that the primary event organizer can benefit from the entry of resellers if they 
can perfectly price-discriminate consumers. Su (2010) shows that the presence of speculators will 
increase an event organizer’s expected profit because the event organizer can sell tickets to 
speculators early and transfer the inventory risk to them. Cui et al. (2014) find that an event 
organizer can benefit from lower transaction costs in the resale market and further improve its 
profit by selling consumers an option for buying tickets later.  
Several studies have empirically examined how the existence of resale markets can affect the 
primary market. Cusumano et al. (2008) show that the entry of Craigslist into the musical ticket 
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resale market raises the prices of popular musicians but lowers the prices of less popular ones. 
They also argue that musicians will be better off if the primary market and the secondary market 
have separate opening time windows. Leslie and Sorensen (2014) find that the existence of resale 
markets can on average increase the allocation efficiency by 5% for major rock concerts, but a 
third of the increase is offset by the ticket brokers’ costly efforts of getting tickets early and the 
transaction costs in the resale market. Lewis et al. (2018) show that the presence of a secondary 
market for season tickets of a Major League Baseball team increases the season ticket purchase 
rate in the primary market. By contrast, secondary-market regulations, such as minimum list price 
policies, will reduce the purchase rate of season tickets.  
Our paper differs from the aforementioned literature in two fundamental aspects. First, all of 
those papers consider a direct selling setting. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
to consider how the resale market can influence the strategic interaction between different channel 
members in the primary market, i.e., the (upstream) musician and the (downstream) ticket 
platform. Second, most of the extant studies focus on whether the firm or the social planner should 
allow consumers or scalpers to resell tickets. By contrast, our research examines how the musician 
and consumers are affected by whether the primary platform and the resale platform are owned 
and operated by the same entity or independent entities. We find that the integration of the primary 
and the resale platforms can lead to lower equilibrium service fees on both platforms and can 
benefit all channel members (i.e., the musician, the primary platform and consumers) at the same 
time.  
Our paper also relates to the literature on retail competition. The general finding of this 
literature is that a merger between retailers will reduce the competition between retailers, so the 
final retail price will increase. Reduced retail competition can exacerbate the double-
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marginalization problem in the distribution channel, making both the upstream manufacturers and 
the consumers worse off (Harutyunyan and Jiang 2018; Li 2002; Padmanabhan and Png 1998; 
Tirole 1988; Zhang 2002). This is the rationale for some anti-trust regulations against horizontal 
mergers that would give the merged firm too much market power. In contrast, our paper shows 
that when the primary platform and the resale platform are integrated rather than independent, the 
final ticket price in the primary market can be lower and the musician and consumers can be better 
off. Furthermore, we also find that consumers can actually be better off when the primary platform 
deprives them of their ability to resell tickets on other resale platforms. The difference in results 
reflects that the relationship between primary platforms and resale platforms is fundamentally 
different from the relationship between competing retailers. The spillover effect between the 
primary and the resale markets are positive: a lower price in one market can lead to more 
transactions in the other market. By contrast, the spillover effect between retailers are negative: a 
lower price of one retailer will reduce the sales of competing retailers.  
This paper also contributes to the general literature on secondary markets for used goods. Swan 
(1970, 1972, 1975) prove that the existence of the secondary market will not limit a monopoly 
seller’s profits. Rust (1986) shows that if consumers endogenously decide when to resell their 
durable goods, the monopolist firm may have an incentive to purposely reduce the durability of its 
product. Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) find that when consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences over new and used goods, a used-goods market can benefit a monopoly seller because 
it allows the seller to achieve a form of second-degree price discrimination. Purohit and Staelin 
(1994) consider a car manufacturer selling to both end consumers and rental companies, both of 
whom resell their used cars on the resale market. They compare the manufacturer’s and the dealer’s 
profits under different market structures, and show that in general a higher substitutability between 
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used rental cars and new cars will reduce the manufacturer’s profit, but dealers are generally better 
off. Desai and Purohit (1998) consider a car manufacturer’s leasing and selling decisions where 
consumers can resell their used cars and find that the manufacturer may choose leasing, selling or 
both, depending on the depreciation rates of sold versus leased cars. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) 
find that a monopolist can benefit from the secondary market even though the used-goods market 
will compete with the new-goods product. Shulman and Coughlan (2007) study a monopoly 
manufacturer’s optimal pricing decision in a market where the retailer can buy back and resell 
used products. They find that under certain conditions, the manufacturer may find it optimal not 
to sell any new goods in the second period. Jiang and Tian (2018) show that, similar to secondary 
markets, consumer-to-consumer product sharing has a value-enhancement effect, which can 
increase a monopolist’s optimal quality and price of its product. Tian and Jiang (2018) find that 
the consumer-to-consumer sharing market is more likely to benefit the downstream retailer than 
the upstream manufacturer. These papers mostly consider that consumers use a durable product 
for a period time before they resell it. By contrast, in our model, concert tickets can be used only 
once even though they may be purchased at different times. More importantly, we model a new 
market dynamic that has not been studied. Consumers are uncertain about their valuations in the 
early period (i.e., whether they can attend the concert); some earlier buyers may want to resell their 
tickets in the later period if they find out that they will not be able to attend the concert. In addition, 
we study a novel research question not studied by past research: how the integration of the primary 
and the resale platforms will affect the musician, the platform, and the consumers. 
1.3  Model 
Consider a musician who plans to organize a concert for his performance in a city at some time 
in the future. The musician (denoted by 𝑀) will sell the tickets via a primary ticket platform (e.g., 
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Ticketmaster), denoted by 𝑃.2 The musician needs to choose the size of performance venue to rent; 
his cost for renting the venue is 𝑐 ⋅ 𝑁, where 𝑁 is the venue size (total number of available seats) 
and 𝑐 is a constant. Let ?̅? denote the size of the largest venue in the city, so 𝑁 ≤ ?̅?. As is typically 
the case on Ticketmaster in practice, the musician will choose the (ticket’s) face price 𝑓 for the 
tickets, and then the primary platform will charge consumers a service fee for the ticket. Let 𝑝 
denote the final price that a consumer pays for a ticket. Equivalently, the primary platform’s per-
ticket service fee is 𝑝 − 𝑓.3 
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a unit mass of consumers (indexed by 𝑖) in 
the market. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the concert. There are two types 
of consumers. A fraction 𝛼 of consumers are “avid fans,” denoted by 𝐴, who have valuation 𝑉𝐴 for 
the concert if they can attend it. The rest of the consumers (a fraction 1 − 𝛼) are “casual fans,” 
denoted by 𝐶, whose valuation for the concert conditional on attending, is 𝑉𝐶 < 𝑉𝐴. Consumers ex 
ante may be uncertain about whether they will be able to go to the concert, e.g., there could be 
other activities in the future that may conflict with the concert (e.g., a friend’s party). Since avid 
fans value the concert more than casual fans, they are probably more likely than casual fans to 
attend the concert rather than other activities. Let 𝜌𝑖 be the probability that consumer 𝑖 can attend 
the concert. For tractability, we assume that 𝜌𝑖 = 1 for avid fans and 𝜌𝑖~uniform(0,1) across the 
population of casual fans. Each consumer knows ex ante her own 𝜌𝑖, but the platforms cannot 
identify each consumers’ type. If a consumer does not attend the concert, her utility from the 
concert is normalized to zero. Therefore, a type-𝑖 consumer has probability 𝜌𝑖 of having 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖, 




To capture the reality that consumers’ uncertainty about whether they can attend the concert 
may get resolved over time, we model two distinctive time periods in which consumers can buy 
tickets. In the first period, casual fans are uncertain about whether they can attend the concert, but 
in the second period they will know whether they can attend it. Consumers who bought tickets in 
the first period can choose to resell their tickets on the resale platform (denoted by 𝑅) in the second 
period, even if they can attend the concert themselves. Let 𝑟 denote the resale price of tickets on 
the resale platform. Consumers can buy a ticket from the primary platform by paying the final 
price 𝑝, or buy a ticket from the resale platform by paying the resale price 𝑟, if tickets are not sold 
out on these platforms. In practice, the resale platform (e.g., StubHub) charges a percentage fee 
for transactions on it. Let 𝑘 ∈ [0,1] denote the resale platform’s percentage service fee, so a 
consumer will receive (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 for reselling her ticket. Section 4 analyzes the case of exogenous 
service fee 𝑘 and discusses the main insights. In Section 5.2, we consider the endogenous decisions 
on 𝑘 by the independent resale platform and by the integrated platform. Most results from our main 
model will remain qualitatively the same when the service fee 𝑘 is endogenously decided. 
Next we introduce how the equilibrium resale price 𝑟∗ is determined in our model. An intuitive 
candidate for 𝑟∗ is the market-clearing resale price, i.e., at this price, the number of consumers 
willing to resell their tickets (the supply) is equal to the number of those willing to buy resale 
tickets (the demand). However, such a market-clearing resale price may not exist in our setting. 
This is because in the second period, consumers will know whether they can attend the concert 
and their ex post valuations of attending the concert can only possibly be 𝑉𝐴, 𝑉𝐶, or zero. Hence, 
neither the demand function nor the supply function in the resale market is continuous in general. 
To determine the unique equilibrium resale price, we use an alternative notion that is conceptually 
similar to the market-clearing price. Specifically, we assume that the equilibrium resale price 𝑟∗ is 
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the maximum resale price that clears the supply in the resale market, and that all resale tickets are 
sold at 𝑟∗. Although this is a simplifying assumption, we suggest that it is reasonable. On the one 
hand, if the resale price is higher than 𝑟∗, there will be excess supply in the resale market, so some 
consumers unable to resell their tickets may have an incentive to lower their listed resale price to 
guarantee a sale. On the other hand, if the resale price is lower than 𝑟∗, a reseller may want to raise 
her listed resale price slightly and still be guaranteed to successfully resell her ticket. We further 
assume 𝑟∗ = 0 if there will be some resale tickets unsold for any positive 𝑟, and 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴 if there 
will be no consumers willing to resell tickets at any 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐴 . Note that consumers’ realized 
valuation 𝑣𝑖 in the second period is either 𝑉𝐴, 𝑉𝐶 or 0, so 𝑟
∗ will be one of these three values in 
equilibrium. Table 1.1 exhibits several examples of the equilibrium resale price in different 
scenarios. 
Table 1.1   Examples of Equilibrium Resale Prices 𝒓∗ 
Demand of resale tickets Supply of resale tickets  Equilibrium 𝑟∗ 
10 fans with willingness-to-pay $10; 
 
20 fans with willingness-to-pay $5. 
5 fans want to resell tickets $10 
25 fans want to resell tickets $5 
35 fans want to resell tickets $0 
When the maximum venue size ?̅? ≤ 𝛼, i.e., the largest venue in the city cannot hold all avid 
fans, one can show that the musician will set the ticket’s face price 𝑓 to be the avid fan’s valuation, 
𝑉𝐴, and the primary platform and the resale platform will always receive zero surplus. We will 
focus on the more interesting case of ?̅? > 𝛼 in the rest of the paper. For closed-form solutions, we 




The timeline of the game is as follows. Prior to the first period, the musician decides the venue 
size 𝑁 ∈ [0, ?̅?] and the ticket face price 𝑓. The primary platform subsequently sets the final ticket 
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price 𝑝, (i.e., it effectively charges a service fee 𝑝 − 𝑓 per ticket). In the first period, consumers 
will decide whether to buy the ticket from the primary platform. In the second period, consumers 
learn whether they can attend the concert. Those who bought tickets in the first period can choose 
to resell their tickets in the resale market. Those without a ticket can choose to buy a ticket from 
either the primary platform (if tickets have not sold out) or from the resale market. On either the 
primary platform or the resale platform, if there are more consumers demanding the ticket than the 
total number of tickets available, tickets will sell out, in which case consumers are assumed to 
have equal chances of getting a ticket. If the price on one platform is lower than the other platform, 
consumers will first try to buy tickets from the cheaper platform. Consumers who fail to get a 
ticket from that platform can then decide whether to buy from the other platform. 
In the main analysis, we consider two cases regarding whether the primary and the resale 
platforms are operated by the same entity. In the case of independent platforms (denoted by IDP), 
the primary and the resale platform are operated by independent entities who maximize their 
respective profits. This case reflects the situation where Ticketmaster (the primary platform) has 
not entered the resale market. In the case of integrated platform (denoted by INT), the primary and 
the resale platforms are owned by the same entity that maximizes the joint profit of two platforms. 
This case reflects the situation where Ticketmaster enters the resale market and can use its 
Paperless Ticket system to prevent consumers from reselling on other platforms. Comparing these 
two cases helps us to examine how Ticketmaster’s entry and control of the resale market will affect 
the musician and consumers. In Section 5.3, we will also examine the case of competing resale 
platforms where an integrated platform and an independent resale platform compete with each 
other in the resale market. 
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1.4  Analysis 
We solve for rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria. In such equilibria, the musician, 
the primary platform, the resale platform and consumers have rational expectations about the resale 
price and the consumers’ probability of getting a ticket from a platform. There may exist multiple 
rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria differing in consumers’ belief on how many 
consumers will buy tickets in the first period, given the final price 𝑝 and the venue size 𝑁. If all 
consumers believe that many consumers will buy tickets in the first period, they may also want to 
buy tickets early because they believe that there will be few tickets left in the second period. 
However, if all consumers believe that only a small number of consumers will buy tickets in the 
first period, they may also postpone buying the ticket, anticipating that there will be many leftover 
tickets in the second period. To pin down the unique equilibrium outcome when multiple rational 
expectation equilibria exist, we introduce the concept of the “buying-spree equilibrium” to our 
setting. We define the buying-spree equilibrium as the rational expectation subgame-perfect 
equilibrium that, among all possible rational expectation subgame-perfect equilibria, has the 
highest number of consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period. This is a reasonable scenario, 
especially for more popular concerts. In reality, consumers often rush to buy tickets as soon as 
tickets are released and many concerts sell out in the first few hours. For example, The Rolling 
Stone sold out 75,000 tickets in 51 minutes for their “14 on Fire” tour in Paris in 2014.5  
LEMMA 1. The buying-spree equilibrium in our setting is unique. 
Lemma 1 shows that the buying-spree equilibrium is unique. All proofs are relegated to 
Appendix A. 
One can easily show that it is not optimal to choose 𝑁 < 𝛼, i.e., a venue that cannot contain 
all avid fans, because the musician can receive a strictly higher profit by choosing 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 =
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𝑉𝐴  to reap all the surplus of avid fans. For the rest of this section, we will analyze the more 
interesting parameter range of 
2𝛼
1+𝛼
≥ ?̅? ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼.  
One can find the derivation of consumers’ utility function in Appendix A. We now examine 
the consumer’s buying and reselling decisions. Note that when 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, or equivalently 
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 > 𝑉𝐶, a casual fan will resell her ticket when the resale price is 𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴, even if her 
realized 𝑣𝑖 is 𝑉𝐶. By contrast, when 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, or equivalently (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑉𝐶, a causal fan will 
never resell her ticket when she has 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶. In this section, we assume the resale percentage fee 
𝑘 to be exogenous, and divide our analysis into the case of a high resale percentage fee (𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
) and that of a low percentage fee (𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
). We show that both the musician and the 
consumers can be better off under the integrated platform than under the independent platforms. 
In Section 5.2, we analyze the case of endogenous resale percentage fee 𝑘 and show that the 
primary platform’s entry into the resale market can lower 𝑘 in equilibrium, which can even further 
increase the musician’s profit and the consumer surplus.  
1.4.1 The Case of High Resale Percentage Fee  
This section considers the case with 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
. In this case, the casual fans will not resell 
their tickets when their realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶. With a final ticket price 𝑝 ∈ (𝑉𝐶 , 𝑉𝐴], avid 
fans will buy tickets in the first period and casual fans will not buy tickets from the primary market 
because 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶. Thus, there will be no transactions in the resale market.  
We proceed to consider the case of 𝑝 ∈ [(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, 𝑉𝐶]. Part (a) of Lemma 2 summarizes the 
equilibrium outcome with the ticket’s final price 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, and part (b) of Lemma 2 characterizes 
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the range of 𝑝 where the concert is expected to sell out in the first period and the equilibrium resale 
price is 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴. 




(a) When 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, there exists a unique equilibrium: all avid fans buy tickets from the primary 
market in the first period, and all casual fans with realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will try to buy tickets 
in the second period. Tickets do not sell out in the primary market and no consumer will resell 
tickets. 
(b) There exists an equilibrium in which the concert will sell out in the first period and the 
equilibrium resale price is 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴  if and only if (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , 
where 0 < 𝜃 =
(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛼)+√(1−𝛼)𝛼[𝛼(1+2𝑁)−𝛼2−2𝑁2]
(1−𝛼)𝑁
< 1.  
In Appendix A, we show that if there is an equilibrium in which the concert sells out in the 
first period and the equilibrium resale price is 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴, this equilibrium is the (unique) buying-
spree equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium described in part (b) of Lemma 2 is the buying-spree 
equilibrium. For conciseness, we will use “equilibrium” to refer to the “buying-spree equilibrium” 
for the rest of the paper. 
Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium consumer choice when 𝑝  belongs to the intervals 
[(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴] or [𝑉𝐶 , 𝑉𝐴]. In Appendix A, we show that it is not optimal 
for the primary platform to choose any 𝑝 outside these two intervals. Thus, we will discuss the 
consumer’s choice decisions only in the subgame with 𝑝 being inside these intervals. 
Decisions of the platform and the musician 
Having discussed the consumers’ buying and reselling decisions, we will now examine the 
optimal strategies of the primary platform (or the integrated platform) and the musician. We 
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compare the equilibrium outcomes under two platform structures. In the independent-platforms 
case, the primary and the resale platforms are operated by independent entities. In the integrated-
platform case, an integrated platform operates in both the primary and the resale markets and 
maximizes their joint profit.  
 We start with the case of independent platforms. In this case, the primary platform maximizes 
its own profit 𝜋𝑃, and the musician maximizes his profit 𝜋𝑀. Note that 𝜋𝑃 = 𝑁(𝑝 − 𝑓) when 𝑝 ≤
𝑉𝐶 and 𝜋𝑃 = min{𝛼,𝑁} ⋅ (𝑝 − 𝑓) if 𝑉𝐴 ≥ 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶. Hence, in equilibrium, the primary platform’s 
optimal final price 𝑝 will be either 𝑉𝐶 or 𝑉𝐴, at which no casual fans will buy tickets in the first 
period, therefore precluding any resale transaction in the second period. We will show later that 
an integrated platform can have incentives to set 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶, which will induce some casual fans to 
buy in the first period. In that case, there may be resale transactions in the second period, since 
some casual fans who bought tickets may not be able to attend the concert and some fans who can 
go to the concert may not have successfully bought a ticket in the first period.  
LEMMA 3. Let 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 ≡ ?̅?(1 − √
𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴−𝑐
). In the independent-platforms (IDP) case: 
 (a) If 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃, the musician will choose the venue size 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ = 𝛼 and the face price 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ =
𝑉𝐴. The primary platform will set the final price 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ = 𝑉𝐴. Avid consumers will buy tickets 
from the primary platform and casual fans will not buy tickets in either periods. Consumer surplus 
is zero. 
(b) If 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃




. The primary 
platform will set 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ = 𝑉𝐶. All avid fans will buy tickets from the primary platform in the first 
period. Casual fans with realized 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will try to buy tickets from the primary platform in the 
second period. Consumer surplus is 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶). 
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Lemma 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms case. Note that a 
large number of avid fans will give the primary platform a stronger incentive to serve only the avid 
fans and extract all their surplus by setting 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. Anticipating this, the musician would rather 
himself set a high face price 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 to extract the avid fans’ surplus. Lemma 3 shows that when 
𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ , the musician will indeed find it optimal to choose such a high face price (𝑉𝐴). In this 
case, the musician will choose a small venue size (𝑁 = 𝛼 < ?̅?) and only avid fans will be served. 
By contrast, if there are not many avid fans (when 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ ), the primary platform is more 
inclined to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 < 𝑉𝐴 to serve both the avid and the casual fans. Thus, anticipating the 
primary platform’s optimal targeting decision, the musician will choose a low 𝑓 (lower than 𝑉𝐶) 
and a large venue size 𝑁 = ?̅?.  
We want to point out that Lemma 3 indicates that regardless of the value of 𝛼, the primary 
market will choose the final price 𝑝 ≥ 𝑉𝐶 so no casual fans will buy tickets in the first period. As 
a result, there will be no transactions in the resale market in the second period. Note that this result 
relies on our assumption that avid fans will always be able to attend the concert. In Section 5.2., 
we examine an extension in which the avid fans also have a small probability of unable to attend 
the concert. We find that, in that extension, some avid fans who find themselves unable to attend 
the concert in the second period will resell their tickets in the case of independent platforms. One 
should interpret the “no resale” result in Lemma 3 as that in the independent-platforms case the 
primary platform will have a limited incentive to encourage first-period purchase from casual fans. 
We will see how this result is different in the integrated-platform case.  
We proceed to discuss the integrated-platform case. Let 𝜋𝐼 ≡ 𝜋𝑃 + 𝜋𝑅 be the total profit of the 
integrated platform. Define 𝛼0 ≡
(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴−2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴
. We begin by analyzing the subgame where the 
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musician has already chosen 𝑁 and 𝑓, and the integrated platform is making its optimal final price 
decision. 






𝑉𝐴, and 𝛼 < 𝛼0, the integrated platform will 
set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶  so all consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period. A strictly 
positive number of casual consumers will resell their tickets in the second period at resale price 
𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴. 
Proposition 1 shows that different from the case of independent platforms, if the musician 
chooses a low enough face price 𝑓 and a large enough venue size 𝑁, it is possible for the integrated 
platform to choose some 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶. At this price point, some casual consumers will want to buy 
tickets in the first period and resell their tickets if they cannot attend the concert in the second 
period. The intuition hinges on the spillover effect from the primary market to the resale markets. 
In particular, in our framework, a lower final price 𝑝 will attract more casual fans with a lower 
likelihood to attend the concert (𝜌𝑖) to buy tickets in the first period (from the primary market). 
These casual fans are more likely to resell their tickets, so there will be more transactions in the 
resale market. To put it differently, lowering 𝑝 will have a positive spillover effect into the resale 
market. When the population of casual fans is larger (i.e., 𝛼 is smaller), the positive spillover is 
more significant. Therefore, when 𝛼 < 𝛼0, the integrated platform may want to reduce its final 
ticket price 𝑝 in the primary market to reap the benefit from more transactions in the resale market, 







𝑉𝐴. This contrasts with the case of independent platforms, where the primary 
platform charges a high final price (𝑝 ≥ 𝑉𝐶 ) that precludes resale transactions. This happens 
because the primary platform cannot directly receive profits from the resale transactions and will 
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hence have limited incentives to lower its price to convince casual consumers to buy in the first 
period (i.e., before they know whether they can attend the concert). To summarize, Proposition 1 
shows that, compared with the case of independent platforms, an integrated platform will be more 
likely to reduce 𝑝 to attract early purchase from casual consumers. Corollary 1 shows that this 
result is more likely to be true when the resale percentage fee (𝑘) is smaller. 










𝑉𝐴 , and 𝛼 < 𝛼0 ) in which the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 =
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce first-period purchases from casual consumers. 
 Intuitively, when the resale percentage fee (𝑘) is larger, the integrated platform can keep a 
great portion of the resale transaction price, so it will be more likely to set 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce more 
casual consumers buying in the first period and thus generate more resale transactions. 
Interestingly, Corollary 1 shows the opposite: A smaller 𝑘 makes the integrated platform more 
likely to choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶. The intuition is as follows. When 𝑘 is smaller, casual consumers will tend 
to buy tickets in the first period (from the primary market), because they will pay a lower resale 
service fee if they cannot attend the concert. As a result, the integrated platform can convince the 
casual fans to buy tickets in the first period by only slightly reducing 𝑝 (to (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴), which will 
not negatively affect its profit in the primary market too much. Hence, the integrated platform is 
more likely to set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑉𝐶. 
Next, we investigate the musician’s optimal decisions on the face price 𝑓 and the venue size 
𝑁 . Let 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≡ ?̅?[1 −
√𝑉𝐴𝑘[𝑉𝐴𝑘?̅?2+8(1+?̅?)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)]−𝑉𝐴𝑘?̅?
4(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)
]. If 𝛼0 ≤ 0, the integrated platform will 
never choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶, and the equilibrium outcomes in the integrated-platform case will be the 
same as those for the independent-platforms case (as described in Lemma 3). If 𝛼0 > 0, the 
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musician’s decisions and the equilibrium outcome depend on the relative magnitude of 𝛼, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇, 
𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 and 𝛼0. Table 2 summarizes the optimal decisions of the musician and the integrated platform 
as well as the equilibrium outcomes. An important observation is that when 𝛼 < min{𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇}, 
corresponding to the first and the fourth rows of Table 2, the equilibrium final price 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ < 𝑉𝐶 and 
the integrated platform will receive a strictly positive profit from the resale market. By contrast, 
as shown in Lemma 3, in the case of independent platforms, the resale platform’s equilibrium 
profit is zero regardless of the value of 𝛼. 
An interesting finding from Table 1.2 is on how the resale percentage fee 𝑘 will affect the 
consumer surplus. Intuitively, when 𝑘 decreases, consumers can pay less for buying and reselling 
tickets. Moreover, more consumers will want to buy tickets, and the musician tends to choose a 
larger venue size to serve more consumers. As a result, consumers should be better off. However, 
Proposition 2 shows that if the musician has already chosen the largest possible venue size 𝑁 =
?̅?, a further drop in 𝑘 can reduce the consumer surplus. 
































(𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃] 𝑁 
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(𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , 1) 𝛼 𝑉𝐴 𝑉𝐴 (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐)𝛼 0 0 
* The intervals 𝛼 belongs to (the second column) may or may not be empty. 
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PROPOSITION 2. A lower resale percentage fee (𝑘) can possibly lead to a lower consumer 
surplus. The result happens only if the musician chooses the largest possible venue size (𝑁 = ?̅?) 
before 𝑘 decreases. 
Corollary 1 has shown that 𝛼0 decreases with 𝑘. Thus if 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇, it is possible that when 𝑘 
is relatively high, 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃, but 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 after 𝑘 declines. In this case, when 𝑘 is relatively 
high such that 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃, in equilibrium the musician will choose the largest-possible venue 
size 𝑁 = ?̅?, the integrated platform will choose the final price 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ = 𝑉𝐶 so casual fans will buy 
tickets only in the second period if their realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶, and the consumer surplus is 
?̅?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶) . After 𝑘  decreases such that 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 , the musician will still choose 𝑁 = ?̅? , the 
integrated platform may find it optimal to choose 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 so all casual fans will try to 




which may be lower than its value before 𝑘 drops. 
The underlying reason of Proposition 2 is that when the musician has already chosen the 
largest-possible venue size ?̅?, although a further decrease in 𝑘 can make more casual fans with 
lower probability of attendance (𝜌𝑖) willing to buy tickets, the musician will not be able to choose 
a larger venue size to serve all of them. These consumers will also try to buy tickets in the first 
period, reducing the chance that the (high-valuation, high-attendance-probability) avid fans can 
successfully get tickets from the primary market. Hence, more avid fans need to buy tickets from 
the resale market, so some consumer surplus will be extracted by the integrated platform via the 
resale service fee. 
Comparison of the independent-platforms case and the integrated-platform case 
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Having characterized the equilibrium outcomes in the independent-platforms case and in the 
integrated-platform case, we now proceed to compare the equilibrium outcomes to determine how 
the integration of the primary and the resale platforms will affect the market. The following 
proposition summarizes the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes between the two cases. 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that 𝛼 ∈ (𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃,min {𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , 𝛼0}) .
6  Compared to the independent-
platforms case (IDP), in the integrated-platform case (INT): 
(a) The musician will choose a strictly lower ticket face price and a strictly larger venue size 
(𝑓𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ < 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗  and 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ > 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ ) and the final price will be strictly lower (𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ < 𝑝𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ ). 
(b)  The musician’s profit is strictly higher (𝜋𝑀,𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ > 𝜋𝑀,𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ ) and the platform’s profit in both 
markets are strictly higher, i.e., 𝜋𝑃,𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ > 𝜋𝑃,𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗  and 𝜋𝑅,𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ > 𝜋𝑅,𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ .  
(c) Consumer surplus is also strictly higher in the integrated-platform case than the 
independent-platforms case.  
At a first glance, since the integrated platform controls both the primary and the resale markets, 
it can raise the final price in the primary market with less concern about losing consumers to the 
resale market. So, in the integrated-platform case, the equilibrium final price will tend to be higher, 
and as a result, fewer consumers will be served and the musician’s profit and consumer surplus 
will decrease relative to the independent-platforms case. Our analysis reveals that this is not 
necessarily true if the number of avid fans is in the intermediate range. As Proposition 3 shows, 
the integration of the primary and the resale platforms can actually lead to a lower final ticket 
price, more consumers attending the concert, a higher profit for the musician, and a higher 
consumer surplus. This is because the integrated platform has an incentive to lower the final price 
𝑝 to internalize the positive spillover effect, i.e., to create more transactions in the resale market 
(as shown in Proposition 1). This will reduce the double-marginalization problem in the 
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distribution channel of the primary market, so the musician is more likely to choose a larger venue 
size 𝑁 to serve more consumers. As a result, the integration of the primary and resale platforms 
can lead to a win-win-win outcome for the musician, the platforms, and the consumers. 
The analysis in this section has focused on the case of high resale percentage fee, i.e., 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
. Under this condition, the resale percentage fee 𝑘 is high enough such that the casual fans will 
not want to resell their tickets if their realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 . Next, we analyze the 




1.4.2 The Case of Low Resale Percentage Fee  
This section considers the case of 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
. In this case, all casual fans will be willing to 
resell their tickets when 𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴 even if they can attend the concert, i.e., even when their realized 
valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶. However, if 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐶, casual fans will not resell their tickets if they can attend 
the concert (𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶).  
LEMMA 4. If 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 and 𝑁 > 𝛼, the equilibrium resale price 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶  as long as some 
consumers will resell their tickets in equilibrium.  
Lemma 4 reveals that with the percentage resale fee 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, the equilibrium resale price 
𝑟∗ will also be no higher than 𝑉𝐶. This is because a lower 𝑘 will allow consumers to keep more of 
their resale revenue, leading to more consumers buying tickets in the first period. Thus, more 
consumers will resell the ticket on the resale market, which will reduce the equilibrium resale price 
𝑟∗, specifically 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶. Note that the resale platform’s profit per resale transaction is 𝑘 ⋅ 𝑟
∗. If 
𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 . Thus the integrated platform will have limited interest in lowering 𝑝 , 
because doing so can only slightly increase the profit from the resale market per resale transaction. 
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It turns out that it is optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ ≥ 𝑉𝐶 so that no casual fans 
will buy tickets in the first period. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes of the independent-
platforms case and of the integrated-platform case will be identical.  
LEMMA 5. If 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms case is 
identical to that in the integrated-platform case, which has been characterized in Lemma 3. 
1.5  Extensions 
Thus far, we have demonstrated that when the primary platform controls the resale market, the 
integrated platform has an extra incentive to lower the final price. The price drop will alleviate the 
double-marginalization problem in the primary-market distribution channel, which can induce the 
musician to choose a larger venue size to serve more consumers. The musician and the consumers 
can be better off as a result. In this section, we consider three model extensions. In the first 
extension, we examine how the presence of scalpers will affect the market outcome. In the second 
extension, we study the optimal resale percentage fee for the resale platform in the independent-
platforms case and for the integrated platform in the integrated-platform case. In the last extension, 
we consider the scenario that the integrated platform competes with an independent resale platform 
in the resale market. 
1.5.1 The Impact of Scalpers 
Oftentimes, many scalpers buy tickets from the primary market and resell them at higher prices. 
According to Scott Cutler, CEO of StubHub, nearly half of ticket resales on StubHub come from 
“professional” traders (Sullivan 2017). It is generally believed that the musician and consumers 
are worse off with scalpers in the market because they will raise the effective price paid by 
consumers. The official Twitter account of the rock band LCD Soundsystem derogated scalpers as 
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“parasites” (Horowitz 2017). Scalpers usually use computer bots to buy hundreds of tickets within 
minutes after concerts start to sell. To combat scalpers, former President Barack Obama signed the 
Better Online Ticket Sales Act in 2016, which restricts the use of software bots to obtain and resell 
event tickets. Many states have also passed legislations banning or restricting scalping behaviors. 
Ticketmaster has also introduced the Verified Fan system, which can block 90% of buying 
attempts from ticket scalpers (Brooks 2017). In this section, we investigate how the existence of 
scalpers affects ticket prices, profits of the musician and platforms, and the consumers under 
different market structures, i.e., whether the primary and the resale platforms are independent or 
integrated. 
In this extension, we assume that besides the unit mass of regular consumers (avid and casual 
fans), there are 𝛽 number of scalpers who can also buy tickets from the primary platform and resell 
them on the resale platform. Scalpers have zero valuation for attending the concert, but move 
earlier than regular consumers in the first period when buying tickets from the primary platform. 
The main model in the previous section is the special case of 𝛽 = 0. For closed-form analytical 
solutions, we focus on the parameter region of 𝛽 ≤
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)?̅?
1−𝛼
, i.e., there are only a small group of 




 and 𝛼 ≤ ?̅? ≤
2𝛼
1+𝛼
. We will show that, even if scalpers have the ability to buy tickets earlier 
than regular consumers, the scalpers’ presence can still result in lower ticket prices and higher 
consumer surplus, and make both the musician and the integrated platform better off. 7  This 
contrasts with the independent-platforms case, where one can show that, in the above assumed 
parameter region, the presence of scalpers has no effect on the market outcome, because the 
primary platform will find it optimal to set a high enough final ticket price (𝑝) so that no scalpers 
will buy tickets in equilibrium. 
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First we analyze the case of integrated platform. We begin by examining the subgame where 
the musician has chosen 𝑁 and 𝑓 and the integrated platform is going to choose its optimal final 
price 𝑝. Similar to the previous section, it is not optimal for the musician to choose a venue size 
𝑁 < 𝛼, so we focus on the case with ?̅? ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼. Note that the scalpers will want to buy tickets 
from the primary market only if 𝑝 is low enough so they can make positive profit from reselling, 
specifically when 𝑝 ≤ (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂.8 Lemma 6 shows that, in the integrated-platform case, it may be 
optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝 low enough such that scalpers will buy tickets in 
the primary market. 
LEMMA 6. Given the musician’s choices of 𝑁 and 𝑓, the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 =
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴  if and only if 𝛼 <
2𝑁(𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶)
(𝑁−𝛽)𝑘𝑉𝐴
− 1  and 𝑓 < 𝑉𝐴 [1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2(𝑁−𝛼)
] . In that case, all 
scalpers and regular consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period, and the equilibrium resale 
price is 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴. The integrated platform’s total profit is 𝜋𝐼 =
1+𝛼
2





It is worth of mentioning that when the conditions in Lemma 6 are satisfied, the integrated 
platform’s profit, 𝜋𝐼, increases with the number of scalpers (𝛽). The presence of scalpers tends to 
increase resale transactions in the market. This is because scalpers are more likely (with probability 
one) to resell the tickets compared to avid and casual fans, thus in expectation selling a ticket to a 
scalper will generate more profit in the resale market for the integrated platform than selling it to 
a regular consumer, i.e., the presence of the scalpers can strengthen the spillover effect. Therefore, 
the integrated platform has an incentive to let scalpers buy tickets from the primary market to 
create transactions in the resale market. To attract scalpers, the integrated platform needs to keep 
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𝑝 ≤ (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂ so scalpers can make a profit. In other words, the integrated platform will have an 
extra incentive to lower the final price on the primary platform.  
Let us use a numerical example to illustrate why the integrated platform may want to lower its 
final price 𝑝 when there are scalpers. Suppose that there are 1,000 regular consumers, 500 of whom 
are avid fans (with 𝑉𝐴 = 100) and the rest 500 of them are casual fans (with 𝑉𝐶 = 80), i.e., 𝛼 =
0.5.9 To illustrate the key intuition, we consider the subgame where the musician has chosen 𝑓 =
20 and a venue with 600 seats (𝑁 = ?̅? = 600), and the integrated platform is to choose the final 
price 𝑝 . Suppose 𝑘 = 0.25 . One can show that when there are no scalpers (i.e., 𝛽 = 0), the 
integrated platform’s optimal price is 𝑝 = 100. By contrast, suppose that the market also has 200 
scalpers (i.e., 𝛽 = 0.2); in this case, one can show that it is optimal for the platform to choose 𝑝 =
75, which is lower than the platform’s optimal price 𝑝 = 100 in the absence of scalpers. Note that, 
in this example, either when 𝛽 = 0 or when 𝛽 = 0.2, the equilibrium resale price will be 𝑟∗ =
𝑉𝐴 = 100 if the platform chooses 𝑝 = 75. 
To delineate the insight of how the integrated platform finds it optimal to reduce its price (𝑝) 
when scalpers are present, Table 1.3 compares the platform’s profit decompositions under the 
cases of 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛽 = 0.2. Note that if the platform charges 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 = 100, the market outcomes 
are the same under the two cases of 𝛽, and the platform’s profit will be 40,000. Now, we examine 
why charging a lower final price of 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 = 75 can have different profit implications to 
the platform depending on the presence of scalpers. Note that if the platform lowers its final price 
from 𝑝 = 100 to 𝑝 = 75, its profit from the primary market will drop by 40,000-33,000=7,000. 
When 𝑝 = 75, all regular consumers and scalpers (if they exist) will try to buy tickets in the first 
period. Without scalpers (𝛽 = 0), 600 regular consumers will get the tickets from the primary 
market, and in expectation, 150 casual fans will not be able to attend the concert and hence will 
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resell tickets. The integrated platform’s expected profit from the resale market is 3,750, which is 
not enough to compensate the profit loss from the primary market. Thus, without scalpers (𝛽 = 0), 
the integrated platform will find it optimal to choose the high final price 𝑝 = 100 and serve only 
the avid fans. By contrast, with scalpers in the market (𝛽 = 0.2), among 600 consumers and 
scalpers who get tickets from the primary platform, in expectation, 100 casual fans who will find 
themselves unable to attend the concert and 200 scalpers will resell their tickets. So, the integrated 
platform’s profit from the resale market is 7,500, which is much more than the platform’s resale-
market profit in the absence of scalpers (𝛽 = 0) and can more than cover the platform’s 7,000 
profit loss from the primary market (due to the lowered final price 𝑝). Thus, with scalpers in the 
market, the platform will find it optimal to choose the lower final price 𝑝 = 75.  
Table 1.3  Profit Decomposition with 𝜷 = 𝟎 and 𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 (𝒇 = 𝟐𝟎,𝑵 = 𝟔𝟎𝟎) 
 
𝜷 = 𝟎 𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
𝒑 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
(optimal) 
𝑝 = 75 𝑝 = 100  








Avid fans 500 300 500 200 
Casual 
fans 
0 300 0 200 
Scalpers 0 0 0 200 
Total 500 600 500 600 
Integrated platform’s 
profit from primary 
market 
500 × (100 − 20) 
= 40,000 
600 × (75 − 20) 
= 33,000 
500 × (100 − 20) 
= 40,000 





tickets in the 
second period 
Avid fans 0 0 0 0 
Casual 
fans 
0 150 0 100 
Scalpers 0 0 0 200 
Total 0 150 0 300 
Integrated platform’s 
profit from resale market 
0 
150 × 0.25 × 100 
= 3,750 
0 
300 × 0.25 × 100 
= 7,500 
Integrated platform’s total 
profit 





Another way to explain why the presence of scalpers can induce the integrated platform to 
charge lower prices is that scalpers can help the platform exercise partial price discrimination in 
the primary market. Without scalpers, if the platform wants to target more consumers, it has to 
lower the final price for all targeted customers, in which case the avid fans who can get the tickets 
will enjoy a large surplus (relative to casual fans). In contrast, with scalpers in the market, when 
the platform charges the low final ticket price, more avid fans will not be able to get tickets in the 
first period compared to the case without scalpers. Note that the avid fans who failed to obtain 
tickets from the primary market will turn to the resale market to acquire tickets at higher prices 
(from scalpers or casual fans who cannot attend the concert). Since the integrated platform receives 
service fees for resale transactions, it in essence has charged these avid fans higher prices for the 
tickets than those consumers who successfully obtained tickets in the primary market. Hence, the 
presence of scalpers will help the platform increase the expected number of avid fans who will end 
up paying higher prices for the tickets. Put differently, scalpers can effectively increase integrated 
platform’s ability to exercise price discrimination. The integrated platform can take advantage of 
this potential benefit from the presence of scalpers only if it charges a low enough ticket price 𝑝 ≤
(1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂ to ensure some profit for the scalpers. Therefore, the presence of scalpers tends to 
induce lower final ticket prices in the primary market. 










We characterize the impact of scalpers on the final prices and different parties’ surplus in 
Proposition 4. 
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose 𝑉𝐴 >
2
2−𝑘
𝑉𝐶 , min{𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇} < 𝛼 ≤ min{𝛼1, 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃}  and 𝛽 <
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)?̅?
1−𝛼
. In the integrated-platform case, compared to the case without scalpers (𝛽 = 0), the 
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presence of scalpers will strictly reduce the final ticket price 𝑝∗ , and strictly increase the 
musician’s profit, the integrated platform’s profit and the consumer surplus in equilibrium.  
Contrary to the conventional belief that scalpers will raise the effective ticket prices paid by 
consumers and thus reduce consumer surplus, Proposition 4 shows that scalpers can possibly result 
in lower final prices and higher consumer surplus if the musician’s and the platform’s strategic 
pricing decisions are taken into account. Moreover, because the presence of scalpers can make the 
integrated platform more inclined to charge a lower final price, the musician will be more willing 
to increase the venue size. As a result, the double-marginalization problem in the primary market 
can be alleviated, making the platform, the musician, and the consumers possibly all better off. 
We want to point out that Proposition 4 does not suggest that scalpers will always benefit 
consumers and the musician. Indeed, there are several boundary conditions for the presence of 
scalpers to be beneficial. For example, if the segment size of avid fans is smaller than a threshold 
(𝛼 < min{𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃}), the platform will find it optimal to set a low final price to target both casual 
fans and avid fans even when there are no scalpers. Under this condition, scalpers will strictly 
reduce the consumer surplus. Moreover, the segment size of scalpers (𝛽) cannot be too high. If 
there are too many scalpers, consumers are worse off because fewer tickets will be available for 
regular consumers in the primary market, forcing more consumers to buy resale tickets at higher 
prices. It is also important to point out that scalpers can benefit the consumers only when the 
primary and the resale platforms are integrated. In the independent-platforms case, the primary 
platform does not take the resale platform’s profit into account, so it will not bother lowering the 
final ticket price to attract scalpers. Thus, with an independent resale platform, the presence of 
scalpers will not facilitate the channel coordination in the primary market and consumer surplus 
will generally decrease. 
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1.5.2 Endogenous Resale Percentage Fee 
In our main model, we have assumed the resale percentage fee 𝑘 to be exogenous. In this 
section, we will analyze the optimal choice of 𝑘  for the resale platform. In the independent-
platforms case, after the musician chooses the venue size 𝑁 and the face price 𝑓, the primary 
platform will set the final price 𝑝 and the resale platform will set the resale percentage fee 𝑘 
simultaneously. In the integrated-platform case, the integrated platform jointly chooses 𝑝 and 𝑘 to 
maximize its profit. Under the original assumption that avid fans are always able to attend the 
concert, in the independent-platforms case, the primary platform will always find it optimal to 
choose 𝑝 high enough such that only avid fans will buy in the first period. Thus the resale platform 
will receive zero profit regardless of its choice of 𝑘. Therefore, to allow for a more meaningful 
comparison of how different market structures affect the equilibrium resale percentage fee 𝑘∗, we 
need both avid consumers and casual consumers to have some probability of not being able to 
attend the concert. One way to revise the model is to introduce another random interruption that 
can prevent a consumer from attending the concert (in addition to the random factors in the main 
model). Suppose that the new interruptive events (e.g., mandatory out-of-town travel or family 
emergency) have a probability 𝛿  of occurrence, in which case the consumer (whether avid or 
casual) will be unable to attend the concert. Thus, one can show that overall, avid fans can attend 
the concert with probability 𝜌𝐴 = 1 − 𝛿 , and the casual fans can attend with probability 
𝜌𝐶~uniform(0,1 − 𝛿). Under this assumption, even if only avid fans will buy tickets in the first 
period, there can still be resale transactions because some avid fans unable to attend the concert 
will resell their tickets in the second period. To concisely present the results, we consider the case 






]. The next proposition reveals which platform 
will choose a lower resale percentage fee. 
PROPOSITION 5. When 𝛼 < 𝛼2 , the integrated platform will choose a strictly lower resale 
percentage fee (𝑘) than the independent resale platform will choose, i.e., 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗ < 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ . 
Proposition 5 reveals that when the population of avid fans is not too large (i.e., 𝛼 < 𝛼2), the 
integrated platform’s optimal resale percentage fee 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇
∗  will be lower than an independent resale 
platform’s choice, 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ . The intuition is as follows. A lower resale percentage fee can incentivize 
consumers to buy tickets in the primary platform, because they expect to pay a lower resale service 
fee if they cannot attend the concert and need to resell their tickets. In other words, lowering 𝑘 will 
have a positive spillover effect from the resale market to the primary market. An integrated 
platform can internalize the spillover and tends to charge a lower resale percentage fee in the resale 
market, unless the population of avid fans is very large (𝛼 ≥ 𝛼2), in which case the integrated 
platform will set 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 and target only the avid fans. 
1.5.3 Competition between Resale Platforms  
 Finally, we examine the case where the integrated platform competes with an independent 
resale platform in the resale market. The platform competition in the resale market will tend to 
reduce the resale percentage fee 𝑘. For tractability, we assume that the integrated platform and the 
independent resale platform have the same resale percentage fees 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃  with 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 𝑘 . A 
fraction 𝜙 of resale-ticket buyers buy from the integrated platform, and a fraction 1 − 𝜙 of resale-
ticket buyers buy from the independent resale platform. While we do not model how 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 and 
𝜙 are endogenously determined in equilibrium, our assumptions reflect that the resale service fee 
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will decrease under competition in the resale market, so we can analyze how competition in the 
resale market will affect the equilibrium prices, profits and consumer surplus.  
One can show that when 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, the integrated platform will choose a final ticket 
price such that only avid fans will buy in the primary market in the first period, so there will be no 
resale transactions in the second period. In other words, if the integrated platform anticipates that 
the presence of a competing resale platform would reduce the resale service fee from 𝑘 to some 
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, then the integrated platform will not want to reduce its price in the primary 
market to attract casual fans in the first period. Below, we analyze the more interesting case of 




Our analysis shows that when 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, the integrated platform may choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶, 
and some casual fans will want to buy tickets in the first period and resell their tickets in the second 
period. Specifically, under the conditions of 
2𝛼
1+𝛼
> 𝑁 > 𝛼 , 𝑉𝐴 >
2
2−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(2−𝜙)






𝑉𝐴, and 𝛼 < 1 −
2[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝜙𝑉𝐴
, we find that the integrated platform will 
choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑉𝐶  with a corresponding total profit 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(1 −
1−𝛼
2
𝜙)) − 𝑓]. In this case, all consumers will try to buy tickets in the first period with a successful 
probability of 𝑁. In expectation 
𝑁(1−𝛼)
2
 casual consumers will resell their tickets at resale price 
𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴. 
Note that a smaller 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 will make the parameter conditions above more likely to hold. In 
other words, the integrated platform is more likely to set a final price 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 to induce some casual 
consumers to buy tickets in the first period and resell their tickets in the second period when they 
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cannot attend the concert. We also show that, as expected, when the integrated platform’s market 
share in the resale market, 𝜙, is larger, the parameter region in which the conditions above are 
satisfied will be larger. This is because if a higher fraction of consumers resell their tickets on the 
integrated platform, the integrated platform will have a stronger incentive to reduce its price in the 
primary market (𝑝) to increase the transaction volume in the resale market. 
In the integrated-platform case, consumers can resell their tickets only through the integrated 
platform. By contrast, in the presence of a competing independent resale platform, consumers will 
face a lower resale service fee. One may expect the consumers to become worse off when the 
integrated platform can block the competing resale platforms and monopolize the resale market. 
Proposition 6 shows that, counterintuitively, the musician and the consumers can be possibly better 
off.  
PROPOSITION 6. In equilibrium, in the integrated-platform case, the final price 𝑝 may strictly 
be lower and the musician’s profit and consumer surplus may be strictly higher than in the 







 When there is competition in the resale market and if the integrated platform’s market share 






), the integrated platform will have little 
incentive to choose a low final price 𝑝 to facilitate transactions in the resale market. Anticipating 
this, the musician will be more likely to choose a higher face price 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and a smaller venue 
size 𝑁 = 𝛼 to target only the avid fans. In this case, the musician’s profit and the consumer surplus 
will be lower. 
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1.6  Discussion 
One key message of this paper is that when the primary platform also controls the resale market, 
it is more likely to lower the final price 𝑝 in the primary market to create more transactions in the 
resale market, and also to set a lower percentage fee 𝑘 in the resale market to attract more buyers 
in the primary market. Moreover, because the integrated platform is more willing to choose a lower 
price in the primary market to target low-valuation casual fans, the double-marginalization 
problem in the primary-market channel tends to be alleviated (relative to the case of independent 
platforms). As a result, the musician is also willing to choose a larger venue size to serve more 
consumers, making both the musician and the end consumers better off as a result. A scenario that 
might seem similar to the integration of the primary and the resale ticket platform is a merger of 
two retailers who sell products from a common upstream manufacturer. However, the market 
outcome tends to be quite different. A merger between retailers generally increases the retail price 
and reduces the number of consumers served, making the consumers and the upstream 
manufacturer worse off. The key difference between these two settings is whether the spillover 
effect is positive or negative. Lowering the price or the service fee in the primary market will have 
a positive spillover to the resale market, and vice versa. An integrated platform operating in both 
markets will internalize the positive cross-market externalities and become more willing to charge 
lower prices and service fees in both markets than independent platforms would. Conversely, in a 
retail market with multiple retailers, one retailer’s reduction of its retail price will generate a 
negative spillover to other competing retailers, i.e., reducing their sales. Hence, after the merger 
of retailers, the merged retailer tends to charge higher prices.  
This paper focuses on the ticket market for concerts (or other performing arts), but the 
qualitative insight can be applied to other markets with similar spillover features, e.g., sports ticket 
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markets, used product market, and peer-to-peer product-sharing market. For example, when a book 
retailer sells both new and used books, it may have an incentive to lower the retail price for new 
books so more people will buy new books and resell them later. Thus, the double-marginalization 
problem in the primary-market channel of the publisher and the retailer can be alleviated. However, 
we expect the effect of cross-market spillover effect in the physical publishing industry will be 
smaller than that in the concert ticket industry. First, reselling physical books usually involves 
some transaction costs, e.g., shipping and handling, which can prevent some consumers from 
reselling their books. By contrast, the transaction cost for reselling concert tickets is generally 
much lower. Resellers usually only need to upload a photo of the ticket to resell it on StubHub or 
Ticketmaster. Second, competition among new-book retailers and competition among used-book 
marketplaces are much more intense than that in the concert ticket industry. A retailer operating 
in both the new-book and the used-book markets is less willing to lower the primary market price 
because its new-book buyers may resell the books at other resale marketplaces. With some caution, 
our qualitative findings can also be applied to peer-to-peer product-sharing markets. Some car 
manufacturers provide their own peer-to-peer car-sharing services. For example, owners of 
Mercedes-Benz cars in Germany can rent out their cars to others on Croove, Mercedes-Benz’s own 
peer-to-peer sharing platform. The insight of our research will predict that the car manufacturers 
with their own peer-to-peer sharing platforms may also have extra incentives to set a lower dealer 
price so more consumers will buy cars and rent them out on the manufacturers’ sharing platforms, 
increasing the car manufacturer’s profit from the sharing platform. We acknowledge that such 
markets have some differences from the concert ticket markets, e.g., cars are not single-use 
products and car buyers themselves may use the cars some of the time (with possible depreciation 
of value). Nevertheless, our qualitative insight that an integrated platform can be beneficial relative 
39 
 
to independent platforms may still be useful since there exists some degree of cross-market 
spillover in those markets.  
1.7  Empirical Study 
In this section, we will provide some suggestive support for our theoretical findings with the 
data collected from Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com. At the outset, we want to acknowledge 
that our empirical results only suggest correlational association rather than causal relationships. 
When musicians contract with Ticketmaster to sell tickets on its platform, they can choose 
whether to enroll in Ticketmaster Resale. If they enroll their concerts in Ticketmaster Resale, then 
consumers will be able to resell their tickets on Ticketmaster in addition to third-party resale 
platforms such as StubHub. If they do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale, then consumers will not 
be able to resell their tickets on Ticketmaster but can still resell on third-party resale platforms. 
Many musicians do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale because they worry that doing so can 
encourage scalping and result in higher prices. For example, musician Tom Waits claimed that he 
“would not take advantage of Ticketmaster Resale because he does not want to take all of a 
person’s disposable income just to go to one show” (Knopper 2014). Some other musicians, such 
as Ed Sheeran and Sigur Rós, do not enroll in Ticketmaster Resale and express similar concerns. 
It is plausible that many musicians’ decisions on whether to enroll in Ticketmaster Resale are not 
always due to their profit-oriented concerns. 
Ticketmaster can profit from both the primary market and the resale market for concerts with 
Ticketmaster Resale, but can profit only from the primary market for concerts without 
Ticketmaster Resale. Based on our theoretical predictions, Ticketmaster will set lower service fees 
in the primary market for concerts with Ticketmaster Resale than those without Ticketmaster 
Resale. Moreover, Ticketmaster’s resale percentage service fee (for concerts with Ticketmaster 
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Resale) will be lower than that on StubHub for the same concert. We propose the following two 
hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Ticketmaster will set lower service fees on the primary platform for concerts 
with Ticketmaster Resale than for concerts without Ticketmaster Resale.  
HYPOTHESIS 2. For concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster will set lower resale 
percentage service fees than StubHub’s for the same concerts.  
Table 1.4    Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Ticket face price 81.75 63.51 59.00 15.00 345.00 
Primary-market service fee 12.26 5.37 10.35 4.85 29.80 
Last.fm followers 898731 949743 635605 0 4328799 
Songkick.com followers 513086 663277 222592 0 1791395 
Ticketmaster Resale enrolled* 0.508 0.501 1 0 1 
* Dummy variable, equaling to 1 if true, 0 otherwise. 
We collected data for all pop and rock concerts in Missouri in 2018 that were on sale at 
Ticketmaster.com on Dec 20th, 2017. We excluded musicians promoted by Live Nation, which is 
the parent company of Ticketmaster. We also excluded concerts with general admission because 
the total number of available tickets is not explicitly determined. We obtained data for 62 concerts 
that satisfy the conditions above, 34 of which enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale. A concert usually 
has multiple ticket price levels. In our dataset, there are 199 price levels in total for all concerts, 
and we treat each price level of a concert as an observation in our empirical analysis. For each 
observation, we have the data on the ticket’s face price and the primary-market service fee on 
Ticketmaster, whether the concert is enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale, and information on the 
concert’s promoter and venue. In addition, we use, as a proxy for the musician’s popularity, his or 
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her numbers of followers on Last.fm—an online radio website—and on Songkick.com—an online 
music community. Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics of some variables. 
Figure 1.3 compares the ratios of the ticket’s primary-market service fee to its face price based 
on whether concerts are enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale. One can observe that, for concerts with 
Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster tends to charge lower service fees as a portion of the ticket face 
price in the primary market, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
 
Figure 1.3  Primary-Market Service Fee Divided by Face Price10 
We have confirmed the correlation with the following regression: 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + ℎ(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖. 
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if concert 𝑖  enrolled in 
Ticketmaster Resale, and 0 if not. ℎ(⋅) is a polynomial of the ticket’s face price. More specifically, 
we specify ℎ(⋅) as either a linear function or the polynomial leading to the lowest Bayesian 
Information Criterion. 𝑋𝑖 represents control variables such as the musician’s number of followers 
on Last.fm or on Songkick.com, and the event-promoter and venue dummies. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that 𝛽1 should be negative. 
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Promoter and venue fixed 
effect 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 199 199 199 199 
𝑅2 0.606 0.946 0.963 0.963 
Standard deviation in parenthesis.  ∗𝑝 < 0.1,  ∗∗𝑝 < 0.05,  ∗∗∗𝑝 < 0.01. 
 
Table 1.5 summarizes the estimation results. The results suggest that a concert’s enrollment in 
Ticketmaster Resale is negatively correlated to its primary-market service fee charged by 
Ticketmaster. Enrollment in Ticketmaster Resale is associated with a $1.15 lower ticket service 
fee on the primary platform, which translates to 11.1% of the median primary-market service fee 
on Ticketmaster. The finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that Ticketmaster will set a lower 
service fee for concerts that are enrolled in Ticketmaster Resale. 
We also collected the resale percentage fees on Ticketmaster and on StubHub for all concerts 
with Ticketmaster Resale between April 27th, 2018 and Dec 31st, 2018.11 There are 16 such 
concerts. Figure 1.4 compares their resale percentage fees on Ticketmaster and on StubHub. For 
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all these concerts, Ticketmaster charges lower percentage fees than StubHub does. A paired t-test 
also confirms that Ticketmaster’s resale percentage fee is lower than StubHub’s: 
mean(𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 0.180 ,  mean(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏) = 0.219 , 𝑡 = 16.19 , 𝑝 < 0.001 . This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2—for concerts with Ticketmaster Resale, Ticketmaster will charge a 
lower resale percentage fee than StubHub will. 
 
Figure 1.4   Resale Percentage Fee: Ticketmaster vs. StubHub 
1.8  Conclusion 
The main message of this paper is that musicians and consumers can benefit from the primary 
ticket platform’s control of the resale market. This is due to the cross-market spillover effect 
between the primary market and the resale market: lowering the price or the service fee on one 
platform will lead to more transactions on the other platform. The integrated platform will tend to 
internalize the positive spillover effect by lowering the price and the service fee in both markets, 
which can alleviate the double-marginalization problem in the primary market channel so the 
musician is more willing to choose a larger venue size to serve more consumers. Consequently, 
the price in the primary market and the service fee in the resale markets are lower, more consumers 





























that lower service fees in the resale market may surprisingly reduce the consumer surplus, because 
more tickets will be misallocated to consumers who are less likely to attend the concert. Moreover, 
the presence of a small group of scalpers can lead to lower ticket prices, higher musician’s profit, 
and higher consumer surplus. Using data from Ticketmaster and StubHub, we provide some 
empirical support for some of our theoretical predictions. 
The result has important implications for legislation on restricting a primary ticket platform’s 
ability to block competitors in the resale market, e.g., the Tickets Resale Rights Act banning 
Ticketmaster’s Paperless Ticket system. Such legislation usually reasons that when the primary 
platform has more control of the resale market, it will have a stronger pricing power in the primary 
and the resale markets, thus will charge higher prices and service fees, making consumers and 
musicians worse off. In this paper, we argue that such reasoning may be flawed because it neglects 
the spillover effect between the primary and the resale markets and how the double-
marginalization problem in the primary market can be alleviated with the integration of the primary 
and the resale platforms. Our policy suggestion is that legislation should be careful in restricting 
the primary platform’s practices in controlling the resale market or the collusion between primary 
and resale platforms.  
This paper is also related to anti-scalping laws. It has been long debated whether allowing 
scalping could benefit the ticket sellers and consumers or not. This paper provides another reason 
why scalpers could potentially be beneficial, i.e., they may incentivize the primary platform to set 
a lower final price if it also has a presence in the resale market. The double-marginalization 
problem in the primary market can be alleviated as a result, making the musician, the integrated 
platform, and the consumers better off.  
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This paper establishes an analytical framework to analyze the interaction among the musician, 
the primary platform, and the resale platform in the concert ticket market. The framework provides 
a foundation for future research on related topics. For example, although dynamic pricing is 
currently uncommon in concert ticket industry, it is used by several sports teams in National 
Football League and Major League Baseball. One can investigate how the primary ticket 
platform’s optimal dynamic pricing decision would change when the platform also controls the 
resale market. We conjecture that an integrated platform has an incentive to increase its primary-
market price over time, which can attract consumers who are uncertain of whether they can attend 
the concert to buy tickets early, leading to more transactions in the resale market. Our paper also 
provides some correlational empirical support for our theoretical prediction of the pricing patterns. 
Future empirical research could validate our predictions with more generalized methods and can 
further explore how the welfare of the musician and consumers will be affected.   
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2 For ease of exposition, we will refer to a platform as “it,” the musician as “he,” and the consumer 
as “she.” 
3 In practice, the prices of most tickets for most concerts are fixed over time. To be consistent, we 
also assume in our model that the ticket price is constant over time.    
4 Note that in the second period, all avid fans and half of casual fans, whose population adds up to 
1+𝛼
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, the venue will 
not be able to hold all these consumers. 
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7 Our results are qualitatively the same if scalpers and regular consumers have equal probability 
of getting tickets. 
8 We use “ ̂” over  a variable indicates a consumer’s rational prediction of a variable that has not 
realized yet. 
9 Note that in this example, without loss of generality, we use the total market size of 1,000 rather 
than 1 to keep the figures integers.  
10 In the box plot, the minimum (maximum) of a group is represented by the end point of the lower 
(upper) whisker. The 25th-percentile (75th-percentile) is represented by the lower (upper) edge of 
the box. The median is represented by the bold line in the center of a box. 
11 We collected these data on April 26th, 2018, so we were unable to find the resale service fee on 





Chapter 2   Consumer Search on Online Retail Platforms 
2.1  Introduction 
Online retailing is growing rapidly. In the United States, online retail sales as a percent of 
total retail sales have more than tripled from 2.7% in 2006 to 9.5% in 2018, and the estimated sales 
on online retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com, eBay.com, and Taobao.com) reached $124 billion 
in Q1 2018.1 In a survey covering 19 countries and territories, more than 95% of some 19,000 
respondents have online shopping experience, and more than half of them shop online at least once 
a month (PwC 2015). Consumers often buy products from independent sellers on retail platforms. 
Take Amazon.com, which accounts for 43% of United States online retail sales.2 In 2015, over 
two million independent sellers sold products on Amazon.com worldwide, contributing to 83% of 
revenue of Amazon.com. 3  A platform’s profit typically comes from the referral fees, a.k.a. 
commissions paid by independent sellers, most commonly a percentage of the product prices. In 
Q1 2017, Amazon.com received $8 billion from referral fees collected from independent sellers.  
Consumers search for products that match their preferences better or have lower prices. 
Consumers’ search cost for product information on online retail platforms has significantly 
dropped in recent years. One driving force is technology advancements. Wider adoptions of high-
speed Internet have significantly reduced the amount of time of loading webpages. The increasing 
popularity of smartphones and tablet computers has also lowered consumers’ perceived search 
cost. In addition, many retail platforms also invest in reducing the search cost of their customers. 
Amazon has been continually improving its webpage design, thereby enabling its independent 
sellers to demonstrate their products with multimedia content formats (e.g., info-graphics, audios, 
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and videos). For example, Amazon permitted some qualified independent sellers to upload “video 
shorts” to their product pages in 2014, and opened up this function to all independent sellers in 
2017.4 In 2009, Amazon debuted the camera search function in its mobile app, enabling consumers 
to shoot a photo of an item to search for similar products on Amazon.com. In 2017, Amazon 
partnered with Samsung to incorporate camera search in the camera app of Samsung’s 
smartphones.5 Amazon has also been developing its augmented-reality view technology, which 
allows consumers to see, for example, how a watch on Amazon.com would look like around their 
wrists before buying it.6 Retail platforms invest billions of dollars in reducing consumers’ search 
cost. For instance, in Q1 2016, Amazon spent over $1.2 billion on augmented reality and virtual 
reality, and a considerable fraction of this investment intended to improve consumers’ search 
experience.7 
Empirical academic research also suggests that consumers’ online search cost has decreased 
over time. Many studies have estimated consumers’ online search cost for hotels, books, tablets, 
computer parts, etc. (Bajari et al. 2003, Blake et al. 2016, Chen and Yao 2016, De los Santos 2008, 
De los Santos et al. 2017, Ghose et al. 2013, Hong and Shum 2006, Jiang et al. 2017, Jolivet and 
Turon 2017, Koulayev 2014, Moraga-Gonzaíez and Wildenbeest 2008, Moraga-González et al. 
2013, Santos et al. 2012). Most of these studies indicate that consumers’ online search cost per 
item is between 1 and 10 US dollars. Figure 2.1 plots their estimated search costs8 against the years 
of their datasets used for estimation. The estimated search costs tend to decrease over time, 





Figure 2.1   Estimated Search Cost vs Dataset Time  
It is not obvious why retail platforms would spend billions of dollars on reducing consumers’ 
search cost. Although doing so can attract more consumers, it will intensify the competition among 
sellers and hence reduce the platform’s revenue from its referral fees. Extant literature provides 
little explanation on why and when a platform should invest in lowering consumers’ search cost.  
Extant literature also provides little insight on how the consumer’s search cost will influence 
the platform’s optimal referral-fee decisions. Most studies either assume the sellers sell directly to 
consumers—completely ignoring the retail platform—or treat the platform’s referral fee as an 
exogenous variable. Because the referral fee is a major contributor to a retail platform’s profit, it 
is practically important for a platform to understand how to optimally adjust its referral fee when 
the consumer’s search cost changes. 
Besides reducing the consumer’s search cost for product information, online retail platforms 
also utilize other instruments to make consumer search easier. For example, many platforms allow 
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when searching for shoes. However, consumers still need to search the information for other 
attributes that are harder to filter, e.g., shoe design and style. To our knowledge, the extant 
literature either ignores the filtering function or treats its effect on consumer search simply as a 
reduction in the consumer’s search cost, except that Zhong (2017) considers a related setting of 
targeted search (We will discuss the difference between our paper and Zhong (2017) in the next 
section.). No research has studied how filtering affects the platform, independent sellers, and 
consumers and how its effect is different from that of a reduction in the search cost. 
  In summary, several important questions have not been well studied by the previous research:  
 Why have many retail platforms been heavily investing in reducing the consumer’s search 
cost, even though the lowered search cost may intensify sellers’ competition and hurt 
platforms’ profit? 
 How will the consumer’s search cost affect optimal pricing decisions of the sellers and the 
platform? How will their profits be influenced? 
 How will filtering affect the platform, the sellers, and consumers? How is its impact different 
from that of a reduction of the consumer’s search cost? 
We develop a game-theoretic framework to address these research questions. In our model, 
many independent sellers sell horizontally differentiated products on a retail platform where 
consumers sequentially search for these products. Similar to Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and 
Renault (1997), consumers initially do not know product prices or match levels—how well a 
product matches their preferences—and can learn a product’s price and match level after incurring 
a search cost. The retail platform sets a percentage referral fee (also known as “commission” or 
“final value fee” in practice) that is charged to sellers. The sellers then simultaneously set their 
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retail prices. We also model the filtering function on the platform. A product’s (aggregate) match 
level consists of two parts: the filterable match level and the unfilterable match level. Filtering 
allows consumers to costless learn a product’s filterable match level, but they still need to search 
for its unfilterable match level. In the analysis, we derive the equilibria in two scenarios. The first 
scenario constitutes our benchmark, where the platform’s referral fee is exogenous, i.e., the 
platform does not adjust its fee when the consumer’s search cost changes. This setting is more 
reasonable in the short term when the platform has not adjusted its referral fee after the search cost 
changes. In the second scenario, the referral fee is endogenously decided by the platform, i.e., the 
platform optimally chooses its referral fee as the consumer’s search cost changes. This setting is 
more reasonable in the long term when the platform can adjust its referral fee responding to the 
change in search cost. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes in these two scenarios, we can 
determine how the effects of a search-cost decrease differ in the short term versus in the long term. 
We highlight several interesting findings. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom that a 
lower search cost will reduce sellers’ profits because it intensifies competition among them, we 
show that a decrease in the search cost can actually increase the sellers’ profits, although the sellers 
receive less profit per unit sale. This is because a decrease in the search cost can attract more 
consumers to the platform (rather than choosing the outside option) and hence expand the market 
demand.  
Second, we find that the retail platform can always benefit from a decrease in the consumer’s 
search cost when it optimally sets the referral fee, although its profit may decrease when the 
referral fee is exogenous. When the referral fee is exogenous, a lower search cost will attract more 
consumers to the platform, but also intensify price competition between sellers and reduce the 
platform’s referral fee revenue per unit sale. Therefore, the platform’s profit can either increase or 
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decrease in equilibrium. By contrast, by optimally adjusting the referral fee, the platform can 
expand its demand without heavily hurting its profit margin, so its profit always increases when 
the search cost declines. Our finding potentially explains why many retail platforms invest large 
amounts of money to reduce the consumer’s search cost in reality. 
Third, we investigate how the platform should adjust its referral fee as the consumer’s search 
cost changes. One may expect that because a lower search cost tends to intensify sellers’ 
competition and reduce the platform’s profit margin, the platform should compensate it by raising 
its referral fee. Interestingly, we find that in equilibrium the platform may choose to lower its 
referral fee if the reduction in search cost significantly increases the demand elasticity of the 
referral fee. In this case, a lower the search cost makes the platform, the sellers, and the consumers 
all better off. By contrast, when a search-cost reduction does not significantly increase the demand 
elasticity, the platform will find it optimal to increase its referral fee. In this case, the decrease in 
the search cost can counterintuitively lead to higher retail prices. This result provides a possible 
explanation to the empirical puzzle that the prices in very competitive markets can be maintained 
much higher than marginal costs even when the search cost is sufficiently low (Clemons et al. 
2002, Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004). 
Fourth, we show that filtering has two opposite effects on how well the product bought by 
consumers matches their preferences in equilibrium. On the positive side, consumers can narrow 
their search set down to the products with better match on filterable attributes. On the negative 
side, because filtering has revealed the filterable match levels to consumers, conducting a search 
will uncover less information in expectation and bring less benefit to consumers. The negative 
effect makes consumers search fewer products and offsets the partially benefit of filtering in 
expectation. We also study how filtering will change the sellers’ pricing strategies. We find that 
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filtering will reshape the demand function for a product. Intuitively speaking, if the market demand 
tends to have a relatively longer (shorter) tail after filtering becomes available, the competition 
between sellers will be alleviated (intensified) and the equilibrium retail price is likely to increase 
(decrease). In other words, filtering can either strengthen or soften the competition between sellers. 
These results suggest that filtering can have very different marketing consequences compared to a 
search-cost reduction, which will encourage consumers to search more and always intensify the 
competition between sellers.  
Lastly, we show that our results are robust when consumers have heterogeneous search costs, 
when products have heterogeneous quality levels, and when the platform charges a fixed (instead 
of percentage) referral fee. We also provide guidance on how the sellers should optimally choose 
their prices when consumers have heterogeneous search costs, and investigate how the distribution 
of the consumer’s outside options will affect the profits of the platform and sellers, as well as the 
platform’s incentive to invest in reducing the consumer’s search cost. 
2.2  Literature Review 
Our research is closely related to the literature on consumer search. Extensive literature has 
studied how the decrease in the consumer’s search cost can influence product prices, firm profits, 
and consumer welfare. Many theoretical studies show that prices will drop to the marginal cost 
when the consumer’s search cost diminishes to zero (Anderson and Renault 1999, Salop and 
Stiglitz 1977, Stahl 1989, Stigler 1961, Wolinsky 1986). Their predictions are supported by several 
empirical studies showing that the Internet has intensified price competition and reduced prices in 
markets for insurance (Brown and Goolsbee 2002), books and CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), 
and prescription drugs (Sorensen 2000). To frustrate consumer search, some sellers engage in 
obfuscation (Ellison and Ellison 2009) to blur the product’s price information. By contrast, there 
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is evidence showing that many firms can still sell at prices considerably higher than marginal costs 
even in very competitive markets with low search costs (Clemons et al. 2002, Hortaçsu and 
Syverson 2004). Some of more recent analytical research finds that a decrease in search cost may 
not always lead to more intense market competition or lower profits. Kuksov (2004) suggests that 
a search-cost reduction may facilitate product differentiation and lead to higher prices and industry 
profit. Cachon et al. (2008) show that when consumers’ search cost decreases, sellers may expand 
their product assortments, which can increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay for their most-
desired products, leading to higher equilibrium price and profit. Some research on consumer search 
studies different features in search markets. Armstrong et al. (2009) study the implication of 
“prominence” in a search market. A prominent seller will be searched first by all consumers in the 
search process. They show that the highest-quality sellers will have the highest incentive to become 
prominent. Recent research (Branco et al. 2012, 2016, Ke et al. 2016) has also considered 
consumers’ decision on how much information to acquire for a single product or for a multi-period 
scenario. 
An important research question of this paper is that how changes in search cost on the platform 
will affect the retail platform’s optimal referral fee and market competition. By contrast, most of 
these studies assume that firms sell directly to consumers. An exception is Janssen and Shelegia 
(2015), who study consumer search in a distributional channel. In their model, a single 
manufacturer sells its product to two symmetric competing retailers at the same wholesale price, 
and consumers have perfect knowledge of product quality but need to search to find out the 
retailers’ prices. They show that consumers’ lack of knowledge about the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price will make both the consumer and the manufacturer worse off. Our article is 
different from Janssen and Shelegia (2015). First, we consider a very different market setting. In 
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their model, the manufacturer sells its homogeneous product to two symmetric retailers on the 
same wholesale-price contract, whereas in our model many sellers sell their respective 
differentiated products on the retail platform which charges the sellers a percentage fee for access 
to customers. Second, in our framework, consumers know neither the product’s match level nor 
its price before searching, whereas in Janssen and Shelegia (2015) only price is not known ex ante 
(because both retailers sell the same product of known valuation).  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two analytical studies about how consumer search 
on retail platforms. Dukes and Liu (2016) examine how a platform should choose the optimal 
search cost level when the consumer optimally decides how many sellers to search and how deeply 
to evaluate each of them. However, they do not consider the platform’s optimal referral-fee 
decision. By contrast, one of our main research questions is how the change in search cost will 
affect the platform’s optimal referral fee. In addition, in our framework, consumers conduct 
sequential search for products, rather than simultaneous search in Dukes and Liu (2016). Zhong 
(2017) considers the setting where the platform knows partially about how products match each 
consumer’s preference and adopts targeted search technology to show a consumer only products 
whose match levels are above a certain threshold. Zhong (2017) shows that an increase in the 
threshold is equivalent to a decrease in the search cost when the threshold is not too high, which 
will intensify price competition and decrease the price. By contrast, if targeted search is very 
precise, consumers will have no need to search in equilibrium, making sellers essential 
monopolists and leading to higher equilibrium prices and lower demand. Therefore, the platform 
wants to limit the precision of its targeted search, even if increasing the precision incurs no direct 
cost. Our paper proposes that filtering can be a very different mechanism than targeted search in 
Zhong (2017). Filtering will reduce the products’ match-level uncertainty so consumers will enjoy 
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less benefit per search. Conversely, targeted search technology will exclude less-relevant products 
from the search set so consumers will enjoy more benefit per search. Filtering and targeted search 
can also affect the equilibrium prices differently. Targeted search will be equivalent to a reduction 
in search cost and intensify competition between sellers for most of cases and will alleviate 
competition only in the extreme case where all consumers search only one product in equilibrium. 
In contrast, filtering is different from a reduction in search cost and can alleviate competition 
between sellers in more general situations where some consumers search multiple products in 
equilibrium. We also analyze research questions not considered by Zhong (2017), such as the 
effects of the consumer’s search cost and the platform’s optimal referral fee decision.  
Our research also contributes to the general literature on online retail platforms. Research on 
retail platforms mainly focuses on two-sided markets (Armstrong 2006, Hagiu 2006, Rochet and 
Tirole 2003, 2005). Our research contributes to this literature by explicitly studying how the 
consumer’s search cost will influence the platform’s pricing decision and profitability. We show 
that as the consumer’s search cost decreases, the platform’s profit always increases if the platform 
optimally adjusts its fee. Whether the platform should raise or reduce its fee depends on how the 
change in search cost affects demand elasticity. 
2.3  Model Setup 
There are 𝑛 independent sellers selling differentiated products on an online retail platform, 
which charges a percentage referral fee (𝑟) for these sellers. We focus on the case when 𝑛 is large, 
so the probability that consumers run out of sellers to search is negligible. Consumer 𝑗’s utility of 
buying seller 𝑖 ’s product is 𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖 , where 𝑀𝑖𝑗  is the “match level” of product 𝑖  to 
consumer 𝑗, measuring how well product 𝑖 matches consumer 𝑗’s preference, and 𝑝𝑖 is the price of 
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product 𝑖. There are no systematic differences among sellers ex ante. All sellers have the same 
marginal production cost 𝑐. Consumer 𝑗 also has an outside option with utility 𝑢0𝑗, distributed with 
the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) 𝐹0(𝑢) and the probability distribution function (p.d.f.) 
𝑓0(𝑢). Without loss of generality, we normalize the total number of consumers to 1.  
Filtering 
Many retail platforms allow their customers to filter products based on certain product 
attributes. For example, if a consumer wants to buy a pair of Nike Lunarglide 8 running shoes, 
Amazon allows her to filter the search outcomes based on attributes such as shoe size, width, and 
color (See Figure 2.2 for an example.). Filtering enables consumers to find products that match 
their preferences better on these attributes. We define these attributes as a product’s filterable 
attributes. In practice, however, filtering usually cannot exhaust all product attributes. There are 
some unfilterable attributes, e.g., shoe design and style, which consumers can learn only through 
searching.  
 
Figure 2.2   Screenshot of Search Results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” on Amazon.com 
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We decompose a consumer’s match level, 𝑀𝑖𝑗, into two parts: 𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 +𝑚𝑖𝑗. The filterable 
match level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗, captures how well the filterable attributes match a consumer’s preference. The 
unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗, reflects how well the unfilterable attributes match the consumer’s 
preference. The filtering function on the platform enables consumers to costless learn the filterable 
match level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , before searching a product. However, consumers still need to search for a 
product’s unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗. 𝜇𝑖𝑗 and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 are independently and identically distributed 
across products and consumers. To avoid confusion, we refer to 𝑀𝑖𝑗 as the product’s aggregate 
match level henceforth.  
In practice, the filters on the platform usually classify each filterable attribute into a finite 
number of categories. For example, Amazon classifies the color of men’s running shoes into 12 
categories. In our model, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 follows a discrete distribution with 𝐾(≥ 2) possible outcomes. 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is 
equal to the 𝑘-th-lowest-possible filterable match level, 𝜇𝑘, with probability 𝜙𝑘, where 𝜇1 < 𝜇2 <
⋯ < 𝜇𝐾 and ∑ 𝜙𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 1. The c.d.f. and p.d.f. of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 are 𝐹(𝑚) and 𝑓(𝑚), respectively. Without 
loss of generality, we assume 𝐄[𝜇𝑖𝑗] = 0, 
9 which implies that 𝜇1 < 0 and 𝜇𝐾 > 0.  
We make several technical assumptions on the distributions of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 and 𝑢0𝑗. First, 𝑓(𝑚) and 
𝑓0(𝑢) have supports (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥)  and (𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥), where −∞ ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ +∞ and 
−∞ ≤ 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ +∞ , are twice continuously differentiable and strictly positive. Second, 
to guarantee existence of a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, 𝐹(𝑚)  is assumed to have a 
decreasing inverse hazard rate ℎ(𝑚) =
1−𝐹(𝑚)
𝑓(𝑚)
. Many commonly used distributions, e.g., normal 
distributions, uniform distributions, exponential distributions, and logistic distributions, satisfy 
these properties above. Third, we assume 𝜏 < 𝐄[𝑚] − max{𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛} to exclude the trivial 




Each consumer buys at most one product, and will either purchase from a seller on the 
platform or choose the outside option (not buying from any seller). A consumer a priori does not 
know a product’s unfilterable match level, 𝑚𝑖𝑗, nor its price, 𝑝𝑖. We assume that consumers do not 
know 𝑝𝑖 ex ante (even after filtering) because in practice many online sellers do not immediately 
show their final transaction price until after a consumer visits their product pages or until the 
product is put in the shopping cart. For example, Ellison and Ellison (2009) document that many 
online sellers of computer parts on retail platforms post low prices to attract consumers to visit 
their product pages and postpone showing consumers the shipping-and-handling cost, taxes or add-
on fees. The final transaction price can be much higher than the posted price that consumers see 
in the beginning. Moreover, a seller may set different prices for different variants of a product 
(e.g., the same design of shoes with different colors), and sometimes the platform will put all these 
variants together within the same webpage and only show their price range or the minimum price. 
Consumers can find the exact price of a specific product variant only after further searching. 
Moreover, filtering and sorting by product prices are often ineffective in practice. For example, if 
one sorts the search results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” by prices from low to high (see Figure 2.3), 
many irrelevant results appear at the top of the page. 20 out of the top 24 results are either non-




Figure 2.3 Screenshot of Search Results of “Nike Lunarglide 8” on Amazon.com, 
Sorted by Option “Price: Low to High” 
Each consumer 𝑗 a priori knows her utility of her own outside option 𝑢0𝑗 and the filterable 
match level of every product, 𝜇𝑖𝑗. To find out 𝑝𝑖 and the exact value of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 for a product, the 
consumer needs to incur a search cost 𝜏. The search cost may include the consumer’s time and 
effort in reading product introduction, understanding the information, and evaluating the product, 
etc. A consumer can decide whether to shop on the platform. If she does, she search the sellers 
sequentially. Specifically, after each search, the consumer learns the exact value of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 and 𝑝𝑖 for 
the searched product 𝑖, then she can decide whether to buy it. If the consumer buys a product, she 
will stop searching and exit the market, otherwise she can continue searching another seller or 
leave the market without buying anything. If the consumer continues searching, one can show that 
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she will next search the seller with the highest 𝜇𝑖𝑗 not yet searched. If there are multiple unsearched 
sellers with the highest 𝜇𝑖𝑗, she will be equally likely to choose one from them to search. 
Sellers, retail platform and time sequence 
The timing of the game is as follows: First, the retail platform sets a percentage referral fee 
𝑟 ∈ (0,1) for all sellers. We assume that the platform’s marginal cost is zero. Then, given 𝑟, all 
sellers simultaneously decide their retail prices. For each unit of product 𝑖 sold at retail price 𝑝𝑖, 
the retail platform earns 𝑟𝑝𝑖 and seller 𝑖’s profit is (1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐. Last, consumers make search 
and purchase decisions. 
Using backward induction, we determine the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: 
given the platform’s referral fee 𝑟, in equilibrium all sellers will charge the same retail price, 𝑝∗. 
Let 𝑝∗(𝑟) denote the seller’s equilibrium retail price given the referral fee 𝑟, and let 𝑟∗ denote the 
platform’s optimal percentage referral fee. Consumers have rational expectations about sellers’ 
prices, i.e., prior to a search they expect that the next seller’s retail price will be 𝑝∗(𝑟).  
2.4  Equilibrium Analysis 
We start by analyzing the consumer’s searching and purchasing strategies. Suppose that the 
platform’s referral fee is 𝑟  and the equilibrium retail price is 𝑝∗(𝑟). Let product 𝑖  be the last 
product that consumer j has just searched and her utility of buying it is 𝑢𝑖𝑗. Because the number of 
sellers (𝑛) is large, consumers will only search sellers with the highest possible filterable match 
level, 𝜇𝐾. It follows from Wolinsky (1986) that consumer 𝑗’s optimal sequential-search strategy is 
to stop searching and purchase the last searched product 𝑖 if and only if conducting another search 
will increase her expected utility beyond 𝑢𝑖𝑗 by an amount lower than the search cost 𝜏; otherwise 
she will continue searching. We have the following two results. 
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RESULT 1. In a symmetric equilibrium where all sellers charge prices 𝑝∗(𝑟), if consumer 𝑗 
faces product 𝑖 with 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝
∗(𝑟) and 𝑚𝑖𝑗, she will purchase product 𝑖 if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≥ ?̅?(𝜏), 




RESULT 2. ?̅? strictly decreases in the consumer’s search cost 𝜏. 
Result 1 suggests that ?̅?(𝜏)  is essentially the equilibrium acceptance threshold of the 
unfilterable match level. Note that the threshold is uniquely determined by the search cost, 𝜏. In 
the rest of the article, we use ?̅? to represent ?̅?(𝜏) for conciseness. Result 2 shows that when the 
search cost (𝜏) declines, searching another product becomes less costly to consumers. Therefore, 
they will have a higher purchase threshold ?̅?.  
It follows Wolinsky (1986) that seller 𝑖’s profit as a function of its price 𝑝𝑖 is: 
where the superscript 𝑆 represents the seller. 
The platform’s total demand, the number of consumers buying on the platform, is 𝐷 =
𝐹0(?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟)) . The expected consumer surplus is 𝐶𝑆(𝜏, 𝑟) = 𝐄𝑢0[max {𝑢0, ?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑝∗(𝑟)}]. 
2.4.1 Exogenous Referral Fee 
We first analyze the benchmark case when the referral fee 𝑟  is exogenous, that is, the 
platform’s referral fee does not change with the search cost. In practice, platforms do not adjust 
the referral fee levels frequently. One reason is that platforms usually need to make announcements 
𝜋𝑖
𝑆 =
𝜙𝐾𝐹0(?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟))
𝜙𝐾𝑛 ⋅ (1 − 𝐹(?̅?))⏟              
Prob(a consumer visit seller 𝑖)
⋅ [1 − 𝐹(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖)]⏟                
Prob(Consumer buys from seller 𝑖)
⋅ [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]⏟          





months before the fee change becomes effective. For example, on November 9th, 2016, Amazon 
announced that it would increase the referral fee for media products starting March 1st, 2017.10 
Similarly, on February 26th, 2017, eBay announced an increase in its fee for certain products to be 
effective after May 1st, 2017. Another reason is that frequently changing the referral fee will 
increase sellers’ risk selling on the platform and lead to confusion, distrust, and frustration among 
them. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume an exogenous referral fee in the short term. 
Sellers’ optimal decisions 
We use “  ̃” over variables to indicate the exogenous-referral-fee case.  
LEMMA 1. Given the platform’s referral fee 𝑟, the sellers’ equilibrium retail price is 𝑝∗ =
𝑐
1−𝑟







(1 − 𝑟)ℎ(?̅?) , respectively. The total demand on the platform is ?̃?∗ =




Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium retail price, the sellers’ profit, and the total demand 
given the percentage referral fee 𝑟. When 𝑟 increases, the platform charges a higher mark-up for a 
unit sale, so the retail price will increase in equilibrium. Thus, the total market demand on the 
platform and the sellers’ profit will both decrease. Note that a seller’s per-unit-sale profit is 
proportional to ℎ(?̅?). Intuitively, a higher ℎ(?̅?) corresponds to more intense competition among 
the sellers. If a consumer is searching a seller charging the equilibrium price, 𝑝∗, she will buy the 
product if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > ?̅?. If this seller increases its price by a small amount to 𝑝
∗ + Δ𝑝, then 
the consumer will buy the product if and only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > ?̅? + Δ𝑝. Thus, the small increase in price 
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. When ℎ(?̅?) is 
high, a seller will have stronger incentives to increase its price because doing so will only reduce 
sales slightly.  
LEMMA 2. When the consumer’s search cost decreases, given that a consumer searches on 
the platform, the expected number of products that she will search before purchase will increase, 
and the expected aggregate match level of the product that she will purchase will also increase. 
When searching for another product becomes less costly, a consumer will stop searching at a 
higher match-level threshold, ?̅?,. Hence, she will search more products and purchase a product 
with higher 𝑀𝑖𝑗 in expectation. 
Proposition 1 summarizes how the equilibrium retail price, the market demand, and a seller’s 
profit will change as the search cost (𝜏) decreases. 
PROPOSITION 1. When the referral fee (𝑟) is exogenous, as the consumer’s search cost (𝜏) 
decreases, (1) the equilibrium price 𝑝∗  decreases (
𝜕?̃?∗
𝜕𝜏
> 0), (2) the equilibrium total market 
demand  strictly increases (
𝜕?̃?
𝜕𝜏
< 0) , (3) each seller’s expected profit ?̃?𝑖
𝑆∗ and the platform’s 
expected profit ?̃?𝑃∗ may either increase or decrease. 
One might intuit that a lower search cost will intensify the competition between sellers and 
reduce their prices and profits. We find that when the search cost decreases, although sellers’ 
equilibrium prices decrease, they may receive higher profits. This is due to a market expansion 
effect: a decrease in the search cost will make consumers more likely to choose to shop on the 
platform rather than choosing the outside option, so a seller’s market demand will increase. The 
platform’s profit may either increase or decrease in equilibrium. 
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Example 1. To explore in detail how the consumer’s search cost affects the sellers and the 
platform, we consider a special example where 𝜇𝐾 = 0.5, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 follows the uniform distribution 
between -0.5 and 0.5, and the utility of the outside option 𝑢0𝑗 is uniformly distributed between 0 
and 1.  The inverse hazard function of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is ℎ(𝑚) = 0.5 − 𝑚. We consider the case with the 







, otherwise all consumers will search at most one product in 
equilibrium. One can easily show that ?̅? = 0.5 − √2𝜏 and the equilibrium retail price is 𝑝∗ =
𝑐
1−𝑟
+ √2𝜏.  
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. Therefore, in the case where the referral fee 𝑟 is exogenous, 
both the firm’s profit and the sellers’ profit first increase and then decrease with 𝜏 (See Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4   Seller’s and Platform’s Profits 




2.4.2 Endogenous Referral Fee 
In this subsection, we study the case where the retail platform endogenously chooses its 
referral fee to maximize its expected profit. In the long term, the platform can strategically adjust 
its referral fee when the search cost changes, so it is more reasonable consider the case of 
endogenous referral fee. Denote 𝑟∗(𝜏)  the platform’s optimal percentage fee and 𝜋𝑃∗ =
𝜋𝑃(𝑟∗(𝜏)) the platform’s optimal profit when the consumer’s search cost is 𝜏.  
PROPOSITION 2. When the platform endogenously sets the referral fee 𝑟, a decrease in the 




A lower search cost may have either positive or negative impacts on the platform’s profit. On 
the one hand, a lower search cost can benefit the platform because it expands market demand. On 
the other hand, it tends to intensify price competition among sellers, which can reduce the 
platform’s per-unit-sale profit. Proposition 1 has shown that when the platform’s referral fee is 
exogenous, a search-cost reduction can either increase or reduce the platform’s profit. In contrast, 
Proposition 2 shows that the platform will always benefit from a lower search cost when it 
optimally chooses its referral fee because it can expand the total demand without heavily reducing 
its profit margin. 
Proposition 2 suggests that if the retail platform can optimally adjust its referral fee in the long 
term, it should always try to reduce the consumer’s search cost if doing so is not too costly. The 
result potentially explains why retail platforms, such as Amazon.com, have invested millions of 
dollars in improving consumers’ search experience and reducing their search cost on the platform. 
Although the platform may see a profit drop in the short term (with the referral fee fixed), it will 
see a profit increase in the long term when it optimally adjusts its referral fee level.  
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Next, we study how the retail platform should optimally adjust its referral fee with the 
consumer’s search cost. Intuitively, a reduction in the search cost tends to intensify the competition 
among sellers and hence reduce the platform’s profit margin, so the platform would mitigate its 
profit-margin decrease by raising the referral fee. However, Proposition 3 shows that under some 
conditions, it may be optimal for the platform to reduce its referral fee as the consumer’s search 






 be the platform’s demand elasticity of referral fee 𝑟.  
PROPOSITION 3. When the consumer’s search cost 𝜏 decreases (i.e., when ?̅? increases), the 















Proposition 3 characterizes the conditions under which the platform should raise or reduce its 
referral fee when the search cost decreases. If a decrease in the search cost significantly increases 
the (absolute value of) demand elasticity, the platform will find it optimal to reduce its referral fee 
because doing so can significantly increase the total demand. Note that the lowered referral fee 
will reduce the equilibrium retail price but could actually increase the sellers’ profit margin. As a 
result, a lower search cost can be all-win for the platform, sellers and consumers if the platform 
chooses to reduce its referral fee in equilibrium.  
Similarly, if a decrease in the search cost does not significantly raise the (absolute value of) 
demand elasticity, then the platform will find it optimal to raise its referral fee, leading to an 
increase in its profit margin. In this case, a decrease in the search cost can reduce sellers’ profits 
and increase the equilibrium retail prices, making the consumers possibly worse off as well. 
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Proposition 3 suggests that when consumers’ search cost declines, whether the retail platform 
should reduce or raise its referral fee depends on how the demand elasticity changes. If a decrease 
in the search cost will attract new customers who are relatively more price-sensitive compared to 
the platform’s existing customers, the platform will have a more elastic demand, so the platform 
tends to reduce its referral fee. In reality, this can happen for a high-end platform (relative to other 
competing platforms) with a wealthier, price-insensitive customer base. By lowering consumers’ 
search cost on the platform, it can attract some marginal consumers, who are relatively more price-
sensitive than the platform’s existing customers, from competing low-end platforms. In this case, 
the platform’s demand elasticity will increase, so the platform may want to lower its referral fee 
to boost its sales volume. Conversely, if the decrease in the search cost will attract new customers 
who are less price-sensitive compared to the existing customer base, the platform’s demand tends 
to become increasingly inelastic so the platform should increase its fee. In reality, this could 
happen for a relatively budget-friendly platform (compared to its competitors). A decrease in the 
search cost will help the platform to attract some wealthier customers from its competitors, which 
reduces the platform’s overall demand elasticity. 
In practice, it is easy for the platform to reduce the referral fee. However, the platform may 
receive complaints from sellers and consumers when raising the referral fees. In practice, when 
the platform finds it optimal to raise the referral fees, it should try to alleviate the sellers’ and 
consumers’ dissatisfaction. For example, the platform may want to announce a soon-to-be-in-
effect fee increase at the same time as it introduces new search features and technologies on its 
website (e.g., augmented-reality technologies), and the platform can communicate to sellers and 
consumers that the fee increase will enable the platform to cover the cost of developing and 
offering such new technologies.  
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Example 2. To further study how the search cost’s impact may be different when the referral 
fee is endogenous versus when it is exogenous, we consider the numerical example with the same 
distributions and parameters as those in Example 1 (the exogenous-referral-fee case), but allow 
the platform to endogenously choose its referral fee.  
 
(a) Equilibrium Referral Fee and Retail Price 
 
(b) Seller’s and Platform’s Profit 
Figure 2.5   Numerical Example with Endogenous Referral Fee 
 
Note. This figure is plotted using 𝑐 = 0.05. The curves are rescaled to be fit in the same figure. 
Figure 2.5(a) plots how the platform’s optimal referral fee and the equilibrium retail price 
changes with the search cost 𝜏. In Example 1 where the referral fee is exogenous, the reduction in 
𝜏 will always reduce the equilibrium retail price, 𝑝∗, because it intensifies the seller competition. 
Conversely, in Example 2 with endogenous referral fee, when 𝜏 is already low, further decreasing 
𝜏 can lead to a higher 𝑝∗. This is because the platform will increase its referral fee when 𝜏 becomes 
lower, forcing the sellers to charge higher prices to cover their cost. Despite the increase in retail 
price, the sellers’ profit per unit sale will decrease. In other words, the reduction in the consumer’s 
search cost may intensify the double-marginalization problem in the channel and lead to higher 
final prices. Figure 2.5(b) depicts how the platform’s and the sellers’ profits will change with the 
consumer’s search cost, 𝜏 . Echoing Proposition 2, although the decrease in 𝜏  can lower the 
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platform’s profit in the case with exogenous referral fee, 𝑟, the platform’s profit will always 
increase if it can optimally adjust 𝑟. 
2.5  Filtering 
This section studies how the filtering function on the platform can affect the consumer’s 
optimal search and the seller’s pricing strategies, and how its effects can be different from that of 
a reduction in search cost. To this end, we compare the equilibrium outcome of the no-filtering 
case with that in the main model where filtering is available. In the no-filtering case, consumers 
do not observe a product’s filterable match level (𝜇𝑖𝑗) before searching, and searching a product 
informs a consumer of the aggregate match level 𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 +𝑚𝑖𝑗. 
Let 𝐹𝑀(𝑀) and 𝑓𝑀(𝑀) denote the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of 𝑀𝑖𝑗. Note that 𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑘 with probability 
𝜙𝑘  and the c.d.f. of 𝑚𝑖𝑗  is 𝐹(𝑚) , so 𝐹𝑀(𝑀) = Pr(𝑀𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀) = Pr(𝜇𝑖𝑗 +𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀) =
∑ Pr(𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑘) ⋅ Pr(𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 = ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 , or equivalenty 𝐹𝑀(𝑀) =
𝐄𝜇[𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇)]. This equation reveals the relationship between the distributions of 𝑀𝑖𝑗, 𝜇𝑖𝑗, and 
𝑚𝑖𝑗. Intuitively, when the filterable match level is 𝜇𝑘, the aggregate match level (𝑀𝑖𝑗) exceeds 𝑀 
if and only if the corresponding unfilterable match level (𝑚𝑖𝑗) exceeds 𝑀− 𝜇𝑘. Hence, the overall 
probability of 𝑀𝑖𝑗 > 𝑀 will be the expected probability of 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > 𝑀 − 𝜇, where the expectation is 
taken with respect to the filterable match level, 𝜇.  
Notice that 𝐹𝑀(⋅) is a convex combination of 𝐹(⋅), so 𝐹𝑀(𝑀) will be greater (smaller) than 
𝐹(𝑀) when 𝐹(⋅) is “convex (concave) enough” around 𝑀.  Similarly, 𝑓𝑀(𝑀) = ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝑓(𝑀 −
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝜇𝑘) = 𝐄𝜇[𝑓(𝑀 − 𝜇)], which will be greater (less) than 𝑓(𝑀) when 𝑓(⋅) is “convex (concave) 
enough” around 𝑀. The inverse hazard rate of 𝑀 is:  
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We assume 𝐹𝑀(𝑀) is twice continuously differentiable and ℎ𝑀(𝑀) is decreasing. A casual 
observation from Equation 2 is that ℎ𝑀(𝑀)  is greater than ℎ(𝑀)  if 1 − 𝐹(⋅)  is “sufficiently 
convex” and 𝑓(⋅) is “sufficiently concave”, i.e., 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently small. Similarly, 
ℎ𝑀(𝑀) is smaller than ℎ(𝑀) if 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently large. As we will show later, the 
relative magnitude between ℎ𝑀(𝑀) and ℎ(𝑚) plays an important role in determining how filtering 
affects the sellers’ pricing strategies. 
Consumer’s optimal search strategy 
First, we examine the consumers’ optimal search strategy under the no-filtering case. Similar 
to the main model, consumers will stop searching and buy the last product they searched if and 
only if its aggregate match level, 𝑀𝑖𝑗, exceeds the equilibrium acceptance threshold, ?̅?𝑁, where 
the subscript 𝑁  indicates the no-filtering case. ?̅?𝑁  is uniquely and implicitly defined by 




In the scenario without filtering, the consumer’s acceptance threshold for the aggregate match 
level is ?̅?𝑁. In the scenario with filtering, the threshold is ?̅? = 𝜇𝐾 + ?̅?. Proposition 4 compares 
?̅? and ?̅?𝑁 and illustrates how the filtering function on the platform affects the consumer’s optimal 
searching strategy. 
PROPOSITION 4. Filtering will increase the consumer’s acceptance threshold of aggregate 
match level, but by less than 𝜇𝐾, i.e., 0 < ?̅? − ?̅?𝑁 < 𝜇𝐾.  
ℎ𝑀(𝑀) =
𝐄𝜇[1 − 𝐹(𝑀 − 𝜇)]
𝐄𝜇[𝑓(𝑀 − 𝜇)]
=





⋅ ℎ(𝑀) (2) 
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Filtering affects on the consumer’s acceptance threshold for a product’s aggregate match level 
in two opposite ways. First, filtering informs consumers of a product’s filterable match level and 
narrows their consideration set down to those products with the best filterable attributes (𝜇𝑖𝑗 =
𝜇𝐾). This effect raises the consumer’s acceptance threshold for the aggregate match level by 𝜇𝐾, 
so a consumer is more likely to end up buying a product with a better match level. Second, filtering 
reduces the direct benefit of searching. Because filtering has already revealed the filterable match 
level and resolved some of the consumer’s uncertainty, conducting a search will uncover less 
information of match levels and thus bring less benefit to consumers, ceteris paribus. As a result, 
consumers tend to search less, stopping searching at lower acceptance thresholds. Overall, the 
second effect only partially offsets the first effect, so the consumer’s acceptance threshold for 𝑀𝑖𝑗 
will increase but by less than 𝜇𝐾.    
Sellers’ pricing decisions 
Next, we investigate how filtering affects the sellers’ pricing. We show that the equilibrium 








+ ℎ(?̅?) when 
filtering is available. Filtering will reduce the equilibrium price (𝑝∗ < 𝑝𝑁









> 1. Earlier discussions reveal that, when 𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are low, 
ℎ𝑀(?̅?𝑁)
ℎ(?̅?𝑁)
 is higher, so 𝑝∗ <
𝑝𝑁
∗  is more likely. Conversely, filtering tends to increase the equilibrium retail prices if 𝑓′(⋅) and 
𝑓′′(⋅) are large.  
To formally illustrate this point, we consider the “marginal” effect of filtering on the seller’s 
optimal pricing strategies, i.e., where filtering reveals only an infinitesimal amount of product 
match level information to consumers. In such a scenario, the magnitude of the filterable match 
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level, 𝜇𝑖𝑗, is very small such that max
1<𝑘≤𝐾
|𝜇𝑘| → 0. Proposition 5 characterizes when filtering can 
increase or decrease the equilibrium retail price. 
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose max
1<𝑘≤𝐾
|𝜇𝑘| → 0.  
(1) If ℎ2(?̅?)𝑓′′(?̅?) + 2ℎ(?̅?)𝑓′(?̅?) + 𝑓(?̅?) < 0, filtering will increase the equilibrium retail 
prices, i.e., 𝑝∗ > 𝑝𝑁
∗ .  
(2) If ℎ2(?̅?)𝑓′′(?̅?) + 2ℎ(?̅?)𝑓′(?̅?) + 𝑓(?̅?) > 0 , filtering will decrease the equilibrium 
retail prices, i.e., 𝑝∗ < 𝑝𝑁
∗ .  
How to interpret the conditions about 𝑓(⋅) , 𝑓′(⋅)  and 𝑓′′(⋅)  in Proposition 5 in business 
practice? Mathematically, a low 𝑓′′(⋅) indicates that 𝑓′(⋅) will not increase fast within a certain 
range. Hence, if 𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓′(𝑥) and 𝑓′′(𝑥) are low at point 𝑥, 𝑓(𝑥) is low at 𝑥 and will stay low when 
𝑥 increases. The discussion of Proposition 1 shows that when the filtering is available, if seller 𝑖 
marginally increases its price, the corresponding unit-sale decrease of this product is 
approximately proportional to 𝑓(?̅?) . Hence, when filtering is available and ℎ2(?̅?)𝑓′′(?̅?) +
2ℎ(?̅?)𝑓′(?̅?) + 𝑓(?̅?) < 0 , i.e., 𝑓(?̅?) , 𝑓′(?̅?)  and 𝑓′′(?̅?)  are sufficiently low, the product’s 
demand is insensitive to its price 𝑝𝑖 and this sensitivity will remain low when 𝑝𝑖 further increases. 
In other words, under the case of filtering, a product’s demand tends to have a relatively long tail. 
Hence, filtering will alleviate competition between sellers and raise the equilibrium prices. An 
example product category is one-of-a-kind niche products whose unique features are hard to filter 
and some consumers have very high valuation for the unfilterable attributes. For these products, 
the platform will be more likely to allow consumers to filter the search results because doing so 
can increase the retail prices and the platform’s revenue from the referral fee. 
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The reverse will happen when ℎ2(?̅?)𝑓′′(?̅?) + 2ℎ(?̅?)𝑓′(?̅?) + 𝑓(?̅?) > 0, i.e., when 𝑓(⋅), 
𝑓′(⋅) and 𝑓′′(⋅) are sufficiently high. In this case, filtering will make a product’s demand more 
sensitive to price, i.e., it has a relatively short tail. Hence, competition between sellers will be 
stronger and the equilibrium retail price will decrease. An example product category is products 
whose major features can be filtered, so the search outcomes are limitedly differentiated on 
unfilterable attributes when filters are applied. For these product categories, the platform may be 
hesitant to adopt filtering because it would trigger keen competition between sellers and reduce 
the profits of sellers and the platform. 
Although both filtering and a reduction in search cost make consumer search easier, our 
analysis above suggests that they can have very different marketing implications. For example, a 
reduction in search cost will always encourage consumers to search more products, but filtering 
will reduce the benefit of search and so consumers may search fewer products in expectation. 
Moreover, when the search cost decreases, the competition between sellers will always be 
intensified and the equilibrium retail price will always decrease (for a given referral fee). By 
contrast, filtering can possibly soften competition between sellers and lead to higher retail prices, 
which is desirable to the platform.    
2.6  Extensions 
2.6.1  Heterogeneous Search Cost 
Consumers are different in their search efficiency, knowledge of products, and opportunity 
cost of searching. In this extension we investigate the case in which consumers are heterogeneous 
in their search cost, 𝜏. Specifically, let 𝛷(𝜏) denote the c.d.f. of 𝜏, where 0 < 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥, 







+ ℎ(?̅?(𝜏)) denote the equilibrium retail price in the homogeneous-search-
cost case where all consumers have the same search cost 𝜏, which we have derived in the previous 
section. 
How should a seller choose its price when facing consumers with different search costs? A 
naïve approach is to “weigh each consumer equally” and set the price to be 𝐄𝜏[?̃?𝜏
∗], the average of 
the homogeneous-search-cost prices (𝑝𝜏
∗) weighted by the density of 𝜏. By contrast, Proposition 6 
suggests that this naïve choice of price is suboptimal for a seller, whose optimal price should 
“weigh low-search-cost consumers more” and be lower than 𝐄𝜏[𝑝𝜏
∗].   
PROPOSITION 6. When consumers have heterogeneous search cost, the seller’s optimal retail 
price is a weighted average of the homogeneous-search-cost prices, i.e., 𝑝∗ = 𝐄𝜏[𝑎(𝜏)?̃?𝜏
∗]. The 
weighting function 𝑎(𝜏) decreases with the consumer’s search cost, i.e., 𝑎′(𝜏) < 0.12 Moreover, 
𝑝∗ < 𝐄𝜏[𝑝𝜏
∗]. 
Intuitively, because a low-search-cost consumer is more likely to shop on the platform instead 
of choosing the outside option, she is more likely to visit a seller than a high-search-cost consumer. 
Therefore, the distribution of a seller’s visitors is skewed towards low-search-cost consumers, so 
the seller should target these consumers more by charging relatively lower prices.  
We also examine a numerical example with heterogeneous consumer search cost, where 𝜏 is 
uniformly distributed on the interval (0, 𝜏̅). We show that all the major results in the homogeneous-
search-cost model are qualitatively robust. Please refer to Appendix B for details. 
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2.6.2  Heterogeneous Product Quality  
Some products are systematically valued more by consumers than other products because of 
their better product or service quality. To capture the quality heterogeneity, we assume that there 
is one premium seller selling a premium product from which consumers on average derive higher 
match levels than the non-premium products sold by the other 𝑛 − 1 non-premium sellers. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that the seller 𝑖 = 1 sells the premium product, and sellers 𝑖 =
2, … , 𝑛 sell the non-premium products. For analytical tractability, we consider the case where all 
product attributes are unfilterable, i.e., 𝜇𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. Specifically, let the aggregate match level of 
the premium product (𝑖 = 1) be 𝑀1𝑗 = Δ𝑞 +𝑚1𝑗 , where Δ𝑞 is the premium product’s quality 
premium i.e., the difference between the average aggregate match level of the premium product 
and that of non-premium products. The distribution of 𝑚1𝑗 is the same as that of a non-premium 
product. The marginal costs of these two types of products are 𝑐𝐻 and 𝑐𝐿, respectively. We assume 
𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿 < Δ𝑞, so the premium seller is relatively cost effective. 
One can show that a consumer’s optimal search strategies depend on her outside options. 
Similar to the main model, if a consumer’s outside option is low, she will search the premium 
product first and, if its match level is low, continue searching non-premium products. If a 
consumer’s outside option is high, she will choose the outside option and not search any product 
on the platform. However, the search pattern for consumers with intermediate outside options is 
different from the main model where all products have homogeneous base quality. These 
consumers will search only the premium product and if its match level is low, they will choose the 
outside option. For these consumers, searching the premium product is better than the choosing 
the outside option in expectation, but the benefit of searching a non-premium product does not 
justify the search cost. 
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Next, we examine the sellers’ pricing strategies. Let 𝑝1
∗ and 𝑝∗ be the equilibrium prices of 
the premium product (product 1) and the non-premium products, respectively. It is easy to prove 
that 𝑝∗ < 𝑝1
∗(𝑟) < 𝑝∗ + Δ𝑞, i.e., the premium seller will charge a higher price than non-premium 
sellers, but the price difference will not exceed their quality difference so consumers will search 
the premium seller first in equilibrium. This result is similar to Armstrong et al. (2009), who find 
that the higher-quality firm has a stronger incentive to become prominent, i.e., being searched first 
by consumer. However, their paper assumes that consumers will always search the prominent 
product first, even though the consumers could be strictly better off in expectation by searching 
other items first. By contrast, the search sequence in our model is not exogenously imposed but 
endogenously determined by consumers’ optimal decisions.  Next, we examine the non-premium 
sellers’ pricing strategies.  




which is independent of the quality premium of the premium product, Δ𝑞. 
Result 3 suggests that 𝑝∗ is independent of Δ𝑞. The intuition is as follows. The consumer’s 
optimal search strategy indicates that consumers will always search the premium seller before they 
search any non-premium ones. Moreover, if a consumer has already searched the premium product 
and decided to continue searching the non-premium products, she will never go back to and buy 
the premium product in equilibrium. Thus, for consumers who have decided to search non-
premium sellers, the premium product’s quality premium and price will not affect their probability 
of buying from a specific non-premium seller. For other consumers, they will not search any non-
premium sellers so a change in a seller’s price will not affect the consumers’ search decisions. 
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Therefore, the optimal price of non-premium products will be independent of the price and base 
quality of the premium product. 
One can show that both the premium seller’s and the non-premium sellers’ optimal prices will 
decrease when the consumer’s search cost (𝜏) decreases. When the platform’s referral fee is 
exogenous, the profits of the premium seller, the non-premium sellers, and the platform can either 
increase or decrease with the search cost. When the platform endogenously chooses 𝑟, its optimal 
profit will always become higher when 𝜏 decreases. Thus, our results in the main model are robust 
when products have heterogeneous base quality levels. 
2.6.3  Fixed Referral Fee 
In the previous analysis, we assume that the platform charges a percentage referral fee for the 
sellers. In practice, some retail platforms may charge a fixed referral fee for each transaction. We 
proceed to examine whether our major results are robust to this alternative referral-fee structure. 
The platform charges a fixed referral fee per unit of sale, 𝑑 > 0, instead of a percentage fee, 𝑟. All 
other model settings remain the same.  
In Appendix B, we analytically derive the equilibrium outcome of the fixed-referral-fee setting. 
A decrease in the search cost will reduce the equilibrium retail price and increase the demand on 
the platform. A seller’s profit can either increase or decrease. When the platform can endogenously 
choose the referral fee, 𝑑, a lower search cost will always increase the platform’s profit. Hence, 
most results in the percentage-referral-fee setting can be qualitatively replicated in the fixed-
referral-fee setting.  
82 
 
2.6.4  Outside Option and Retail Platform Competition 
In practice, a consumer can choose whether to shop on the retail platform that we focus on or 
on some other competing platforms, and the latter can be considered as the consumer’s outside 
option in our model. In this sense, our analytical framework could partially capture the competition 
between different retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com versus eBay.com) although we do not 
explicitly consider the competitor’s pricing decisions. When the focal platform faces stronger 
competition, consumers are more likely to have a better outside option. We analyze how the 
distribution of outside options affects consumers, sellers, and the platform. For analytical 
tractability, we assume that the platform endogenously chooses its fixed referral fee, 𝑑 . We 
continue to adopt the distribution assumptions in Example 1 and 2: 𝜇𝐾 = 0.5  and 
𝑚𝑖𝑗~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(−0.5,0.5). The consumer’s outside option, 𝑢0 , follows a uniform distribution 
between 𝑙 and 1 + 𝑙. A larger 𝑙 indicates that the outside option tends to be more attractive, i.e., 
the competing platform is stronger. We consider the nontrivial case with −2√2𝜏 − 𝑐 < 𝑙 < 1 −
2√2𝜏 − 𝑐, otherwise either no consumers or all consumers will shop on the platform.  













the platform faces stronger competition, i.e., 𝑙 is larger, it will charge a lower referral fee, and its 






< 0.  
Note that the absolute value of the above derivative decreases with 𝑙. To put it differently, 
when the platform competes with stronger competitors, it will receive less benefit from reducing 
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the consumer’s search cost. This result may sound surprising because one might conjecture that a 
platform facing stronger competition would be more inclined to lower its search cost in order to 
poach customers from competitors. However, our result suggests that it will be a platform facing 
weaker competitors (𝑙 is larger) which have a stronger incentive to reduce its search cost. This is 
because such a platform has a higher profit per unit sale so it can benefit more from acquiring an 
additional customer. This result explains why large retail platforms (e.g., Amazon.com and 
Overstock.com) invests heavily in search-cost-reduction technologies, e.g., camera search, 
barcode search, and augmented-reality view, whereas smaller shopping sites usually use less 
advanced search technologies. This will create a Matthew effect, allowing larger platforms to offer 
better search experience and attract even more customers.  
2.7  Conclusion 
This article studies how the consumer’s search cost influences an online retail platform, 
independent sellers on it, and consumers.  We explicitly model the consumer’s search process and 
the pricing decisions of both the platform and the sellers. When the referral fee is exogenous, a 
lower search cost will reduce the equilibrium retail price due to stronger competition, but the 
seller’s expected profit may actually increase. This is because a lower search cost attracts more 
consumers to shop on the platform instead of choosing the outside option. The platform’s profit 
may either increase or decrease as the consumer’s search cost decreases. However, when the 
platform endogenously chooses its referral fee, its expected profit will always increase as the 
search cost decreases. This result implies that the platform should always try to reduce the 
consumer’s search cost as long as doing so is not too costly. 
Our analysis shows that when the consumer’s search cost decreases, the platform should 
reduce its referral fee to boost its sales volume if the demand elasticity of the referral fee 
84 
 
significantly increases, otherwise the platform should raise the referral fee to increase its profit 
margin. If a lower search cost reduces the platform’s optimal referral fee, sellers will pay less to 
the platform for a unit sale, possibly leading to a lower equilibrium retail price yet higher expected 
seller profits. In this case, a lower search cost can be all-win for the platform, sellers and 
consumers. In contrast, when a lower search cost increases the platform’s optimal referral fee, the 
equilibrium retail price may increase but the seller’s profit margin will shrink. Hence, a lower 
search cost can make both sellers and consumers worse off. 
We also consider how the filtering function affect the consumer’s search and the sellers’ 
pricing decisions. We show that, after filtering becomes available, a consumer can filter out the 
products with better filterable attributes and hence is more likely to find a product with a better 
match level. At the same time, because filtering has already partially resolved the consumer’s 
uncertainty, conducting a search will uncover less amount of information and generate less benefit 
for the consumer. Hence, she tends to search fewer products and buy a product with less good 
match. We also characterize the conditions when filtering will increase or reduce the sellers’ 
equilibrium prices. If a product’s demand tends to have a relative longer (shorter) tail when 
filtering is available, the competition between sellers will be alleviated (intensified) and the 
equilibrium retail price tends to increase (decrease). These results suggest that filtering can be very 
different from a search-cost reduction, for the latter always induces the consumers to search more 
and leads to stronger price competition among sellers. 
Even though we assume that sellers sell differentiated products, our model can conceptually 
apply to the case where some sellers sell a common branded product. In essence, a product in our 
model is the totality of the core product and any seller attributed together as a whole. So, the 
differentiation among “products” comes from not only the core product attributes (e.g., shoes of 
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different brands, style, color, size, etc.) but also the sellers’ attributes (e.g., service, return policy, 
existence of physical stores close to the customers, etc.). For example, sellers on the east coast of 
the U.S. can ship their products to New York City within two days, but it may takes longer to ship 
to Los Angeles. Similarly, sellers on the west coast of the U.S. can ship products to Los Angeles 
faster than to New York City. Furthermore, whether the sellers have physical stores close to the 
customers can differentiate the sellers among consumers, because consumers may have more 
convenient options for product returns or exchanges if there is a physical store nearby. 
This paper mainly focuses on the online context, but many results, including how the search 
cost will affect sellers and retail platforms’ pricing strategies and profits, can be generalized to 
offline settings with caution. However, our research also captures several features that are unique 
to the online shopping environments. First, our paper analyzes the impact of filtering, which is 
commonly used on online retail platforms but is rarely adopted in offline stores. Second, most 
previous studies on consumer search in offline channels assume that the retailer carries a limited 
number of products (usually two) and consider the setting with wholesale contracts: the 
manufacturers first set the wholesale price and then the retailer determines the final retail prices 
(e.g., Gu and Liu 2013). Thus, the retailer will always benefit when the manufacturers charge lower 
wholesale prices. These assumptions are more reasonable for offline retail stores where the retailer 
can carry only limited product varieties due to the shelf-space restriction and is able to determine 
the final retail prices for each product. However, an online platform has very low operational costs 
of including an additional seller, so it usually carries a large assortment. As a result, the retail 
platform usually cannot optimize the final prices for each individual product. In practice, retail 
platforms usually charge a percentage referral fee applied to all sellers and let the sellers decide 
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their final prices. Contrary to the offline setting, an online platform may benefit from a higher final 
price of sellers because it can lead to a higher referral-fee revenue.  
We would like to point out a few caveats about our model. In our analysis, we do not explicitly 
study how sellers’ entry decisions can be affected when the consumer’s search cost changes. 
However, one can easily extend our model to analyze how the search cost affects sellers’ entry on 
the platform. For example, one can assume that a seller needs to incur some positive fixed cost to 
sell on the platform. If in our model a seller’s expected profit increases when the consumer’s search 
cost decreases, then in that parameter region it will be more likely to observe sellers entering the 
market. Similarly, if a lower search cost reduces the seller’s expected profit, then it is likely that 
some sellers will exit the market. We have assumed that each seller sells only one product. In 
practice, a seller may sell multiple differentiated products on the platform. One can study how the 
consumer’s search cost affects the seller’s product assortment decisions. Cachon et al. (2008) show 
that when sellers sell directly to the consumer, they will increase their product assortments when 
the consumer’s search cost decreases. We conjecture that if the sellers sell their products through 
a retail platform, a decrease in the consumer’s search cost will increase sellers’ product assortments 
when the referral fee is exogenous. However, when the referral fee is endogenous, if a lower search 
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8 Different articles present estimated search costs in different formats. We use the median of their 
estimates whenever possible because the distributions of many estimates have long tails for very 
high search costs. For articles only reporting the range of the estimated search cost, we use the 
midpoint of the range. We take natural logarithm to mitigate the impact of extreme values. 
9 Our model decomposes consumers’ valuation of a product into a vertical component (𝑞𝑖) and a 
horizontal component (𝑀𝑖𝑗). 𝑞𝑖 is the mean of consumers’ valuation of the product, and 𝑀𝑖𝑗 is a 




11 Without loss of generality, we assume the consumer with the largest search cost (𝜏 = 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
will search on the platform with positive probability.   




Chapter 3  The Bright Side of Cost Transparency: 
Facilitating Product Innovation 
3.1  Introduction 
A firm’s cost information for its products is increasingly transparent to consumers. Many third-
party infomediaries publish the cost information of products in the market. For example, 
consumers can get good estimates of car dealers’ cost of a vehicle by referring to the factory 
invoice price disclosed by truecar.com. Many other websites provide cookbook guides or online 
calculators to help consumers gauge the dealer’s true cost of getting a car from the manufacturer. 
Consumers can also find cost-breakdown reports for many electronic devices. For example, 
Electronics360 provides a detailed cost-breakdown analysis of Jawbone Mini Jambox, a Bluetooth 
speaker, suggesting that a Mini Jambox, sold at $179.99, costs Jawbone only $24.32 to produce.24 
In addition to these third-party infomediaries, many firms, including Everlane, Oliver Cabell, and 
HonestBy, voluntarily disclose their own cost information. For example, Everlane reveals on its 
website that the cost of a $100 cashmere crew sweater is around $52 ($34.05 for materials, $1.90 
for hardware, $13.00 for labor, $1.96 for duties, and $0.60 for transportation). Everlane also 
discloses the detailed information of the factories for each of its products. New technologies, e.g., 
blockchain, enable the firms to further convincingly communicate with their customers about their 
cost information. A survey of supply chain professionals shows that 56% of the respondents 
believe that firms should use blockchain to share information (such as production cost) with 
customers (Weinswig 2018). 
It has been long debated whether cost-information transparency is a boon or a bane for firms. 
On the negative side, Sinha (2000) argues that cost transparency can be harmful because it can 
lower the firm’s profit margin, reduce products and services differentiation, weaken customer 
92 
 
loyalty, and create perceptions of price unfairness. Zhu (2002, 2004) show that cost transparency 
can reduce the high-cost firms’ incentive to participate in the market, hence may reduce the profit 
of these firms and the total social welfare. On the positive side, Mohan et al. (2016) show that 
firms disclosing its cost can attract more consumers and raise their willingness-to-buy. On how 
cost transparency can affect consumers, Simintiras et al. (2015) argue that unit-cost transparency 
can help consumers make judgement on price fairness and product quality. By contrast, Kuah and 
Weerakkody (2015) state that unit cost are often hard to define in practice and thus can mislead 
the consumers. Our paper adds to the discussion above by building an analytical model to 
investigate how cost transparency affects consumer purchase timing, the firm’s innovation and 
pricing decisions, and the consumer surplus. Specifically, we show that cost transparency has a 
bright side on firms and consumers: when the firm sells a durable product and can change the price 
dynamically, cost transparency can foster product innovation and therefore benefit consumers and 
firms.  
We start with why and how cost transparency can affect a durable good producer’s dynamic 
pricing and the consumer’s purchase timing decisions. After a firm has sold products to consumers 
with relatively high valuations, it has an incentive to cut its price to target some low-valuation 
consumers. This phenomenon, termed as intertemporal price discrimination, has been well 
documented in the literature (e.g., Bridges et al., 1995; Coase, 1972; Conlisk et al., 1984; 
Narasimhan, 1989; Stokey, 1979, 1981). Strategic consumers, anticipating the firm’s incentive to 
drop future prices, may postpone purchase if they are patient and believe that the price will 
significantly decrease in the future. The consumers’ belief about the future price is affected by the 
firm’s cost. If consumers know or believe that the firm has a high cost (hence a relatively low 
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profit margin), they will expect any dramatic future price drop to be unlikely and thus will be 
inclined to buy the product in the current period.  
Such consumer behaviors are common in reality. For instance, as a technology blog noted, 
“While prices for sub-50-inch HDTVs are flat, prices for displays larger than 60 inches are 
already heading down.” It then explained, “TV-makers are looking to stimulate sales at the high-
end [HDTVs], where profit margins are the greatest, while keeping prices steady for sub-50-inch 
models that already have razor-thin margins. On the low-end of the market, the margins are too 
small and pricing will stay flat.” 25  On another online tech-forum, one user suggested that 
consumers should buy new computers right away rather than wait because “… with hardware 
profit margins already pretty low, I wouldn’t expect massive reductions [of computer prices].”26  
Without cost transparency, consumers do not know the firm’s cost and their belief about the 
future price will depend on the firm’s current price. Intuitively, a high-cost firm tends to charge a 
high price. When a consumer sees a high price, she may infer that the firm has a high cost and 
expect that the future price will also be relatively high, so she tends to buy the product immediately. 
As a result, a low-cost firm may have an incentive to mimic the high price to induce consumers to 
buy right away. With cost transparency in the market, the firm’s ability to manipulate consumers’ 
expectation of future prices will be limited. 
We analyze a dynamic model in which a firm first decides whether to make an R&D investment 
to develop a new product. If the firm develops the product, the firm can sell to consumers in two 
periods. Without cost transparency, the firm’s cost is its private information. In the first period, 
consumers may infer the firm’s cost from its current price.  This affects their expectation of the 
future (second-period) price and thus the current purchase decisions. In this case, the low-cost firm 
has an incentive to mimic the high-cost firm by charging the same first-period price as the high-
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cost firm would, and the high-cost firm has an incentive to raise its first-period price, and thus sell 
to fewer customers to avoid the low-cost firm’s mimicry. However, with cost transparency, the 
firm’s cost is common knowledge and the consumer’s belief about the future price will be based 
on the firm’s true cost (rather than the inferred cost) and its current profit margin. In this case, 
because the low-cost firm can no longer pretend to be the high-cost firm, it will be worse off 
whereas the high-cost firm will be better off. 
A firm’s R&D investment for innovation is often made long before the product will be 
manufactured and sold to consumers. So, when making an innovation investment decision, the 
firm is typically uncertain about the final marginal cost for its product. Thus, the firm’s innovation 
investment decision depends on whether its expected profit exceeds the upfront R&D investment. 
Our analysis reveals that cost transparency will increase the firm’s expected profit and hence make 
the firm more likely to invest in innovation. 
We also examine the effect of cost transparency on consumers. Conventional wisdom suggests 
that customers will benefit from having more information. However, we show that this is not 
always true in the context of cost transparency. When the firm has a high cost, cost transparency 
can reduce the consumer’s surplus. This is because the high-cost firm will charge higher prices 
since cost transparency prevents a low-cost firm from pooling with the high-cost firm. Although 
cost transparency can reduce the consumer surplus in case of a high-cost firm, we show that, in 
expectation, cost transparency will benefit the consumer. Thus, in expectation, cost transparency 
is a win-win situation for both the firm and the consumers.  
We also check the result robustness under different model settings. We show that all the main 
results remain qualitatively the same when consumers tend to buy the product early either because 
they value the “newness” of the product or their utility is time-discounted. We also consider the 
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case where the market has a low entry barrier, i.e., the (incumbent) firm faces competition of 
entrants in the second period. We find that most of our results remain qualitatively unchanged in 
the low-entry-barrier scenario. Interestingly, when the competition in the second period is perfect, 
we show that the incumbent firm’s profit can be independent of its marginal cost (up to a 
threshold), when the cost information is transparent to consumers.   
3.2  Literature Review 
Our research contributes to the literature on intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic 
pricing. Coase (1972) proposes that if a monopolist selling durable products is able to decrease its 
price on an infinitely frequent basis or on an infinite time horizon, consumers will not accept any 
price higher than the product’s marginal cost and the firm will thus make zero profit. However, it 
has been shown that when the firm can pre-commit its future price or it has an increasing cost with 
respect to time, it can charge prices higher than its marginal cost (Kahn 1986, Stokey 1981). 
Several other papers also focus on firms’ optimal intertemporal price discrimination strategies 
under different settings (Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Besanko and Winston 1990, Conlisk et al. 1984, 
Levin et al. 2008, Narasimhan 1989, Stokey 1979).  
Our research complements the aforementioned literature on intertemporal price discrimination 
in that we study cost uncertainty and information asymmetry, which this literature has mostly 
neglected. Only a few studies investigate the impact of uncertainty and information asymmetry on 
the firm’s intertemporal price discrimination decisions. For example, Png (1991) shows that when 
the firm has demand uncertainty, high-valuation consumers may gamble on a future price cut. To 
mitigate this problem, the firm can offer most-favored-customer protection which guarantees early 
buyers the benefit of subsequent reduction in prices. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
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the first to study how the consumer’s knowledge about the firm’s cost will affect the firm’s 
intertemporal price discrimination and innovation decisions.  
This paper also relates to the signaling literature in marketing (Desai and Srinivasan 1995, 
Jiang et al. 2011, Kuksov 2004, Kuksov and Lin 2017, Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995, Simester 
1995, Soberman 2003). One stream of this literature studies why and how a firm signals its cost 
information in different contexts. Simester (1995) shows that in a duopoly where firms’ marginal 
costs are their private information, the firm with a low marginal cost may advertise low prices for 
some products to signal that prices of unadvertised products are also low, since costs of different 
products are positively correlated. Shin (2005) examines how a store’s “vague advertisement,” 
which commits only the minimum price of a product, may construct a credible price image if 
consumers do not know the store’s selling cost. Guo and Jiang (2016) consider the case in which 
a consumer feels that it is unfair when the firm’s profit margin is too high relative to her surplus. 
Hence, a high-cost firm may have an incentive to use its price and product quality to signal its high 
cost. They find that as the expected cost-efficiency in the market decreases, both product quality 
and social welfare may increase rather than decrease. In the extant signaling literature, the work 
most closely related to our paper is Balachander and Srinivasan (1998). They consider a firm 
selling a durable good whose cost decreases over time due to learning-by-doing—the more 
products a firm sells in the first period, the lower its unit cost will be in the second period. 
Consumers know the firm’s current cost but do not know a priori the firm’s efficiency of learning-
by-doing. The authors show that a “high-experience” firm tends to charge a lower price to sell 
more products in the first period in order to greatly reduce its future cost, which will lower the 
consumers’ expectation of the future price. The low-experience firm can charge a high first-period 
price to signal that it has low learning efficiency and hence its future price will not drop 
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dramatically. Our paper studies a new substantive question of how cost transparency affects firm 
innovation through investments in product development, which has not been examined in this 
literature. In our model, the cost signaling game in the case without cost transparency is merely a 
subgame following the firm’s innovation decision.  
This paper is also related to the literature on cost transparency, which is typically focused on whether a 
firm shares its private cost information with competitors or within a supply chain (Fried 1984, Gal-or 1986, 
Shapiro 1986, Yao et al. 2008). Some recent studies also consider the cost information asymmetry between 
the firm and consumers. Mohan et al. (2016) show, through experiments, that a firm’s voluntary disclosure 
of its cost information to consumers will increase their trust to the firm and hence their intent to purchase. 
Several qualitative studies discuss the potential benefits and problems of cost transparency to the consumers 
and the society (Kuah and Weerakkody 2015, Simintiras et al. 2015). Our paper complements this stream 
of literature by analytically modeling the effects of cost transparency on firm pricing and innovation. 
3.3  Model 
We consider a firm deciding whether to invest in R&D to develop a new durable product. If it 
does not invest, the product will not be developed and the firm’s payoff is normalized to zero. If it 
invests, it incurs a fixed cost 𝐼 > 0 and the product will be developed. Given that the firm invests, 
it can sell its developed product in two time periods (𝑡 = 1, 2), and the consumers will buy at most 
one unit of the product, either in the first period or the second period. We assume that when the 
firm decides whether to invest, it does not know the marginal cost of product. This accommodates 
the reality that when making innovation investment decision, the firm typically does not know the 
exact technology, materials and production techniques that will be used later. Thus, the firm’s 
investment decision will depend on whether its expected future profit exceeds its upfront fixed 
cost 𝐼. To capture the uncertainty in the firm’s future cost of production, we assume that the firm’s 
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marginal cost will be high (𝑐𝐻) with probability 𝛼, or low (𝑐𝐿) with probability 1 − 𝛼. When 
deciding whether to invest 𝐼, the firm knows only the distribution of its future cost. In essence, the 
firm’s cost can be thought of as its type, denoted by  𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}; we will use these terms (e.g., high-
cost or high-type) interchangeably. We normalize 𝑐𝐿 = 0  and denote 𝑐𝐻 = 𝑐 . Therefore, 𝑐 
represents the cost difference between the two types of firms. The firm’s cost is constant across 
the two selling periods (please see Section 6 for discussion regarding the possibility of cost 
decreases over time, or learning-by-doing). With cost transparency, the consumers can learn the 
firm’s marginal cost from the third-party infomediaries before their purchase decisions. Without 
cost transparency, consumers do not observe the firm’s marginal cost when making purchase 
decisions.  
Let 𝑝𝑖,1  and 𝑝𝑖,2  denote the 𝑖 -type firm’s first-period price and second-period price, 
respectively. If the consumer does not purchase the product in either period, she gets zero utility 
(from the outside option). If consumers buy the product in the first period, they can get a total 
usage value of 𝑣. We assume that 𝑣~uniform(0,1) in the consumer population. We normalize the 
total population of consumers to 1.  
Given our interest in modeling intertemporal price discrimination, we consider two reasons 
why a consumer may want to purchase early rather than wait. First, for innovative or fashion 
products, consumers tend to derive extra satisfaction from being innovators or early adopters. To 
capture this notion, we assume that if consumers buy the product in the second period, they will 
derive only a fraction 𝜇 ∈ (0,1) of the total usage value 𝑣 , because they no longer enjoy the 
“newness” of the product or the satisfaction of being early adopters. Second, consumers may have 
a time discount factor 𝛿 on future utility from delaying purchase. Thus, a consumer obtains a net 
present utility of 𝑢1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,1 if buying the product in the first period; she gets a net present utility 
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of 𝑢2 = 𝛿(𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,2) if buying the product in the second period. In our main analysis, we focus 
on the “newness” factor 𝜇 and abstract away from the effect of time discounting by assuming 𝛿 =
1. Section 5 will consider the robustness of the results with the time discount factor. 
The game proceeds as follows. First, the firm decides whether to invest 𝐼  to develop the 
product. If it does not invest, the firm’s payoff is zero. If the firm invests, it can sell the product in 
two periods. In the first period, the firm chooses its price 𝑝𝑖,1, and consumers decide whether to 
purchase the product in the first period based on their expectation about the firm’s second-period 
price. In the second period, the firm chooses 𝑝𝑖,2 and consumers who did not buy the product 
decide whether to buy it in the second period. 
3.4  Analysis 
Subsection 4.1 studies the subgame given the firm invests 𝐼 to develop the new product. We compare 
the firm’s optimal pricing strategy, profit, and consumer surplus for the cases with and without cost 
transparency. Subsection 4.2 examines how cost transparency affects the firm’s innovation decision and 
the expected consumer surplus. 
3.4.1 Firm Pricing Decisions 
Given the firm has invested 𝐼, it can produce and sell its product in two periods. We first consider the 
case with cost transparency, i.e., consumers know the firm’s marginal cost (𝑐𝑖) and can rationally infer the 
firm’s future price based on the firm’s current price and its actual marginal cost. Then, we analyze the case 
without cost transparency, i.e., consumers do not know the firm’s actual cost but will infer it from the firm’s 
price. We will compare the results to determine the effect of cost transparency on the firm and consumers. 
With cost transparency (perfect-information case) 
With cost transparency, the firm’s cost is common knowledge and the consumer’s belief about 
future prices will be based on the firm’s true cost. We use “  ̃ ” over a variable to indicate this 
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perfect-information setting. Using backward induction, one can show that type-𝑖 firm’s optimal 




. One can see that a higher first-period price will lead to 
a higher second-period price, because fewer consumers will purchase the product in the first 
period. In addition, a higher 𝑐 will lead to a higher 𝑝𝑖,2
∗ , which is also intuitive. Substituting the 
firm’s optimal second-period price into its profit function, we can derive type-𝑖 firm’s optimal 
first-period price and its optimal profit, as shown in lemma 1.   
LEMMA 1. When the firm’s cost is common knowledge, its optimal first-period and second-























, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. 
Without cost transparency 
The consumers’ belief about the firm’s cost affects their expectations of the firm’s future price 
and will thus influence their current purchase decisions. When consumers do not know the firm’s 
cost, a low-cost firm may have an incentive to mimic a high-cost firm’s pricing strategy in the first 
period to induce consumers to purchase immediately rather than wait. If the firm has a high cost, 
it would want consumers to know its high cost so that they will be less likely to postpone their 
purchase.27 To credibly convince consumers that it has a high cost, the firm needs to sufficiently 
raise its first-period price such that a low-cost firm would not want to mimic. Note that a low-cost 
firm will not choose a very high price even if consumers believe that it has a high cost.  Because 
the low-cost firm’s optimal price is lower than that of the high-cost firm, the opportunity cost of 
choosing a high price is higher for a low-cost firm than for a high-cost firm. Put differently, for a 
given price, the low-cost firm’s profit margin is higher, so it loses more profit when losing a sale 
(due to the high price) than a high-cost firm.  
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Since the firm prefers to be believed to have a high cost, one might wonder whether the firm 
may want to intentionally increase its cost. Our analysis reveals that a low-cost firm’s equilibrium 
profit is always higher than that of a high-cost firm, and that even if the firm’s cost is directly 
observable to consumers, the firm will not be able to improve its profit by wastefully raising its 
cost. Thus, although a low-cost firm may want consumers to believe that it has a high cost, it has 
no incentive to raise its actual cost. 
Two types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) are possible in our setting. In separating 
equilibria, different types of firms charge different 𝑝1, so consumers can correctly infer the firm’s 
type from 𝑝1. In pooling equilibria, both types of firms will choose the same 𝑝1, so consumers will 
not be able to tell the firm’s type. There are infinitely many PBE outcomes depending on 
consumers’ off-equilibrium beliefs. We use the Lexicographical Maximum Sequential 
Equilibrium (LMSE) concept, proposed by Mailath et al. (1993), to refine multiple equilibria. 
LMSE and the related Undefeated Equilibrium concepts are widely used in marketing and 
management research (e.g., Gill and Sgroi 2012; Jiang et al. 2014; Miklós-Thal and Zhang 2013; 
Nan and Wen 2014; Taylor 1999). In our setting, the LMSE refinement selects among all PBE the 
outcome that is most profitable for the type of firm that wants its type revealed (i.e., the high-cost 
firm), and subsequently, if multiple outcomes persist, then LMSE selects among them the outcome 
that is the most profitable for the low-type firm.28 
We derive the LMSE of our game in these the following steps: First, we determine the PBE 
yielding the highest profit for the high-cost firm among all separating equilibria, 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  . Second, we 
find the PBE giving the highest profit to the high-cost firm among all pooling equilibria, 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ . 
Finally, we compare 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙




𝜇 such that in equilibrium a high-cost firm will serve some consumers in the 
102 
 
second period. Otherwise, the model will de facto reduce to an uninteresting one-period game. In 
practice, firms in an industry often use similar production technology, so the cost difference 
between different firms will not be very dramatic. Besides, the consumer’s valuation for the 
product’s newness may be relatively small compared with their overall valuation for the product, 
so we expect that 𝑐 is low and μ is high in many realistic situations. 
LEMMA 2.  Suppose that consumers do not know the firm’s cost. A unique LMSE outcome 


























Figure 3.1  Equilibrium Outcome 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts whether the LMSE equilibrium outcome is separating or pooling. Note that 
when 𝛼 is low enough, if the high-cost firm pools with the low-cost firm, many consumers may 
postpone their purchases because the firm will very likely to have a low cost and will significantly 
reduce its price in the second period. In other words, when 𝛼 is low, the high-cost firm will find 
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the opportunity cost for pooling very high, so it will prefer the separating outcome, in which it 
incurs the signaling cost (of raising its first-period price) to separate itself from the low-cost firm. 
Lemma 2 can be equivalently stated as that the equilibrium is separating if and only if 𝑐 is large 
enough. Recall that the low-cost firm’s marginal cost is zero, so the high-cost firm’s marginal cost 
(𝑐) represents the difference between the two types of firms’ marginal costs. Hence, Lemma 2 
suggests that when the difference in costs between the two types of firms is high, the high-cost 
firm will prefer separating itself from the low-cost firm.  
COROLLARY 1. The high-cost firm’s profit 𝜋𝐻
∗  decreases with 𝑐. The low-cost firm’s profit 𝜋𝐿
∗ 
increases with 𝑐 when 𝑐 ≤
2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
, decreases with 𝑐 when 
2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐∗, and is independent 

























As a side note, Corollary 1 shows that the high-cost firm’s profit strictly decreases with 𝑐 
whereas the low-cost firm’s profit changes non-monotonically with 𝑐. Note that when 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐∗, the 
equilibrium is pooling. Under this condition, a higher 𝑐 has two opposite effects on the low-cost 
firm’s profit. First, a higher 𝑐 tends to increase the consumers’ expectation of the second-period 
price, hence consumers will be more likely to purchase the product in the first period. Second, 
when 𝑐 increases, the high-cost firm tends to increase its first-period price, which the low-cost firm 
will mimic under pooling. This higher pooling price will reduce the low-cost firm’s first-period 
demand. When 𝑐 ≤
2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
, the first effect dominates so the low-cost firm’s profit increases with 
𝑐. By contrast, when 
2(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐∗, the low-cost firm’s profit decreases with 𝑐. Note that when 
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𝑐 > 𝑐∗, the equilibrium is separating so the low-cost firm’s profit does not depend on the high-cost 
firm’s marginal cost 𝑐.  
Effect of cost transparency 
We can determine the effect of cost transparency by comparing the market outcomes with 
versus without cost transparency.  
PROPOSITION 1. (1) Cost transparency will lower the high-cost firm’s first-period and second-
period prices when 𝛼 < 𝛼∗, and will increase its first-period and second-period prices when 𝛼 ≥
𝛼∗; cost transparency will not affect the low-cost firm’s prices when 𝛼 < 𝛼∗ and will lower its 
first-period and second-period prices when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗. (2) Cost transparency will increase the high-
cost firm’s total profit and (weakly) reduce the low-cost firm’s total profit. 
Proposition 1 examines how cost transparency affects the firm’s pricing strategies and its total 
profit. When the firm’s cost is not known to consumers, if 𝛼 < 𝛼∗, the equilibrium is separating. 
The high-cost firm has to set a first-period price higher than its perfect-information price to reduce 
its demand enough to make mimicking unprofitable for a low-cost firm. Note that under the 
separating equilibrium, the high-cost firm’s second-period price is also higher than its second-
period price under perfect information (i.e., under cost transparency). This is because in the 
separating equilibrium the second-period customer base (those consumers who have not purchased 
in the first period) has higher valuations than the second-period customer base in the case with 
cost transparency. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗, the equilibrium is pooling. Because consumers cannot tell the 
firm’s cost, their expectation of the second-period price is lower than the price that the high-cost 
firm will actually charge in the second period. Therefore, consumers are less willing to purchase 
the product in the first period, so the equilibrium prices are lower than the high-cost firm’s perfect-
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information prices. With cost transparency, the high-cost firm can charge its perfect-information 
prices, making more profits than when its cost is not known to consumers. 
By contrast, cost transparency can make the low-cost firm worse off. When 𝛼 < 𝛼∗  and 
consumers do not know the firm’s cost, the equilibrium is separating, where consumers can 
correctly infer the firm’s cost. In this case, the low-cost firm will charge its perfect-information 
price. Therefore, cost transparency will not affect its profit when 𝛼 < 𝛼∗ . When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗ , the 
equilibrium is pooling and consumers cannot infer the firm’s cost from 𝑝1. Note that in this case a 
low-cost firm can always deviate to its perfect-information price and earn the perfect-information 
profit, so its pooling-equilibrium profit must be higher than its profit under cost transparency. 
Hence, cost transparency will reduce the low-cost firm’s profit. Proposition 2 summarizes how 
cost transparency affects the consumer surplus. 
PROPOSITION 2. When 𝛼 < 𝛼∗, cost transparency will increase the consumer surplus if the firm 
has a high cost, and it will not affect the consumer surplus if the firm has a low cost. When 𝛼 ≥
𝛼∗, cost transparency will lower (increase) the consumer surplus if the firm has a high (low) cost.  
Suppose that the firm has a high cost. When consumers do not know the firm’s cost, if 𝛼 < 𝛼∗, 
the equilibrium is separating. As discussed earlier, the firm’s price will be higher than its perfect-
information price. Hence, cost transparency lowers the high-cost firm’s price and increases the 
consumer surplus. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗, the equilibrium is pooling and the equilibrium price is lower 
than the high-cost firm’s perfect-information price. Hence, when consumers know the firm’s cost, 
the firm does not need to lower its price anymore, so consumer surplus will decrease. Similarly, in 
the low-cost firm case, consumer surplus increases when 𝛼 < 𝛼∗ and remains unchanged when 
𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗. 
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3.4.2 Firm Innovation Decision 
We have so far examined how cost transparency affects the consumer and the profits of both 
types of firms. In the case of a high-cost firm, cost transparency will benefit the firm but may either 
increase or reduce the consumer surplus. By contrast, if the firm’s cost is low, cost transparency 
makes the firm worse off but the consumers better off. Now we analyze the first stage of the game, 
in which the firm decides whether to invest in innovation. Since the firm does not know its future 
cost at the time of the innovation decision, it will be based on whether its expected profit exceeds 
the required fixed-cost investment (𝐼).  
LEMMA 3. Cost transparency will lower the expected price in both the first period (𝛼𝑝𝐻,1 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,1) and the second period (𝛼𝑝𝐻,2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,2). However, it will increase both the 
firm’s expected profit (𝛼𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿) and the expected consumer surplus. 
Lemma 3 examines how cost transparency affects the expected price, the expected profit and 
the consumer surplus. We find that cost transparency will reduce the expected prices in both 
periods. One might intuit that lower expected prices will lead to a lower expected profit for the 
firm. However, our analysis reveals that both the firm and consumers will actually be better off in 
expectation. In the separating parameter region, without cost transparency, if the firm has a high 
cost, it will raise its price to signal its cost, but with cost transparency the firm will choose a lower 
price (i.e., its perfect-information price). Note that in the separating parameter region (when 𝛼 <
𝛼∗ as shown in Figure 1), if the firm has a low cost, it will charge its perfect-information price 
regardless of cost transparency. Thus, overall cost transparency will lower the expected prices in 
the separating region. In contrast, in the pooling region (when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗), cost transparency will 
lower the expected price mainly because with cost transparency a low-cost firm will significantly 
reduce its price from the high pooling price to its low perfect-information price. Hence, cost 
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transparency will lower the firm’s prices in expectation, resulting in a higher expected consumer 
surplus. 
Cost transparency will also increase the firm’s expected profit. In the separating region, if the 
firm has a low cost, cost transparency will have no effect on its profit, but if the firm has a high 
cost, cost transparency will allow the firm to make a higher profit (i.e., its perfect-information 
profit) since the firm no longer needs to distort its price to separate from a low-cost firm. Thus, 
overall, in the separating region, cost transparency will give the firm a higher expected profit. 
Similarly, in the pooling region (𝛼 ≥ 𝛼∗), cost transparency will also increase the firm’s ex ante 
expected profit because the firm’s benefit from having a high cost revealed will dominate its profit 
loss from having a low cost revealed. Proposition 3 easily follows. It shows that cost transparency 
will make the firm more likely to develop a new product. Moreover, because consumers will also 
benefit from the development of the new product, cost transparency can be a Pareto improvement 
for the society.  
PROPOSITION 3. There exist 𝐼 and 𝐼 such that (1) if the firm’s fixed-cost investment 𝐼 ∈ (𝐼, 𝐼), 
the firm will develop the product under cost transparency but not develop it without cost 
transparency; (2) if 𝐼 ∈ [0, 𝐼], the firm will develop the product regardless of transparency, (3) if 
𝐼 ∈ [𝐼,̅∞), the firm will not develop the product regardless of transparency. 
Our results suggest that infomediaries that share cost information with consumers are socially 
beneficial. In fact, the firm may a priori have incentives to commit to sharing its cost information 
through a credible third-party infomediary that collects and disseminates product-cost information 
to consumers. The information-sharing platform can potentially earn a profit through service fees. 
Consumer advocacy groups can also help to promote or facilitate such cost transparency.  
108 
 
Our result may also help to partially explain why in practice a growing number of firms are 
building a reputation for making their cost more transparent (e.g., Everlane, Honestby, Oliver 
Cabell). Mohan et al. (2016) show through experimental and field studies that a firm’s disclosure 
of costs can increase its trustworthiness in consumers’ mind, making consumers more interested 
in considering the firm’s product. Our paper provides a direct economic rationale why firms can 
benefit from cost transparency. 
3.5  Extension 
3.5.1 Time Discount 
In our main model, the consumer’s “cost” of delaying purchase is the loss of “newness” when 
consuming the product in a later period; we have assumed no time-discounting (i.e., 𝛿 = 1).  We now assess 
the robustness of our results to the alternative assumption that the consumer’s “cost” of delaying purchase 
is due to time discounting of future utility (not newness concerns), by considering the case of 𝛿 < 1  and 
assuming away the consumer’s “newness” concern (i.e., 𝜇 = 1). That is, the consumer’s present value of 
buying the firm’s product in the second period is 𝑢2 = 𝛿(𝑣 − 𝑝𝑖,2). Other assumptions are the same as in 
the main model. Result 1 summarizes the firm’s optimal prices and profit under cost transparency (i.e., in 
the perfect-information case), where “  ̃ ” over a variable indicates the case of cost transparency. Result 2 
describes the LMSE equilibrium outcome when the firm’s cost is not known to consumers.  
RESULT 1. When the firm’s cost is common knowledge, its first-period and second-period 








  respectively, 





, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. 
RESULT 2. Suppose that consumers do not know the firm’s cost. When 𝑐 > 𝛿, the equilibrium 
is costless-separating, i.e., both types of firms will charge their respective perfect-information 
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equilibrium is costly-separating, i.e., the high-cost firm’s first-period price is higher than its 
perfect-information price and its total profit is lower than its perfect-information profit. When 𝑐 <
𝛿 and 𝛼 > 𝛼∗∗, the equilibrium is pooling.  
When consumers have time discounting rather than a “newness” preference, if the cost 
difference between the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm is large (i.e., 𝑐 is high), the high-cost 
firm does not need to distort its price to signal its high cost to prevent the low-cost firm’s mimicry 
and can earn a profit as high as its perfect-information profit, even if consumers do not know the 
firm’s cost a priori. This is because when the cost difference between the two types of firms is 
large, the low-cost firm needs to greatly increase its price from its perfect-information price in 
order to be believed as having a high cost, which significantly reduces its unit sales. Note that the 
result is qualitatively similar to that in our main model with consumer “newness” preference, 
where the separating parameter region is the largest when 𝑐 is high (illustrated in lemma 2). Also 
similarly, when 𝑐 < 𝛿, the equilibrium is separating when the prior probability of the firm’s cost 
being high, 𝛼, is low. 
PROPOSITION 4. If 𝑐 > 𝛿 , the firm’s innovation decision will not be affected by cost 
transparency. If 𝑐 < 𝛿, there exist 𝐼′ and 𝐼′ such that (1) if the firm’s fixed-cost investment 𝐼 ∈
(𝐼′, 𝐼′), the firm will develop the product under cost transparency but not develop it without cost 
transparency; (2) if 𝐼 ∈ [0, 𝐼′], the firm will develop the product regardless of transparency, (3) if 
𝐼 ∈ [𝐼′̅, ∞), the firm will not develop the product regardless of transparency.  
Proposition 4 examines how cost transparency affect the firm’s innovation decision. When 𝑐 >
𝛿, the equilibrium is costless-separating, so cost transparency will not affect the firm’s expected 
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profit, nor its decision of whether to invest the fixed-cost 𝐼 to develop the product. By contrast, 
when 𝑐 < 𝛿, cost transparency will increase the firm’s expected profit, so it will increase the firm’s 
incentive to develop the product, i.e., expanding the parameter region in which the firm will 
develop the product. This is consistent with proposition 3, where consumers have “newness” 
concerns but no time discounting. 
3.5.2 Market with Low Entry-barriers 
Our main model has implicitly assumed a very high entry barrier in the market such that the 
firm is a monopoly in both periods, so the intertemporal price decrease is mainly due to the firm’s 
intertemporal price discrimination rather than increasing future competition. In some markets, 
firms can maintain their monopoly power for a long time because they are protected by high entry 
barriers such as patents, government policies, or geographical barriers. In such markets, 
intertemporal price discrimination may be the main driving force of the over-time price decrease. 
But some markets may have very low entry barrier, stronger competition can also drive the future 
price down, and it may be the main factor for the firm’s price intertemporal decrease. In this 
subsection, we check whether the findings from our main model are robust when the market entry 
barrier is low.  
We analyze a limiting case where the entry barrier is very low so that the market becomes 
perfectly competitive in the second period. This contrasts our assumption in Section 4 that the firm 
remains a monopoly in the second period, which represents the other limit of prohibitively high 
entry barrier. In reality, future entry barriers or the level of competition in the market may lie 
somewhere between these two cases; analyzing these two limits will help better gauge the 
boundary of our results. 
111 
 
We assume the firm to be a monopoly for its new product in the first period, but in the second 
period new entrants will enter to produce the product at the same marginal cost (𝑐𝑖). Thus, the 
second-period equilibrium price will drop to 𝑐𝑖. Other aspects of the model are the same as in the 
main model. We focus on the interesting case of 𝑐 ≤
𝜇
2
 such that in equilibrium the high-cost firm 
will serve some consumers in the second period. Lemma 4 presents the equilibrium results when 
consumers do not know the firm’s cost. 
LEMMA 4. Suppose that the firm’s cost is not known to consumers. The unique LMSE outcome 
is separating if 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ , and pooling if 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ , where 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗  is given in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 3.2 Equilibrium Outcome – Market with Low Entry Barriers 
 
When the prior probability of the firm having a high cost is low (i.e., 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ ), the LMSE 
outcome is separating, otherwise it is pooling. Figure 3.2 illustrates the equilibrium outcome in 
different parameter regions. One can see that the boundary between the pooling and separating 
parameter regions is qualitatively the same as that in Figure 3.1. Corollary 2 shows that when the 
market has low entry barriers, the high-cost firm’s profit decreases with its marginal cost (𝑐), but 
interestingly, 𝑐  has a non-monotonic effect on the low-cost firm’s profit. This is qualitatively 
similar to Corollary 1 in the main model. 
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COROLLARY 3. The high-cost firm’s total profit 𝜋𝐻
∗  decreases with 𝑐. The low-cost firm’s total 
profit 𝜋𝐿
∗  increases with 𝑐  if 𝑐 ≤
(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
, decreases with 𝑐  if 
(1−𝜇)𝛼
1−𝛼2
< 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ , and is 
independent of 𝑐  if 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ , where 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝






























Result 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome under cost transparency. Interestingly, the firm’s 
profit is independent of its marginal cost. This is because a higher marginal cost has two opposing 
effects on the firm. On the one hand, it tends to lower the firm’s profit margin. On the other hand, 
it raises the consumers’ expected second-period price (?̅?2), which tends to make consumers more 
likely to buy the product in the first period. Note that when consumers know the firm’s cost, ?̅?2 
will be equal to the firm’s marginal cost 𝑐𝑖 (since the market is perfectly competitive in the second 
period). One can also show that the consumer’s first-period purchase decision will remain 
unchanged if both the first-period price 𝑝1 and the expected second-period price ?̅?2 increase by the 
same amount (not too large). So, when 𝑐𝑖 increases, the firm can raise its first-period price by the 
same amount, making the firm’s profit margin and its market coverage stay the same in the first 
period. Since the firm earns zero profit in the second period, the firm’s total profit is just its first-
period profit, which will not be affected by the change in marginal cost. In other words, when the 
market has very low entry barriers, the two opposing effects of a cost increase can cancel out when 
there is cost transparency in the market, so the firm’s total profit will be unchanged. 
Result 3 shows the invariance of the firm’s profit with respect to its marginal cost under cost 
transparency, assuming perfect competition in the future. In practice, the level of competition in 
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the market is often not perfect, so the two effects of a cost change may not perfectly cancel out, 
and the firm’s profit can decrease with its marginal cost. We cautiously interpret our result as that 
under cost transparency the negative effect of an increase in a firm’s marginal cost may be 
significantly mitigated because it can reduce the consumer’s strategic delay of product purchase.  
Our analysis shows that all other results in section 4 remain qualitatively the same in the current 
case of very low entry barrier. That is, the qualitative effects of cost transparency on the firm’s 
profit and consumer surplus are robust to different levels of entry barriers in the market.  
3.6  Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of cost transparency on firm innovation, pricing, profits, and 
the consumer surplus. Our analysis shows that although cost transparency may ex post make the 
firm or consumers worse off, it ex ante makes both the firm and the consumers better off in 
expectation. This suggests that cost transparency can encourage more innovation by the firm and 
increase the overall consumer surplus. Moreover, cost transparency reduces the expected first-
period and second-period prices in the market. 
Our results provide insight on why a high-cost firm may seek to reveal its high cost to 
consumers on its own or facilitate the sharing of cost information through third-party 
infomediaries. For example, Xiaomi, a Chinese electronics company, has been actively informing 
consumers of its low profit margin. Some fashion firms, such as Everlane and Oliver Cabell, 
disclose the detailed cost breakdown of their products on their own websites. However, a firm’s 
own claim of high costs may sometimes lack credibility. Many consumers question Xiaomi’s own 
claim of its high cost (or low margins),29 and the third-party’s cost estimate of Xiaomi’s cellphone 
can be much lower than Xiaomi’s own claim.30  Moreover, the reach of the firm’s own claim of 
its cost may be narrow. Kuah and Weerakkody (2015) also summarize some other difficulties for 
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the firm to credibly disclose its cost information. In contrast, many third-party infomediaries and 
news media, such as Electronics360, can examine or take apart the new products to provide more 
credible cost information because they do not have conflict of interests. So, infomediaries can 
serve an important role in providing credible cost transparency. 
Our results around the effect of cost transparency on profit margins are consistent with some 
anecdotal evidence. For example, Scott Painter, CEO of TrueCar.com, suggested that the “average 
gross profit [of participating dealerships] has risen $100 per new vehicle to $350 today, from $250 
a year and a half ago.”31 This is consistent with our prediction that if the equilibrium is pooling 
when consumers do not know the firm’s cost, then cost transparency will increase the high-cost 
firm’s optimal price because the firm is no longer pooled with the low-cost firm.  
Note that we assumed that the product’s marginal cost is independent of the firm’s innovation 
cost (𝐼). This is a reasonable assumption when the variance in production cost arises from the 
uncertainty in exogenous factors such as production technology or input prices. We however 
conjecture that when the firm’s investments are focused on reducing its unit cost (e.g., process 
innovation), cost transparency will tend to lower the firm’s incentive in making cost-reduction 
investments, since cost transparency will increase a high-cost firm’s profit and reduce a low-cost 
firm’s profit, leading to a smaller profit difference between a high-cost firm and a low-cost firm.  
We hope that our paper will inspire empirical work on testing when cost infomediaries arise 
and their effects on firm pricing and margins. We offer the conjecture that cost infomediaries can 
lead to greater product innovation and lower process innovation. Similarly, our paper offers 
hypotheses for empirical testing of the effects of cost intermediaries on prices and margins. 
Our analysis can be extended in the following ways: First, throughout the paper we have 
assumed that all consumers are strategic and anticipate future price change when they make 
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purchase decisions. It will be interesting to investigate what happens if some of the consumers are 
myopic and do not anticipate future price changes. Previous research shows that the existence of 
myopic consumers increases the firm’s profit when there is no information asymmetry (Aviv and 
Pazgal 2008). Future research can focus on whether this result will still hold when information 
asymmetry exists and consumers do not know the firm’s cost. 
Second, in this paper we have analyzed two-period models, and have not explicitly investigated 
a multi-period model or a continuous-time model. Previous research shows that as the number of 
periods increases, firms’ incentive to acquire a good reputation (e.g., “being tough” or “being 
benevolent” as in Kreps and Wilson 1982) becomes stronger. If we apply their arguments to our 
research setting, a firm will tend to have a stronger incentive to be considered as a high-cost type 
when the number of periods increases. Hence, a low-cost firm will have stronger incentive to 
mimic a high-cost firm and the high-cost firm will need to raise its price more to prevent being 
mimicked. Consequently, we conjecture that if the number of periods increases, the high-cost 
firm’s benefit from cost transparency will tend to increase whereas the low-cost firm will become 




3.7  References 
Aviv, Yossi and Amit Pazgal (2008), "Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of 
Forward-Looking Consumers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10 (3), 
339–359 
Balachander, Subramanian and Kannan Srinivasan (1998), "Modifying Customer Expectations of 
Price Decreases for a Durable Product," Management Science, 44 (6), 776–786 
Besanko, David and Wayne L. Winston (1990), "Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing 
Rational Consumers," Management Science, 36 (5), 555–567 
Bridges, Eileen, Chi Kin (Bennett) Yim, and Richard A. Briesch (1995), "A High-Tech Product 
Market Share Model with Customer Expectations," Marketing Science, 14 (1), 61–81 
Coase, Ronald H. (1972), "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law & Economics, 15 (1), 143–
149 
Conlisk, John, Eitan Gerstner, and Joel Sobel (1984), "Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods 
Monopolist," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99 (3), 489–505 
Desai, Preyas S. and Kannan Srinivasan (1995), "Demand Signalling under Unobservable Effort 
in Franchising: Linear and Nonlinear Price Contracts," Management Science, 41 (10), 1608–
1623 
Fried, Dov (1984), "Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure in a Duopolistic 
Environment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99 (2), 367–381 
Gal-or, Esther (1986), "Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria," The Review 
of Economic Studies, 53 (1), 85–92 
Gill, David and Daniel Sgroi (2012), "The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer," Journal of 
Economic Theory, 147 (3), 1247–1260 
Guo, Xiaomeng and Baojun Jiang (2016), "Signaling Through Price and Quality to Consumers 
with Fairness Concerns," Journal of Marketing Research, 53 (6), 988–1000 
Jiang, Baojun, Kinshuk Jerath, and Kannan Srinivasan (2011), "Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” 
of Platform-Based Retailing," Marketing Science, 30 (5), 757–775 
Jiang, Baojun, Jian Ni, and Kannan Srinivasan (2014), "Signaling Through Pricing by Service 
Providers with Social Preferences," Marketing Science, 33 (5), 641–654 
117 
 
Kahn, Charles (1986), "The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs," 
Econometrica, 54 (2), 275–294 
Kuah, Adrian T.H. and Vishanth Weerakkody (2015), "Commentary: Is Cost Transparency 
Necessarily Good for Consumers?," European Journal of Marketing, 49 (11/12), 1980–1986 
Kuksov, Dmitri (2004), "Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design," Marketing 
Science, 23 (4), 490–499 
Kuksov, Dmitri and Yuanfang Lin (2017), "Signaling Low Margin Through Assortment," 
Management Science, 63 (4), 1166–1183 
Levin, Yuri, Jeff McGill, and Mikhail Nediak (2008), "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of 
Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition," Management Science, 55 (1), 32–46 
Mailath, George J., Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Andrew Postlewaite (1993), "Belief-Based 
Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), 241–276 
Miklós-Thal, J. and Juanjuan Zhang (2013), "(De) Marketing to Manage Consumer Quality 
Inferences," Journal of Marketing Research, 50 (1), 55–69 
Mohan, Bhavya, Ryan W. Buell, and Leslie K. John (2016), "Lifting the Veil: The Benefits of 
Cost Transparency," SSRN Electronic Journal, 
Moorthy, Sridhar and Kannan Srinivasan (1995), "Signaling Quality with a Money-Back 
Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs," Marketing Science, 14 (4), 442–466 
Nan, Lin and Xiaoyan Wen (2014), "Financing and Investment Efficiency, Information Quality, 
and Accounting Biases," Management Science, 60 (9), 2308–2323 
Narasimhan, Chakravarthi (1989), "Incorporating Consumer Price Expectations in Diffusion 
Models," Marketing Science, 8 (4), 343–357 
Png, I.P.L. (1991), "Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time," 
Journal of Political Economy, 99 (5), 1010–1028 
Shapiro, Carl (1986), "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," The Review of Economic 
Studies, 53 (3), 433–446 
Simester, Duncan (1995), "Signalling Price Image Using Advertised Prices," Marketing Science, 
14 (2), 166–188 
118 
 
Simintiras, Antonis C., Yogesh K. Dwivedi, Geetanjali Kaushik, and Nripendra P. Rana (2015), 
"Should Consumers Request Cost Transparency?," European Journal of Marketing, 49 
(11/12), 1961–1979 
Sinha, Indrajit (2000), "Cost Transparency: The Net’s Real Threat to Prices and Brands," Harvard 
Business Review, 78 (2), 43–49 
Soberman, David (2003), "Simultaneous Signaling and Screening with Warranties," Journal of 
Marketing Research, 40 (2), 176–192 
Stokey, Nancy L. (1979), "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 93 (3), 355–371 
Stokey, Nancy L. (1981), "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," The Bell Journal 
of Economics, 12 (1), 112–128 
Taylor, Curtis R. (1999), "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality," Review of Economic Studies, 
66 (3), 555–578 
Weinswig, Deborah (2018), "Transparency Is The New Normal: Top Takeaways From The 2018 
Innovation Series," 
Yao, Dong-Qing, Xiaohang Yue, and John Liu (2008), "Vertical Cost Information Sharing in a 
Supply Chain with Value-Adding Retailers," Omega, 36 (5), 838–851 
Zhu, Kevin (2002), "Information Transparency in Electronic Marketplaces: Why Data 
Transparency May Hinder the Adoption of B2B Exchanges," Electronic Markets, 12 (2), 92–
99 
Zhu, Kevin (2004), "Analysis Information Transparency of Business-to-Business Electronic 











                                                                                                                                                             
27 The high-cost firm may want to directly reveal its cost to consumers but its own claim may lack 
credibility. In contrast, third-party infomediaries can provide reliable cost information because 
they do not have conflict interests. See the Conclusion section for a detailed discussion. 
28 We adopt LMSE as the equilibrium refinement criterion instead of other criteria mainly because, 
in our model, other refinement criteria, such as the Intuitive Criterion, still leave a continuum of 
PBE and do not identify a unique equilibrium outcome. By contrast, all PBE surviving LMSE 









PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Note that 𝑈𝑖,2 is defined as type-𝑖 consumer’s utility if she does not buy 
tickets in the first period and makes her optimal buying decision (from the primary market, from 
the resale market, or not buying) in the second period. Hence 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,2] ≥ 0 and a type-𝑖 consumer 
will try to buy tickets in the first period if and only if 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,1] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,2].  
Because 𝑁 ≤ ?̅? <
1+𝛼
2
, there will be always some consumers with strictly positive valuation 
unserved in the second period, so 𝑟 ∗̂ > 0. Thus, 𝑟 ∗̂ is either 𝑉𝐴 or 𝑉𝐶. 
LEMMA A.1 If there are any casual fans trying to buy tickets in the first period, all avid fans 
will try to buy tickets in the first period. 
This is true because 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] − 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] − 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] for all 0 ≤ 𝜌𝑖 ≤ 1. 
LEMMA A.2 If a casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 > 0 will try to buy tickets in the first period, then all 
casual fans with 𝜌𝑖 ∈ [𝜌, 1] will try to buy tickets in the first period.  
We prove by contraposition. Suppose that there exist 𝜌 ∈ (0,1), such that the casual consumer 
with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 will try to buy tickets in the first period and that there exist 𝜌𝑖 > 𝜌 and the casual 
consumer with 𝜌𝑖 will not buy tickets in the first period. Because both 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] are 
linear in 𝜌𝑖 and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] ≥ 0, the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 1 will not try to buy tickets in the first 
period, and the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 0  will try to buy tickets in the first period. But 
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] = 0 if 𝜌𝑖 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] > 0 when 𝜌𝑖 = 0, which is equivalent to (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂ − 𝑝 > 0. 
Therefore, 𝑟 ∗̂ ≠ 0, so 𝑟 ∗̂ ≥ 𝑉𝐶.  
Note that both 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] are weakly increasing in 𝜌𝑖  and that 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] > 0 when 
𝜌𝑖 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝑖,1] > 0 for all 𝜌𝑖 = 0. We divide the discussion into the following three cases. 
(i) If tickets are expected to sell out in the first period, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟
∗̂, 0} = 0 for 
all 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 0. So 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] when 𝜌𝑖 = 1. 
(ii) If tickets are not expected to sell out and 𝑝 > 𝑟∗̂, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] = 0 for all 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 0. So 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] 
when 𝜌𝑖 = 1. 
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(iii) If tickets are not expected to sell out and 𝑝 ≤ 𝑟∗̂, for the casual consumer with 𝜌𝑖 = 1, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] =
max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 − 𝑘)𝑟
∗̂} − 𝑝 = max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, (1 − 𝑘)𝑟
∗̂ − 𝑝} ≥ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} ≥ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} =
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2]. 
Therefore, in all three cases, the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 1 will try to buy tickets in the first period, 
contradictory to the previous conclusion that this consumer will not try to buy tickets in the first period.  
Let 𝑛1 be the number of consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period. Lemma A.1 and Lemma 
A.2 together imply that if there are two rational expectation subgame perfect equilibria with the same 𝑛1, 
then they are the same group of consumers in these two equilibria. 𝑃𝑟1̂ = min {1,
𝑁
𝑛1
} is also the same in 
these two equilibria. Further, note that in the second period, the number of consumers who want to sell 
tickets, the number of avid fans, and the number of casual fans who want to buy tickets are uniquely pinned 
down by 𝑛1, so 𝑟
∗ is also uniquely determined by 𝑛1, and so is 𝑟
∗̂. Thus, if there are two rational expectation 
subgame perfect equilibria with the same 𝑛1, these two equilibria are identical. This directly implies that 
the buying-spree equilibrium is unique.   ∎ 
 
Derivation of the casual fan’s utility function 
We first derive the consumer’s utility functions. Note that, as described earlier, a consumer 
who wants to buy a ticket may not be able to get a ticket. Let 𝑈𝑖,1 denote type-𝑖 consumer’s utility 
of trying to buy a ticket in the first period, and 𝑢𝑖,1 denote her utility of successfully getting a ticket 
in the first period. Let 𝑈𝑖,2 be type-𝑖 consumer’s utility if she does not buy tickets in the first period 
and makes her optimal buying decision (from the primary market, from the resale market, or not 
buying) in the second period. In the buying-spree equilibrium, the rational prediction will be 
fulfilled. Because the resale price 𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝐴, an avid fan will never resell her ticket in the second 
period. Thus, an avid fan will attend the concert if she has a ticket, and will always want to buy a 
ticket from either the primary or the resale market if she does not have a ticket. If tickets are 
expected to sell out on the primary platform in the first period, an avid fan’s expected utility of 
trying to buy a ticket in the first period is  
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𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] = 𝑃𝑟1̂(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃𝑟1̂) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟
∗̂), (1) 
where 𝑃𝑟1 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket (from the primary market) in the first 
period and 𝑃𝑟2,𝑅 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket from the resale market in the 
second period. Note that 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] consists of two terms. The first term represents the case that the 
avid fan successfully gets a ticket in the first period, where 𝑃𝑟1̂  is the rationally expected 
probability of getting the ticket and 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝 is the avid fan’s utility conditional on getting the ticket 
in the first period. The second term in (1) represents the case that the avid fan does not get a ticket 
in the first period (which occurs with a probability of 1 − 𝑃𝑟1̂) but gets a ticket in the second period 
(which occurs with a probability of 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?) and 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗̂ is her utility conditional on getting the 
resale ticket. 32 Note that in the second period the consumer cannot get a ticket from the sold-out 
primary platform. In this case, an avid fan’s expected utility from trying to buy a ticket in the 
second period is 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2] = 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗̂) ≥ 0.  
If tickets are not expected to sell out on the primary platform in the first period, 𝑃𝑟1̂ = 1 and 
an avid fan’s expected utility from buying in the first period is 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] = 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝. Her expected 
utility of trying to buy a ticket in the second period depends on 𝑝 and the expectation of 𝑟. If 𝑝 <
𝑟 ∗̂, avid fans will first try to buy tickets from the cheaper, primary platform, and if unsuccessful, 
then from the resale platform. An avid fan’s expected utility from trying to buy in the second 
period is given by 
𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2] = 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?]) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? ⋅ (𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗̂), (2) 
where 𝑃𝑟2,𝑃 is the probability of successfully getting a ticket on the primary market in the second 
period. The first term in (2) corresponds to the situation in which the avid fan can successfully get 
a ticket from the primary platform in the second period, which occurs with probability 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? and 
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conditional on which the avid fan’s utility is 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝. The second term of (2) represents the situation 
in which the avid fan does not successfully get a ticket from the primary platform in the second 
period, which happens with probability 1 − 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?. In this case, the avid fan will try to buy a ticket 
from the resale platform, where she can successfully get a ticket with probability 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?, in which 
case her utility is 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗̂. Similarly, if 𝑝 ≥ 𝑟 ∗̂, an avid fan will try to buy tickets from the resale 
platform first, and if unsuccessful, then try the primary platform. So, 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2] = 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟 ∗̂) +
(1 − 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝) ≥ 0. 
A casual fan 𝑖 has probability 1 − 𝜌𝑖 of having realized valuation 𝑣𝑖 = 0, in which case she 
wants to resell the ticket at any positive price. With probability 𝜌𝑖, her valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶. Note 
that the consumer can earn (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 from reselling a ticket, so when her realized valuation is 𝑣𝑖 =
𝑉𝐶 , a casual fan will resell her ticket if and only if 𝑉𝐶 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑟. Therefore, if a causal fan 
successfully gets a ticket in the first period, her expected utility is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 −
𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂} + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)(1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂ − 𝑝. If tickets are expected to sell out on the primary platform in the 
first period, a casual fan’s expected utilities from trying to buy a ticket in the first period and in 
the second period are 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] = 𝑃𝑟1̂ ⋅ 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] + 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ (1 − 𝑃𝑟1̂) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? ⋅ max {𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 ∗̂, 0}  and 
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? ⋅ max {𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 ∗̂, 0}, respectively. If tickets are not expected to sell out on the 
primary platform in the first period, 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] = 𝜌𝑖 ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 , (1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂} + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)(1 − 𝑘)𝑟 ∗̂ − 𝑝 
and 
𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2] = {
𝜌𝑖 ⋅ [𝑃𝑟2,?̂?max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0} + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? ⋅ max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 ∗̂, 0}], 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤ 𝑟 ∗̂
𝜌𝑖 ⋅ [𝑃𝑟2,?̂?max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑟 ∗̂, 0} + (1 − 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?max{𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, 0}], 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 > 𝑟 ∗̂
. 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.  
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(a) 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] ≤ 𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 = 0, so 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,2]. Therefore, no casual fans will buy tickets in the first 
period. Tickets will hence not sell out in equilibrium. 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] = 𝑉𝐴 − 𝑝 > 0, so all avid fans will buy tickets 
in the first period. 
(b) If there is an equilibrium where the concert sells out in the first period and 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴, there will be 
more avid fans, whose valuation is 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴, wanting to buy tickets than the number of consumers wanting 
to reselling tickets in the second period.  
 
Let 𝑥 = 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑝 and 𝑦 = 𝑣𝐿 − (1 − 𝑘)𝑣𝐻. We need to guarantee that (i) there are more than 𝑁 
consumers who want to buy tickets in the first period, (ii) on the resale market, there are at least as many 
consumers who want to buy tickets as those who want to resell tickets at resale price 𝑟 = 𝑣𝐻.  
 
If tickets sell out, 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼, so all avid fans will buy tickets in the first period. For casual fans, 





buy tickets in the first period. Thus condition (i) 𝑛1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌




There will be 
𝛼
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗)
𝑁  avid fans and 
(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗)
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗)
𝑁  casual fans with 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 𝜌
∗  successfully 
getting tickets in the first period. In the second period, all avid fans with tickets will attend the concert. 
Consumers reselling tickets are casual fans with a ticket but unable to attend the concerts. Thus, the supply 
of resale tickets is 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑁
(1−𝛼)𝑥
𝛼𝑦+(1−𝛼)𝑥









 . There will be 𝛼[1 −
𝑁
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗)
] avid fans who did not get tickets in the first period, so the demand in the resale market when 
𝑟 = 𝑉𝐴 is 𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼[1 −
𝑁
𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝜌∗)











, condition (ii) implies condition (i). There is an equilibrium 













PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Lemma 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the independent-platforms 
case. We first consider the primary platform’s optimal strategy given the musician’s choices of 𝑁 
and 𝑓. 
When 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, it is optimal for the primary platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. The primary platform’s 
profit is 𝜋𝑃 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓). 
When 𝛼 < 𝑁 ≤ ?̅? ≤
2𝛼
1+𝛼
, it will be optimal for the primary platform to either choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴 
or 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. If it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, its profit will be 𝜋𝑃(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓). If it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, 
its profit will be 𝜋𝑃(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) . The primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴  if 𝑓 >
𝑁𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼




Then we consider the musician’s optimal strategy: 
If 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, its profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐), so the musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴. 
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 >
𝑁𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼
, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, and only avid fans will 
buy tickets from the primary platform. So the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝛼𝑓 − 𝑐𝑁. The musician 
will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼. 
If 𝑁 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝑓 ≤
𝑁𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼
, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, so avid fans will buy 
tickets in the first period and casual fans with 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will buy in the second period, and tickets 
sell out. The musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐). Because 
𝑁𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼
 increases in 𝑁, the musician 


















), and will choose (𝑁, 𝑓) = (?̅?,
?̅?𝑣𝐿−𝛼𝑣𝐻
?̅?−𝛼
) if 𝛼 < ?̅?(1 − √
𝑉𝐴−𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴−𝑐




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Proposition 1 can be directly shown from the integrated platform’s 
optimal choice of 𝑝 in the integrated-platform case.  
When 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, the integrated platform will optimally choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. Its profit is 𝜋𝑃(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴) =
𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓). 




(i) If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶 , its profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑝 − 𝑓), so it is optimal for the 
integrated platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. 
(ii) If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, its profit is 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) 
(iii) Suppose that the integrated platform chooses 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 . Suppose that 
casual consumers with 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 𝜌0 will try to buy tickets in the first period. Thus 𝑛1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜌0). 
If 𝑛1 ≤ 𝑁 , i.e., 1 − 𝜌0 ≤
𝑁−𝛼
1−𝛼
, all consumers trying to buy tickets in the first period will get a ticket 







 consumers reselling 













. If 𝑛1 > 𝑁, i.e., 
1 − 𝜌0 >
𝑁−𝛼
1−𝛼
, all tickets sell out in the first period and consumers get tickets with probability 
𝑁
𝑛1
, thus there 
will be 𝑆𝑅 =
𝑁
𝑛1










 consumers reselling their 










. Thus 𝑆𝑅 ≤
𝑁(1−𝛼)
2
 no matter 
whether 𝑛1 > 𝑁 or not.  
Lemma 2 indicates that in equilibrium, it is either 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶 or tickets do not sell out in the first period. 
We discuss the following cases. 
(a) If tickets do not sell out in the first period and no casual consumers buy tickets in the first period, 
there will be no consumers reselling tickets in the second period, so the integrated platform’s profit 
is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁(𝑝 − 𝑓) < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓). 
(b) If tickets do not sell out in the first period and some casual consumers buy tickets in the first period, 
we claim that 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶. If not, 𝑟
∗ = 𝑉𝐴, so 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,1] > 𝐸[𝑈𝐴,2], and all avid fans will buy tickets in 
the first period and get tickets successfully. In the second period there will be no avid fans wanting 
tickets and there will be some casual fans reselling the tickets, so 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶, which is contradictory 
to 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴. Therefore 𝑟
∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶. For the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌0, 0 ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] ≤ 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] = 𝜌0𝑉𝐶 +
(1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)𝑟
∗ − 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝, so 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶. The 
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integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = (𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅𝑘𝑟
∗ ≤ {[𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓}𝑁 +




𝑘]𝑉𝐶𝑁 −𝑁𝑓 . Note that 1 − 𝜌0 ≤
𝑁−𝛼
1−𝛼
, so 𝜋𝐼 ≤




𝑘]𝑉𝐶𝑁 −𝑁𝑓 < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓). 
(c) If tickets sell out in the first period, then 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶. For the casual fan with 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌0, 0 ≤ 𝐸[𝑈𝐶,1] ≤
𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] = 𝜌0𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)𝑟
∗ − 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 − 𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 , so 𝑝 ≤ [𝜌0 + (1 −
𝜌0)(1 − 𝑘)]𝑉𝐶 . The integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = (𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅𝑘𝑟
∗ ≤ {[𝜌0 + (1 −





















𝑘 < 1. Thus 
𝜋𝐼 < 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓). 
The discussion of case (a) to (c) together show that if 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 < 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶 , the 
integrated platform will earn strictly less profit than when choosing 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. Thus the integrated platform 
will never choose 𝑝 ∈ (𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, 𝑉𝐶). 
(iv) If the integrated platform chooses (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , by part (b) of 
Lemma 2, all tickets sell out in the first period and 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴 in the buying-spree equilibrium. The integrated 











− 1] + 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓), where 𝑥 = 𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝 and 𝑦 = 𝑉𝐶 − (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , so (1 − 𝜃)𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦. 











≥ 1 . So if 𝜋𝐼 ≤ 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) 
when 𝑥 = 𝑦, then it is not optimal for the integrated platform to choose (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜃𝑉𝐶 + (1 −
𝜃)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴. By contrast, if 𝜋𝐼 > 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓), the integrated platform can earn a higher profit by choosing 









The integrated platform’s profit with 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)
2
) − 𝑓] . 
(v) If the integrated platform chooses 𝑝 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 , the integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 =
(𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + 𝑆𝑅𝑘𝑟
∗ < ((1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓)𝑁 +
𝑁(1−𝛼)
2
𝑘𝑉𝐴 ≤ 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)
2




From the results in (i) to (v), we know that the integrated platform will choose either 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, 𝑉𝐶 or 
(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 . In addition, 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴) ≥ 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶)  if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼0 , and  𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = (1 −






𝑉𝐴.      ∎ 
 
DERIVATION OF TABLE 2. We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that the integrated platform will 
choose either 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 or 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴. 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴) ≥ 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼0, 






𝑉𝐴 , and 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) ≥ 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴)  if 








will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶  if and only if 𝑓 ≤
𝑁𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
𝑁−𝛼
. Lemma 3 has shown that when 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃, the 
musician will choose 𝑓 =
?̅?𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
?̅?−𝛼
 and 𝑁 = ?̅?, and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. 
When 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃, the musician will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼, and the integrated platform will 
choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. 













Now consider the musician’s optimal choice of 𝑁 and 𝑓. 
If 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑁(𝑓 − 𝑐), so the musician will choose 𝑁 = 𝛼 and 𝑓 =
𝑉𝐴. 






𝑉𝐴, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, and only avid 
fans will buy tickets from the primary platform. So the musician’s profit is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝛼𝑓 − 𝑐𝑁. The 
musician will choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼. 






𝑉𝐴, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, so avid fans will 
buy tickets in the first period and casual fans with 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶 will buy in the second period, and 
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𝑉𝐴 increases in 𝑁, 













𝑉𝐴) in equilibrium, 
























𝑉𝐴) if and only if 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇. 
Therefore, in the case of 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇: 
If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 , the musician will choose (𝑁






𝑉𝐴) , and the integrated 
platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴. 
If 𝛼0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose (𝑁
∗, 𝑓∗) = (?̅?,
?̅?𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
?̅?−𝛼
) , and the integrated 
platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶. 
If 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝐷𝑃 , the musician will choose (𝑁
∗, 𝑓∗) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴), and the integrated platform will 
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴. 
In the case of 𝛼0 > 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇: 
If 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , the musician will choose (𝑁






𝑉𝐴), and the integrated 
platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴. 
If 𝛼 > 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇 , the musician will choose (𝑁
∗, 𝑓∗) = (𝛼, 𝑉𝐴), and the integrated platform will 
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴. 
One can directly calculate the profits of the musician, the integrated platform, and consumer 
surplus with the 𝑁∗, 𝑓∗, and 𝑝∗ above.  ∎ 
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) − 𝜖2 , where 
𝜖1, 𝜖2 > 0 and they are sufficiently small. So 𝑘1 > 𝑘2.  Since 
(2−𝑘)𝑉𝐴−2𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑉𝐴






, so there exist 𝛼 such that 
(2−𝑘1)𝑉𝐴−2𝑉𝐶
𝑘1𝑉𝐴






} , and 𝛼 <
(2−𝑘2)𝑉𝐴−2𝑉𝐶
𝑘2𝑉𝐴







When 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 satisfy the conditions above, if 𝑘 = 𝑘1, 𝛼0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇, in equilibrium the 
musician will choose (𝑁∗, 𝑓∗) = (?̅?,
?̅?𝑉𝐶−𝛼𝑉𝐴
?̅?−𝛼
) and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶, 
and the consumer surplus is ?̅?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶); if 𝑘 = 𝑘2, 𝛼 < 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇, in equilibrium the musician 






𝑉𝐴)  and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝
∗ =
(1 − 𝑘2)𝑉𝐴, and the consumer surplus is ?̅?[𝛼𝑉𝐴𝑘2 +
(1−𝛼)[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘2)𝑉𝐴]
2







] < ?̅?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶). So, 𝑝
∗ is smaller when 𝑘 = 𝑘2 than when 𝑘 = 𝑘1, 
but the consumer surplus is lower when 𝑘 = 𝑘2 than when 𝑘 = 𝑘1.   ∎ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 AND PROPOSITION 4. One can derive the results by directly comparing 
the outcomes of Lemma 3 and Table 2. 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. We prove Lemma 4 by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium 𝑟∗ >
𝑉𝐶. As we discussed earlier, there are three possible equilibrium resale prices in our setting: 𝑉𝐴, 
𝑉𝐶, and zero, so 𝑟
∗ = 𝑉𝐴. If 𝑝 ≥ (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, no casual fans will buy tickets from the primary market 
in the first period, so no one will resell tickets in equilibrium (since avid fans can always attend 
the concert). If 𝑝 < (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, all casual fans will try to buy tickets in the first period and resell 
them at the high resale price 𝑟∗ = 𝑉𝐴 regardless of whether they can attend the concert. Because 
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all casual fans and avid fans will try to buy tickets in the first period, the concert will sell out in 
the first period. Because in equilibrium all ticket resellers successfully resell their tickets, the 
casual fans will not possess any tickets after all resale transactions have completed. This implies 
that the number of consumers attending the concert cannot exceed the population of avid fans, 𝛼. 
This contradicts the fact that 𝑁 > 𝛼 and the concert sells out in the primary market. This completes 
the proof.   ∎ 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Lemma 4 shows that 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑉𝐶. Suppose that the retail price is 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶. A 
casual fan’s expected utility of successfully buying a ticket in the first period is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] = 𝜌𝑖𝑉𝐶 +
(1 − 𝜌𝑖)(1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝. A necessary condition for the casual fan to try to buy tickets in the first 
period is 𝐸[𝑢𝐶,1] ≥ 0, i.e., 𝜌𝑖 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶−𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶
. The number of casual fans who will resell tickets in the 
second period will not exceed (1 − 𝛼)𝑁
𝑉𝐶−𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶
. The integrated platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 ≤ 𝜋𝑃 + 𝜋𝑅 =
(𝑝 − 𝑓)𝑁 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁
𝑉𝐶−𝑝
𝑘𝑉𝐶
⋅ 𝑘𝑉𝐶 < (𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝)𝑁 , which is strictly lower than the integrated 
platform’s profit if it chooses 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. Thus the integrated platform will never choose 𝑝 < 𝑉𝐶. The 
equilibrium outcome will be the same in the independent-platforms case and in the integrated-
platform case.  ∎ 
PROOF OF LEMMA 6. We consider the parameter region with 𝛽 ≤
2𝛼−(1+𝛼)?̅?
1−𝛼
 and 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
.   
If 𝑝 > 𝑉𝐶, it is optimal for the integrated platform to choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. Only avid fans will buy 
tickets in the first period. No casual fans or scalpers will buy tickets in either period. The integrated 
platform’s profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑓). 
If 𝑉𝐶 ≥ 𝑝 > (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, no scalpers will buy tickets in the first period. Similar to the proof of 
Proposition 1, the integrated platform will optimally choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. 
If 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴 and 𝑟
∗ = 𝑉𝐴, all consumers and scalpers will buy in the first period. 𝛽 
scalpers, 𝛼(𝑁 − 𝛽) avid fans and (1 − 𝛼)(𝑁 − 𝛽) casual fans will successfully receive the 
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ticket. All scalpers and 
(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2
 casual fans will resell the tickets, so the supply in the resale 
market is 𝑆𝑅 = 𝛽 +
(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2
. 𝛼(1 − 𝑁 + 𝛽) avid fans will buy resale tickets in the resale 






, 𝑆𝑅 < 𝐷𝑅, so 𝑟
∗ = 𝑉𝐴. The 
number of tickets resold on the resale platform is 𝛽 +
(1−𝛼)(𝑁−𝛽)
2
. The integrated platform’s total 
profit is 𝜋𝐼 =
1+𝛼
2
𝛽𝑘𝑉𝐴 + 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)
2
) − 𝑓]. ∎ 
 






] . We 
will next prove that 
𝜕𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃
𝜕𝛽
> 0 , which is equivalent to 
√[𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? − 𝛽)]2 +
8(1+?̅?)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)
?̅?
𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? − 𝛽) − 𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? − 𝛽) decreases with 𝛽. Let 𝑎 = 𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? −
𝛽) > 0  and 𝑏 =
8(1+?̅?)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)
?̅?
> 0 . So √[𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? − 𝛽)]2 +
8(1+?̅?)(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)
?̅?
𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? − 𝛽) − 𝑉𝐴𝑘(?̅? −


















, one can show that 
𝜕𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃
𝜕𝛽
> 0. Also note that if 𝛽 = 0, 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 = 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇, so 𝛼𝑆𝐶𝑃 >




− 1 is increasing in 𝛽, and if 𝛽 = 0, 𝛼1 = 𝛼0. So 𝛼1 > 𝛼0 when 𝛽 > 0. 
When 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛼 > min {𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇}, Table 2 has shown that if 𝛽 = 0, the integrated platform 
will set 𝑝∗ ≥ 𝑉𝐶. But if 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛼 < min {𝛼1, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇}, in equilibrium the musician will choose 
𝑁∗ = ?̅? and 𝑓∗ = 𝑉𝐴[1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)(?̅?−𝛽)
2(?̅?−𝛼)
], and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐶. 
∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. We consider the case when 𝛿 → 0+. From the previous analysis, we 
know that in the independent-platforms case, the primary platform will choose 𝑝 such that no 
casual fans will buy tickets in the first period. This is still true when 𝛿 → 0+. The only consumers 
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reselling tickets in the first period are avid fans who find themselves not being able to attend the 
concert, whose population is 𝛿𝛼. The resale platform’s profit is 𝜋𝑅 = 𝛿𝛼𝑘𝑟
∗. Because 𝛿 → 0+, 
changing 𝑘 will not affect the resale ticket demand, so 𝑟∗ will not change with 𝑘. Hence the resale 
platform will always choose 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑃
∗ = 1. 
Next we consider the integrated-platform case. If 𝑘 < 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
, as is shown in Lemma 5, the 
integrated platform will never set 𝑝∗ < 𝑉𝐶, and its profit is less than when it sets 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑘 =
1. If 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 and 𝑁 ≤ 𝛼, in equilibrium the musician will choose 𝑓∗ = 𝑉𝐴, and the integrated 
platform will choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐴, so the integrated platform will receive zero profit. When 𝑘 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 and 𝛼 < 𝑁 ≤
2𝛼
1+𝛼
, it could either set 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, or 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴. If 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴, the 
integrated platform’s profit is 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘(1+𝛼)
2
) − 𝑓], which strictly decreases with 𝑘. So it will 
set 𝑘 = 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 and set 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶. 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑁{(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) +
1−𝛼
2
(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐶)}. If the integrated platform sets 
𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, its profit is 𝜋𝐼 = 𝛼(𝑉𝐻 − 𝑓), and in this case the integrated platform will optimally choose 
𝑘 = 1 . The platform will choose (𝑝, 𝑘) = (𝑉𝐶 , 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴






















] ≡ 𝛼2 . If 𝛼 > 𝛼2 , the musician will choose 
𝑁∗ = 𝛼 and 𝑓∗ = 𝑉𝐴, and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝
∗ = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑘
∗ = 1. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼2, the 
musician will choose 𝑁∗ = ?̅? and 𝑓∗ =
𝑁[(1−𝛼)𝑉𝐴+(1+𝛼)𝑉𝐶]−2𝛼𝑉𝐴
2𝑉𝐴(𝑁−𝛼)
, and the integrated platform will 
choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑉𝐶 and 𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑇





PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that 𝛼 < 𝑁 <
2𝛼
1+𝛼
 and 𝑘𝐶 ≥ 1 −
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
. In the competitive 
platform case, suppose the musician has chosen 
2𝛼
1+𝛼
> 𝑁 > 𝛼 and 𝑓, the integrated platform’s 
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total profit is 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴) = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃[2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]
2
) − 𝑓]  if it sets 𝑝 = (1 −
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴, its profit is 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓) if 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶, and its profit is 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 −
𝑓) if 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴.  
𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴) = 𝑁 [𝑉𝐴 (1 −
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃[2−(1−𝛼)𝜙]
2
) − 𝑓] > 𝜋𝐼(𝑝 = 𝑉𝐶) = 𝑁(𝑉𝐶 − 𝑓)  if and 
only if 𝛼 < 1 −
2[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝜙𝑉𝐴
. If 𝛼 < 1 −
2[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝜙𝑉𝐴
, the integrated platform will 





















𝑉𝐴), and its corresponding profits are 𝜋𝑀(𝑁 = 𝛼, 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴) = 𝛼(𝑉𝐴 −












𝑉𝐴 − 𝑐] . The 






𝑉𝐴  if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 ≡ ?̅?[1 −
√(𝜙𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃?̅?𝑉𝐴)2+8𝑉𝐴(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃[2−(1−?̅?)𝜙]−𝜙𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃?̅?𝑉𝐴
4(𝑉𝐴−𝑐)
] . Note that 𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 < 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇  and 1 −
2[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝜙𝑉𝐴






. So if min{𝛼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 , 1 −
2[𝑉𝐶−(1−𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃)𝑉𝐴]
𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝜙𝑉𝐴
} < 𝛼 < min{𝛼0, 𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇} , in the competing-platform case, the musician will 
choose 𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑁 = 𝛼, and the integrated platform will choose 𝑝 = 𝑉𝐴, and in the integrated-
platform case, the musician will choose 𝑓 = [1 −
?̅?𝑘(1+𝛼)
2(?̅?−𝛼)
]𝑉𝐴  and 𝑁 = ?̅? , and the integrated 
platform will choose 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐴. ∎ 
32 In our setting, in the buying-spree equilibrium, 𝑃𝑟1̂ , 𝑃𝑟2,?̂? , and 𝑟
∗̂ can be uniquely calculated, and they will be 
exactly equal to their realized values. Hence 𝐸[(1 − 𝑃𝑟1)𝑃𝑟2,𝑅(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟
∗)] = (1 − 𝑃𝑟1̂) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟2,?̂?(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑟
∗̂) in equilibrium. 





PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose that the referral fee is 𝑟 and all sellers’ retailing prices are 
𝑝∗(𝑟). In equilibrium, seller 𝑖 will not change its retail price 𝑝𝑖 away from 𝑝




𝐹0(?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟))
𝑛(1 − 𝐹(?̅?))
⋅ [1 − 𝐹(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖)] ⋅ [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]. 








⋅ {[1 − 𝐹(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖)](1 −
𝑟) − 𝑓(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖) ⋅ [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]} = 0, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑐
1−𝑟
+ ℎ(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑟) + 𝑝𝑖). In a 
symmetric equilibrium, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝
∗(𝑟), therefore, 𝑝∗(𝑟) =
𝑐
1−𝑟
+ ℎ(?̅?). We also need to check the 




2 |𝑝𝑖=𝑝∗(𝑟) < 0. This is equivalent to −2𝑓(?̅?) −
𝑓′(?̅?)ℎ(?̅?) < 0. This is true because ℎ′(?̅?) < 0 implies that −
𝑓(?̅?)+ℎ(?̅?)𝑓′(?̅?)
𝑓(?̅?)
< 0, which 




+ ℎ(?̅?) into expressions of ?̃?𝑖







(1 − 𝑟)ℎ(?̅?) and ?̃? = 𝐹0 (?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑐
1−𝑟
− ℎ(?̅?)).  ∎ 










= 𝑓0 (?̅? + 𝑞 −
𝑐
1−𝑟
− ℎ(?̅?)) (1 − ℎ′(?̅?)) ⋅
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝜏
< 0.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Since 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝜏
< 0, it is sufficient to show that , 
𝑑𝜋𝑃∗(?̅?)
𝑑?̅?
> 0.  
𝜋𝑃∗(?̅?) = 𝜋𝑃(𝑟∗(?̅?)) = 𝐹0 (?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)
− ℎ(?̅?)) ⋅ 𝑟∗(?̅?) ⋅ (
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)
+ ℎ(?̅?)). Because 




















ℎ(?̅?)) = 0. 
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|𝑟=𝑟∗(?̅?) = 𝐹0 (?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)




ℎ(?̅?)) (1 − ℎ′(?̅?)) ⋅ 𝑟∗(?̅?) ⋅ (
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)




ℎ(?̅?)) 𝑟∗(?̅?)ℎ′(?̅?) + 𝐹0 (?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)








 𝐹0 (?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 −
𝑐
1−𝑟∗(?̅?)








)] > 0.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. The platform’s profit is 𝜋𝑃 = 𝐷(𝑟, ?̅?) ⋅ (
𝑐𝑟
1−𝑟




















Because the second-order condition guarantees 
𝜕2𝜋𝑃|𝑟=𝑟∗(?̅̅̅?) 
𝜕𝑟2
< 0, therefore, 
𝜕𝑟∗(?̅?)
𝜕?̅?









































































































2.   ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.  Let 𝐺(𝑥) = ∫ (𝑚 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚
𝑚max
𝑥
. One can show that 𝐺′(𝑥) =
𝐹(𝑥) − 1 < 0 and 𝐺′′(𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥) > 0. When filtering is not available, the consumer’s 
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acceptance aggregate match level threshold, ?̅?, satisfies ∫ (𝑀 − ?̅?)𝑓𝑀(𝑀)𝑑𝑀
𝑀max
?̅?
= 𝜏, where 
𝑀max = 𝑚max + 𝜇𝐾. Note that 𝑓(𝑚) = 0 when 𝑚 > 𝑚max. The left-hand-side can be written 
as: 
𝜏 = ∫ (𝑀 − ?̅?)𝑓𝑀(𝑀)𝑑𝑀
𝑚max+𝜇𝐾
?̅?








𝑘=1 = ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 . 
Because 𝐺′′(𝑥) > 0 and ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝜇𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 0,  𝐺(?̅?) = 𝐺(∑ 𝜙𝑘(?̅? − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1  ) <
∑ 𝜙𝑘𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 𝜏. 
When filtering is available, the consumers will search products with 𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝐾 and will buy 
a product only if 𝑚𝑖𝑗 > ?̅?. ?̅? is determined by 𝐺(?̅?) = ∫ (𝑚 − ?̅?)𝑓(𝑚)𝑑𝑚
𝑚max
?̅?
= 𝜏 > 𝐺(?̅?). 
Because 𝐺(𝑥) is a strictly decreasing function, ?̅? > ?̅?. Thus ?̅?𝑁 − ?̅? = 𝜇𝐾 + ?̅? − ?̅? < 𝜇𝐾.  
Moreover,𝐺(?̅?) = 𝜏 = ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 < ∑ 𝜙𝑘𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇𝐾)
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇𝐾), so ?̅? − 𝜇𝐾 <
?̅?, i.e., ?̅?𝑁 − ?̅? > 0. ∎ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.  Consider the marginal impact of filtering on the sellers’ 
equilibrium price. Let max
𝑘
|𝜇𝑘| → 0. Let 𝜎𝜇
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇). 
First we determine the relationship between ?̅? and ?̅?. Observe that: 
𝜏 = 𝐺(?̅?) = 𝐸𝜇𝐺(?̅? − 𝜇) = 𝐸𝜇𝐺(?̅? + (?̅? − ?̅? − 𝜇))  
= 𝐸𝜇 [𝐺(?̅?) + 𝐺
′(?̅?)(?̅? − ?̅? − 𝜇) +
𝐺′′(?̅?)
2
(?̅? − ?̅? − 𝜇)2 + 𝑜((?̅? − ?̅? − 𝜇)2)]  
= 𝐺(?̅?) + 𝐺′(?̅?)(?̅? − ?̅?) +
𝐺′′(?̅?)
2
[(?̅? − ?̅?)2 + 𝜎𝜇
2] + 𝑜((?̅? − ?̅?)2) + 𝑜(𝜎𝜇
2)  




2 + 𝑜(?̅? − ?̅?) + 𝑜(𝜎𝜇
2) . 



















































































































The above expression is greater than 1 if and only if𝑓′′(?̅?) ⋅ ℎ2(?̅?) + 2𝑓′(?̅?) ⋅ ℎ(?̅?) +
𝑓(?̅?) > 0.       ∎ 
 
PROOF OF RESULT 3. According to Lemma 4, the consumers will search the non-premium 
products if and only if 𝑢0 < −𝑝
∗(𝑟) + ?̅? and 𝑚1𝑗 < 𝑝1 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟) − Δ𝑞 + ?̅?. Following 
Wolinsky (1986), the profit of a non-premium seller’s profit is 𝜋𝑖
𝑆(𝑝𝑖) = 𝐹0(𝑚 − 𝑝∗(𝑟)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ⋅
𝐹(𝑝1 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟) − Δ𝑞 + ?̅?) ⋅
[1−𝐹(?̅?−𝑝∗(𝑟)+𝑝𝑖)]⋅[(1−𝑟)𝑝𝑖−𝑐]
𝑛−1
 . Note that the first two terms is positive 
and independent of 𝑝𝑖, so the optimal 𝑝𝑖 should satisfy 
𝜕[1−𝐹(?̅?−𝑝∗(𝑟)+𝑝𝑖)]⋅[(1−𝑟)𝑝𝑖−𝑐]
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0. The 
FOC implies that 𝑝∗(𝑟) =
𝑐
1−𝑟
+ ℎ(?̅?). ∎ 





[1 − 𝐹(?̅?(𝜏) − 𝑝∗ + 𝑝𝑖)][(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐]].  







= 0 when 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝






















which is a strict decreasing function of 𝜏, because 𝐹0(?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑝
∗(𝑟)) increases with ?̅?, ℎ(?̅?) 




∗ strictly increases with 𝜏, so 𝑝∗ = 𝐄𝜏[𝑎(𝜏)𝑝𝜏
∗] = 𝐄𝜏[𝑎(𝜏)]𝐄𝜏[?̃?𝜏
∗] + 𝐂𝐨𝐯𝜏(𝑎(𝜏), 𝑝𝜏
∗) <
𝐄𝜏[𝑝𝜏
∗].    ∎ 
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HETEROGENEOUS SEARCH COST: SPECIAL CASE.  Consider the case with 


















































, which decreases with 
𝜏max. ∎ 






𝐹(?̅? − 𝑝∗(𝑑) + 𝑝𝑖)] ⋅ [𝑝𝑖 − 𝑑 − 𝑐]. 




ℎ(?̅?). Total market demand is ?̃? = 𝐹0(?̅? + 𝜇𝐾 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 − ℎ(?̅?)). The 






PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose that the firm is high-type. Let ?̅?𝑖,2  be a consumer’s the 
expectation of type-𝑖 firm’s second-period price after seeing the first-period price. The marginal 




, and the marginal 




. In the second 







)(?̃?𝐻,2 − 𝑐), which 




. Because consumers have rational 
expectations, i.e., 𝑝𝐻,2




. In the first period, the firm 






































. Finally, since we focus on the situation where in equilibrium some consumers buy 
the product in the second period, so, ?̃?𝐻,1
∗ > ?̃? 𝐻,2
∗  and 𝑝𝐻,2




The derivation of the low-type’s optimal price and profit is similar. The low-type firm’s 

















PROOF OF LEMMA 2. We follow three steps to find the LMSE. First, we analyze all separating 
equilibria and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ , the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest 
payoff. Next we examine all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ , the pooling equilibrium which gives 
the high-type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  and 
𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  to determine the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest payoff. 
Step 1:  finding 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗   
Consider separating equilibria. Denote a separating equilibrium 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝 =
({𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡}𝑡=1,2, {𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡}𝑡=1,2, 𝐺
(𝑣), 𝜙) , where 𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡  is the i-type firm’s price in period 𝑡 , 
𝐺: [0,1] → {𝑏𝑢𝑦, 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑦} describes whether consumer 𝑣 purchase the product in the first period, 
and 𝜙 = 𝜙(𝑖|𝑝) is consumers’ belief of the probability that the firm is i-type conditional seeing 
the first-period price 𝑝. We assume that 𝜙 is consistent wherever Bayes rule can be applied. One 
141 
 
can see that for all PBE that are sequential, 𝐺(𝑣) maximizes consumer 𝑣’s expected utility, so the 
value of 𝐺(𝑣)  can be pinned down given  {𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡}𝑡=1,2, {𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝑡}𝑡=1,2  and 𝜙  except for the 
marginal consumer who has zero mass on interval [0,1]. Moreover, because in the second period, 
both the high-type firm and the low-type firm will charge their perfect-information price 
conditional on 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1 and 𝜙, the values of 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2 and 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2 are functions of 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, 
𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1  and 𝜙 . Therefore, it is convenient to denote a separating equilibrium 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝 =
(𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, 𝜙) without loss of generality. 
Note that in a separating equilibrium the high-type firm has no incentive to mimic the low-type 
firm and consumers can correctly infer the firm’s type. Thus, the low-type firm will set its prices 































− 𝑐). In a separating equilibrium, we need to guarantee the low-type firm 
has no incentive to mimic the high-type firm. If the low-type firm mimics the high-type firm, its 






































. Therefore, to guarantee the low-type firm has no incentive to mimic the 
high-type firm, we need to have 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ≥ 𝜋𝐿(𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, 𝑝𝐿,2|𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1) = 1) . This is equivalent 






, 1 − 𝜇 +




. Thus, in the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type 



























Step 2: finding 𝝈𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
∗   
Consider pooling equilibria. Let 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) be a pooling equilibrium, where 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 
is the price charged by both the high-type firm and the low-type firm in the first period, and 𝜙 =
𝜙(𝑖|𝑝) is consumers’ belief of the probability that the firm is i-type conditional on the first-period 
price 𝑝. In equilibrium, consumers believe that the firm is high-type with probability 𝛼, and that 
the firm is low-type with probability 1 − 𝛼. If a consumer 𝑣 purchases the product in the first 
period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1. If she purchases the product in the second period, her 
utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝛼 ⋅ max{𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2, 0} + (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ max {𝜇𝑣 − 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2, 0}. 
For more interesting analysis, we assume that in the second period there are some consumers 
who purchase the product even if the firm turns out to be high-type in the second period, which 
requires that the marginal consumer in the first period 𝑣1
∗ satisfies 𝜇 > 𝜇𝑣1
∗ > 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2. Therefore, 
𝑣1
∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝛼(𝜇𝑣1
∗ − ?̅?𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜇𝑣1
∗ − ?̅?𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2), where ?̅?𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 is the belief of the 





















. Because the consumer has rational belief,  
?̅?𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
∗  and ?̅?𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
















. Therefore the high-type firm’s profit in a pooling 
equilibrium is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 − 𝑣1











, and the low-type firm’s 















Let 𝛭(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = {𝜙|𝜙(𝐻|𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 𝛼} be the set of beliefs which are consistent with the 
pooling equilibrium (i.e., 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 𝛼). We proceed to show that (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) is a PBE 
for some 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙) if and only if neither the high-type nor low-type firm has an incentive to 
deviate to another price 𝑝′ when consumers have a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙) with 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝
′) =
0, ∀𝑝′ ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 (i.e., consumers believe that the firm is low-type with probability 1 when 𝑝
′ ≠
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1). This is because on the one hand, if this condition is satisfied, then (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) is a PBE. 
On the other hand, if this condition is violated, then for any other 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1), (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) 
cannot be a PBE since deviating to 𝑝′ will give the firm even higher profit. Consequently, this 
condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙)  to be a PBE for some 𝜙 ∈
𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1). Hence hereafter we only consider the belief 𝜙 such that 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 𝛼 and 
𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 0. 
The highest possible profit a low-type firm can get by deviating is its perfect-information profit 
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
∗ = 𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝 =
(2−𝜇)2
4(4−3𝜇)
. For the high-type firm, suppose it deviates by charging 











because  𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1) = 0 . When 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 <
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇

































) (𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,2 − 𝑐),
 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇




Next we will find the 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1  which maximizes 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 . (1) When 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣  increases with 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1  if 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
1+𝑐
2













 is always true. 
Therefore, when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇
 ,𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 is maximized when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 =
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇




. (2) When  𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣  increases with 
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𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1  when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≤
(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)













 is always true. Therefore, when 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 >
(2−𝜇)𝑐
2𝜇
, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣  is maximized when  𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 =
(2+𝑐−𝜇)(2−𝜇)
2(4−3𝜇)
 with 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 =
2(2−𝜇)𝑐2+𝜇(2−𝜇)2−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇)
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)



















In a pooling equilibrium with the first-period price 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, neither the high-type nor the low-
type firm has an incentive to deviate, which requires  𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
∗  and 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
∗ . Condition 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣



































































] . Therefore, there 
exists a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) such that  (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) is a PBE if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1⋂𝒫2.  
The LMSE gives the high-type firm the highest profit among all PBE. One can show that 
without the restriction of 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1⋂𝒫2 , 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙  is maximized when 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 =
(2−𝜇)2+𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)
. It is obvious that 
(2−𝜇)2+𝑐(2−𝜇+2𝛼(1−𝜇))
2(4−3𝜇)






∈ 𝒫2 , so the pooling PBE outcome which gives the 























Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is an increasing function of 𝑝1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 on 𝒫1⋂𝒫2. As a result, the pooling PBE 












Step 3: comparing 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗  and 𝝈𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
∗   
 We compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  and 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝐻



















. Next we show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  is an increasing 
function of 𝛼 . When 𝛼 <
√4(1−𝜇)2+𝑐2−2(1−𝜇)
𝑐
, it is obvious that 
𝜇(2−𝜇)2+𝑐2(4−(3+2𝛼)𝜇)−2𝑐𝜇(6−5𝜇−√𝛼𝑐(4(1−𝜇)+𝛼𝑐))
4𝜇(4−3𝜇)













< 1 , 2(1 −







> 0. Moreover, one can show that 
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  is a continuous function of 𝛼. Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗   is a strictly increasing function of 𝛼 





































































 is independent of 𝛼  and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗   is a 
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strictly increasing function of 𝛼 when 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), implies that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
























≡ 𝛼∗.  









. When 𝛼 ≥


























PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We compare the firm’s optimal price and profit when its cost is not 










































































































∗ < 0 because ?̃?𝐿
∗ = 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣
∗ ≤ 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  
Cost transparency strictly increases the firm’s expected first-period and second-period prices: 
(𝛼𝑝𝐻,1
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,1
∗ ) − (𝛼𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
∗ ) = 𝛼(𝑝𝐻,1
∗ − 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
∗ ) + (1 −
𝛼)(?̃?𝐿,1
∗ − 𝑝𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1
∗ ) < 0. 
(𝛼𝑝𝐻,1
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐿,1
∗ ) − (𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ ) = 𝛼(𝑝𝐻,1
∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝𝐿,1
∗ −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ ) = 𝛼
2𝑐(1−𝜇)(1−𝛼)
2(4−3𝜇)






< 0. ∎ 
Cost transparency strictly increases the expected consumer surplus: 
We define 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 as consumer surplus in period 𝑡 if the firm’s cost is 𝑐𝑖, and 𝐶𝑆𝑖 = 𝐶𝑆𝑖,1 +
𝐶𝑆𝑖,2 is the total consumer surplus. 𝐶?̃?𝑖
∗ = 𝐶?̃?𝑖,1
∗ + 𝐶?̃?𝑖,2



































∗ , where 
𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. The expected consumer surplus is 𝐸[𝐶?̃?] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶?̃?𝐻
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝐶?̃?𝐿
∗ when the cost is 
known to consumers, is 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑝] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  when the cost is not known to 
consumers and 𝜎∗  is separating, and is  𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙] = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  when the 
cost is not known to consumers and 𝜎∗ is pooling. 
First, we will show that when 𝜎∗ is separating, cost transparency strictly increases consumer 
surplus. 𝐶?̃?𝐻
∗ > 𝐶𝑆𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝






∗  and ?̃?𝐻,2
∗ <
𝑣𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,2
∗ . Intuitively, when consumers know the firm’s cost, consumer surplus is higher because 
prices in both periods are lower and the amount of first-period consumers and the amount of total 
consumers both increase. Moreover 𝐶?̃?𝐿
∗ = 𝐶𝑆𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝





Therefore, 𝐸[𝐶?̃?] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑝] > 0. 
Next we show that when 𝜎∗  is pooling, cost transparency strictly increases expected 
consumer surplus. Let ?̂?1 = 𝛼𝑝𝐻,1
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝐿,1
∗ . One can see that ?̂?1 < 𝑝1 from section (2) of 
the proof of proposition 1. Now suppose both the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm have to 
charge a price  ?̂?1 in the first period. Given this first period price ?̂?1, type-i firm charges ?̂?2,𝑖
∗  to 
maximize its second period profit ?̃?2,𝑖.Since both types of firms charge the same first period price, 












. The marginal consumer in the first period is 𝑣1 =
2𝑝1−𝛼𝑐
2−𝜇










Therefore, when both types of firms have to charge ?̂?1 in the first period, consumer surplus is 
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𝐶?̂? 𝑖 = ∫ (𝑠 − ?̂?1)𝑑𝑠
1
?̂?1




 if the firm has cost 𝑐𝑖 . Since ?̂?1 < 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ , ?̂?2,𝐻 <
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
∗ , ?̂?2,𝐿 < 𝑝𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
∗ , 𝑣1 < 𝑣𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1
∗ , 𝑣𝐻,2 < 𝑣𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
∗ , and 𝑣𝐿,2 < 𝑣𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2
∗ , 𝐶?̂?𝑖 > 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ , 
∀𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}, therefore 𝐸[𝐶?̂?] > 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ]. 
The value of 𝐸[𝐶?̂?] bridges the comparison of 𝐸[𝐶?̃?] and 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ]. One can show that 
𝐸[𝐶?̂?] = 𝐸[𝐶?̃?] =
48−𝛼𝑐(4−3𝜇)[20−(30−11𝜇)𝜇]−𝜇[88−𝜇(32+𝜇(20−11𝜇))]
2(4−3𝜇)3
. Therefore, 𝐸[𝐶?̃?]  >
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ]. Thus, when 𝜎∗ is pooling, cost transparency increases the expected consumer surplus.       
∎ 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.  
(𝛼?̃?𝐻
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝐿
∗) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) = 𝛼(?̃?𝐻
∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)(?̃?𝐿
∗ −
𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) > 0. 
(𝛼?̃?𝐻
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝐿
∗) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ) = 𝛼(?̃?𝐻
∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)(?̃?𝐿
∗ −
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ) = 𝛼
(1−𝛼)𝑐(4−4𝜇−(1−𝛼)𝑐)
4(4−3𝜇)








PROOF OF RESULT 1.  In the first period, a consumer’s utility of purchasing the product in period 1 
is 𝑢1,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝1 and utility of purchasing in period 2 is 𝑢1,2 = 𝛿(𝑣 − ?̅?2). In the second period, 
the utility of purchasing in period 2 is 𝑢2,2 = 𝑣 − 𝑝2. 





second period marginal consumer is 𝑣2,𝐻 = 𝑝2,𝐻. Solve the game by backward induction. The 
second-period profit is 𝜋2,𝐻 = 𝛿(
?̃?1,𝐻−𝛿?̅̃?2,𝐻
1−𝛿







). Consumers have rational expectation: 𝑝2,𝐻 = ?̅?2,𝐻 =
(1−𝛿)𝑐+?̃?1,𝐻
2−𝛿
. The total profit in both 



















(𝑝1,𝐻 − 𝑐)[(2 − 𝛿)
2 + 𝛿(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 − (4 − 3𝛿)?̃?1,𝐻] . The 


























PROOF OF RESULT 2. Similar to the proof of lemma 2, we follow three steps to find the LMSE. 
First, we focus on all separating equilibria and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ , the separating equilibrium which gives 
the high-type firm the highest payoff. Next we focus on all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ , the 
pooling equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the 
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high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  to find the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest 
payoff. 
Step 1: finding 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗   






























2 + 2𝛿(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 −

















. When 𝑐 < 𝛿 , in a separating 









Step 2: finding 𝝈𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
∗   
Next consider pooling equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, the high-cost firm and the low-


























  The total 
profit of the high-cost firm is 𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐻 = (1 −
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1−𝛼𝛿𝑐
2−𝛿









− 𝑐) , the total profit of the low-cost firm is 
𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿 = (1 −
2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1−𝛼𝛿𝑐
2−𝛿






Now consider deviation from the pooling equilibrium. It is sufficient to check the belief such 
that Pr(𝑐 = 𝑐𝐿) = 1  whenever 𝑝 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 . If deviate, the high-cost firm’s profit is 
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (1 −
2𝑝𝐻,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
2−𝛿































. The low-cost firm doesn’t 
deviate if 𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝜋𝐿,𝑑𝑒𝑣







] . When 𝛼 >
2(1−𝛿)+√2(1−𝛿)2+𝑐2(2−𝛿)2
𝑐𝛿





















Step 3: comparing 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗  and 𝝈𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒍
∗ . 
Finally we compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ . One can show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ > 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝




 and 𝑐 < 𝛿, i.e., the equilibrium is 








. If 𝑐 < 𝛿  and 𝛼 <
2(1−𝛿)−𝑐(2−𝛿)+√2(1−𝑐)(2−(2−𝛿)(2−𝑐)𝛿)+2𝑐(2−𝛿)√𝑐𝛿(4−(4−𝑐)𝛿)
𝑐𝛿
, the equilibrium is (costly) separating. 








. When 𝑐 >
𝛿, the equilibrium is costless separating. ∎ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. 
(𝛼?̃?𝐻
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝐿
∗) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) = 𝛼(?̃?𝐻
∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)(?̃?𝐿
∗ −
𝜋𝐿,𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ ) ≥ 0. The equality holds if and only if 𝑐 > 𝛿. 
(𝛼?̃?𝐻
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝐿
∗) − (𝛼𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ) = 𝛼(?̃?𝐻
∗ − 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)(?̃?𝐿
∗ −
𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙





PROOF OF LEMMA 4 AND RESULT 3.  We start by solving the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the 
game with cost transparency. Suppose the firm has high cost. Because the second-period price will 




, and the marginal 




. Because the market becomes 
perfectly competitive in the second period, the firm earns all its profit from the first period. Hence 
?̂?𝐻 = (1 −
𝑝𝐻,1−𝑐
1−𝜇









. Finally we have to guarantee that 𝑣𝐻,1
∗ > 𝑣𝐻,2
∗ , which yields 𝑐 <
𝜇
2










Next we solve the game when cost transparency is absent. To find the LMSE, we follow the 
same 3 steps as in the proof of lemma 2 and lemma 5. First, we analyze all separating equilibria 
and find 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ , the separating equilibrium which gives the high-type firm the highest payoff. Next 
we analyze all pooling equilibria and find 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ , the pooling equilibrium which gives the high-
type firm the highest payoff. Finally we compare the high-type firm’s profit in 𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗  and 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  to 
find the PBE giving the high-type firm the highest payoff. 
Step 1: finding 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒑
∗   
Consider separating equilibria. Note that in a separating equilibrium the high-cost firm has no 
incentive to mimic the low-cost firm and that consumers can correctly infer the firm’s cost type. 









The high-cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝 = (1 −
𝑝1−𝑐
1−𝜇
) (𝑝1 − 𝑐). In a separating equilibrium, the 
low-cost firm has no incentive to mimic the high-cost firm by charging the high-cost firm’s price 
in the first period. If the low-cost firm mimics the high-cost firm by charging 𝑝1 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1, its 












, 1 − 𝜇). Moreover, any 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1  in this region can 
form a PBE (𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝,1,
1−𝜇
2
, 𝜙), where 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝) = 1 if 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝  and 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝) = 0 if otherwise. 


















Step 2: Consider pooling equilibria. In such equilibria, consumers believe that the firm is high-
type with probability 𝛼, and that the firm is low-type with probability 1 − 𝛼. If a consumer 𝑣 
purchases the product in the first period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1. If she purchases the 
product in the second period, her utility is 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,2 = 𝛼 ⋅ max{𝜇𝑣 − 𝑐, 0} + (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ 𝜇𝑣.  
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that in the second period there are some consumers 
who purchase the product even if the firm turns out to be high-type in the second period, which 
requires that the marginal consumer in the first period 𝑣1
∗ satisfies 𝜇 > 𝜇𝑣1
∗ > 𝑐. Therefore, 𝑣1
∗ −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 = 𝛼(𝜇𝑣1
∗ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑣1




. Therefore, the high-
cost firm’s profit is 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1−𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇
)(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 − 𝑐) , and the low-cost firm’s profit is 




Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 and 2, it is without loss of generality for us to only consider 
the belief 𝜙 such that 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 𝛼 and 𝜙(𝐻|𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) = 0. The highest possible 
profit a low-cost firm can get by deviating is its perfect-information profit 𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣




For the high-cost firm, if it deviates by charging 𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 , its profit will be 
𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣 = (1 −
𝑝𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑑𝑒𝑣,1
1−𝜇





In a pooling equilibrium, neither the high-cost firm nor the low-cost firm has incentive to 
deviate. This requires 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1−𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇





𝜋𝐿,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = (1 −
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1−𝛼𝑐
1−𝜇


















]. The second condition is 













]. Therefore, there exists a belief 𝜙 ∈ 𝑀(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1) 
such that  (𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1, 𝜙) is a PBE if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1⋂𝒫2. 
The LMSE gives the high-type firm the highest profit among all PBE. One can show that 
without the restriction of 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 ∈ 𝒫1⋂𝒫2, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is maximized when 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙,1 =
1−𝜇+(𝛼+1)𝑐
2










∈ 𝒫2, so the pooling PBE 



















. Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙  is an increasing function of 𝑝1,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙  on 𝒫1⋂𝒫2. As a 








Step 3: We compare 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  and 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑝,𝐻



















we show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙





∗  yields 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ = 𝐶 +
𝑐
2(1−𝜇)
[√(𝛼𝑐 + (1 − 𝜇))
2
− (1 − 𝜇)2 − 𝛼𝑐] , where 𝐶  is 
independent of 𝛼 . It is easy to see that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  strictly increases with 𝛼  when 𝛼 <
√(1−𝜇)2+𝑐2−(1−𝜇)
𝑐







 also increases with 𝛼 . 
Moreover, one can show that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗  is a continuous function of 𝛼. Therefore, 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗   is a strictly 















































 is independent of 𝛼 and 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗   is a strictly increasing function of 
𝛼  when 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , implies that 𝜋𝐻,𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙
∗ ≥ 𝜋𝐻,𝑠𝑒𝑝
















In conclusion, when consumers do not know the firm’s cost, when 𝛼 < 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝









. When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
∗ , the 








. When consumers 
know the firm’s cost, ?̂?𝐻
∗ = ?̂?𝐿
∗ =
1−𝜇
4
. ∎ 
